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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION  
IN THE SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS DISPUTE IN THE LIGHT OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS-LED SETTLEMENT EFFORTS 
 
Onat, Ayşe Elçin 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Yüksel Đnan 
March 2008 
 
This thesis aims to explore the role of the EU in the settlement of the Cyprus 
dispute in the light of the UN-led settlement efforts whether it is a failure and targets to 
fınd out the basic reasons, if it is a failure. The EU membership of the Greek Cypriot-
controlled “Republic of Cyprus”, on behalf of the whole island, has changed the 
dynamics of the dispute by deepening the island’s economic and political division in 
favour of the Greek side. Moreover, the settlement proposals of the UN, EU and Turkish 
side differ in the sense that while the two organizations support a bi-zonal and bi-
communal federal state, the Turkish side insists on the recognition of the TRNC in 
exchange for its unification with the Greek Cypriots. Although the parties’ EU 
integration prospects can contribute to a compromise, illegality of the EU membership 
of the GCA according to the 1960 system, misperceptions of the EU related to the 
parties’ expectations, partiality and incredibility of the EU policies and ineffectiveness 
of its policy methods have led the Union’s failure. Relying on official UN and EU 
documents, on historical and legal facts and on literature works, this thesis reaches to the 
conclusion that the EU’s success in contributing to a permanent solution in the Cyprus 
dispute has been very limited contrary to the expectations from it.  
 
Keywords: Cyprus dispute, EU, UN, Settlement Efforts, Membership Prospects 
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ÖZET 
 
BĐRLEŞMĐŞ MĐLLETLER ÇÖZÜM GĐRĐŞĐMLERĐ IŞIĞINDA  
KIBRIS SORUNUNUN ÇÖZÜMÜNDE AVRUPA BĐRLĐĞĐ’NĐN ROLÜ 
Onat, Ayşe Elçin 
Master, Uluslararası Đlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Yüksel Đnan 
March 2008 
 
  Bu tez, BM önderliğindeki çözüm girişimleri ışığında, Kıbrıs sorununun 
çözümünde AB’nin rolünü, bir başarısızlık örneği olup olmaması çerçevesinde 
incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır ve eğer başarısızlıksa bunun altında yatan temel nedenleri 
bulmayı hedeflemektedir. Kıbrıslı Rumların kontrolündeki “Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti”nin tüm 
ada adına AB üyeliği, adanın siyasi ve ekonomik bölünmüşlüğünü Kıbrıslı Rumların 
lehine perçinleyerek, Kıbrıs sorununun dinamiklerini değiştirmiştir. Bu noktada, BM, 
AB ve Türk tarafının çözüm önerileri şu bağlamda farklılaşmaktadır: BM ve AB, iki 
bölgeli ve iki toplumlu federal bir devletin kurulmasını desteklerken, Türk tarafı Kıbrıslı 
Rumlarla birleşmeleri karşılığında KKTC’nin tanınması üzerinde ısrar etmektedir. 
Tarafların AB ile bütünleşme beklentileri, bir uzlaşmaya katkıda bulunabilirse de, Kıbrıs 
Rum Yönetimi’nin AB üyeliğinin 1960 sistemine göre yasal olmaması, AB`nin 
tarafların beklentilerine ilişkin yanlış algılamaları, AB politikalarının yansız ve güvenilir 
olmaması ve politika yöntemlerinin etkisizliği Birliğin başarısızlığına yol açmıştır. Bu 
tez, BM ve AB resmi belgelerine, tarihi ve hukuki gerçeklere ve literatürdeki kaynaklara 
dayanarak, AB’nin Kıbrıs sorununa kalıcı bir çözüme katkıda bulunma konusundaki 
başarısının, Birlikten beklentilerin aksine, çok sınırlı olduğu sonucuna ulaşır.  
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Kıbrıs Sorunu, AB, BM, Çözüm Girişimleri, Üyelik Beklentileri 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The Cyprus dispute has remained on the agenda of both parties of the dispute and 
of the international fora for nearly 40 years. Because it deserves great attention and 
significance due to its potential to threaten the stability in the Southeast Mediterranean 
and to affect negatively the relations between not only the Turkish and Greek Cypriot 
communities, but also Turkey, Greece, the United Nations (UN) and European Union 
(EU). The issue has also occupied a significant place in the evolution of the EU 
membership process of Turkey for 40 years. Therefore, it is a complex dispute with 
several parties involved and which is shaped by strict nationalistic emotions of the two 
communities. 
 The island has been divided between the two communities, the Northern part by 
the Turkish Cypriots and Southern part by the Greek Cypriots, following the 
intervention of Turkey to Cyprus in July 1974. Since the December 1963 hostilities 
between the two Cypriot communities and especially since Turkey’s intervention, 
various peaceful settlement efforts and mediation attempts of a number of actors such as 
the UN, EU, United States, Council of Europe and some non-governmental 
organisations have failed to meet the two communities around a common solution. So, 
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the Cyprus dispute with an urgent need for a permanent solution still preserves its 
importance.  
 The direct involvement of the EU in the Cyprus dispute came into agenda 
following the EU membership application of the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) - 
diplomatically called as the “Republic of Cyprus (RoC)” by the international 
community, however, not recognized by Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC) - in the name of the whole island on July 3, 1990. The role of the EU in 
the dispute became more evident at the June 1994 Corfu Summit in which the European 
Council declared that Cyprus would be involved in the next phase of enlargement. At the 
December 1997 Luxembourg Summit, while a date was given to the GCA to begin 
accession negotiations, Turkey was not given a candidate country status. The accession 
negotiations with Cyprus started in March 1998.    
 At the December 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey was given a candidate country 
status in exchange for its commitment for a settlement in Cyprus, otherwise, the Union 
would decide for the accession of the GCA without waiting a solution. Indeed, in May 
2004, the Greek Cypriot-controlled “Republic of Cyprus” became a full member of the 
EU in the name of the whole island. This has been a major turning point for the Cyprus 
dispute in terms of the division of the island through a de facto EU border running along 
the Green Line. Also, the parties` EU integration interests have indicated the increasing 
significance and role of the EU in the Cyprus dispute. Therefore, the parameters of the 
dispute have changed following the involvement of the EU.  
 However, according to the 1960 Treaties, the legality and appropriateness of the 
EU membership of the GCA is skeptical whether it is legal for the Union to accept the 
GCA as an EU member in the name of the whole island. In addition, the EU has tended 
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to put more emphasis on the Turkish side in the failure of the settlement attempts and in 
reaching a compromise with the Greek side. So, the impartiality and credibility of the 
EU policies in Cyprus seem to be questionable. 
Moreover, there are crucial differences between the approaches of the UN and 
EU and the Turkish side on how to unite the two communities, under a federal roof or 
under the separate sovereignties of the two communities. On the other hand, the then UN 
Secretary-General’s “The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem” (Annan 
Plan) has a significance due to the fact that it tries to recognize the current de facto 
situation in Cyprus. In that context, the Plan seems to approach to the Turkish demands. 
So, this can lead the Turkish side to the belief that the UN should take an active role in 
the settlement of the dispute more than the EU should. 
As the achievement of a permanent and just solution gets more difficult, 
especially due to the EU membership of the GCA, the EU`s potential in contributing to a 
solution has been questioned in academic, political and public arena. Although the 
parties’ EU integration prospects can play a positive role towards a lasting settlement in 
the island, it is still uncertain that the EU can transform these expectations to policies 
that will bring a permanent solution. At that point, the EU policies and perceptions will 
determine its limitations in contributing to a permanent settlement to the island. 
 So, this study aims to assess the role of the EU in the settlement of the Cyprus 
dispute. The research question of this thesis is as follows: What is the role of the EU in 
the settlement of the Cyprus dispute in the light of the UN-led settlement efforts, 
whether it is a failure and if it is a failure, why is it so? This thesis is based on the belief 
that given the maintenance of the insolvability in Cyprus and the EU`s wrong 
assumptions and miscalculations about the parties’ interests and the Cyprus dispute, the 
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role of the Union has been a failure although it is expected to act as a catalyst for 
comprimise between the parties. In this regard, the basic reasons of this failure will be 
found out in this study.   
As methodology, the thesis will rely mainly on the textual analysis. To evaluate 
the role of the EU in the Cyprus dispute, the UN and EU official documents and papers 
will be analyzed. In addition, the historical and legal facts will be provided when 
exploring the evolution of the Cyprus dispute and the stages of the EU involvement in 
the dispute. The study will also utilize comparative analysis between the UN, EU and 
the Turkish and Greek approaches towards the dispute. Moreover, some references to 
the literature will allow for exploring different interpretations about the Union policies. 
Some major statements of the leaders of the parties and the UN and EU officials will 
provide crucial evidences.   
Because the settlement efforts of the other global actors have been limited to 
their declarations of their support for the UN decisions and these actors have preferred 
not to directly involve in the dispute, they will not be examined in this study. In addition, 
this study treats the EU as a monolithic actor in its Cyprus policies, although the 
attitudes towards Cyprus differ among member states in some points. However, these 
differences are not considerable in amount and not so strict to be taken into account. 
Also, the EU is perceived as an integral and global actor and formulates its policies as a 
single entity. So, the national differences will not be addressed in this study. 
This study does not aim to analyze the details of the Cyprus dispute itself, 
however in order to provide a general context, Chapter I provides the origin of the 
dispute and the key events in its evolution before the EU involvement within the legal 
and historical framework of the UN Resolutions. The historical background will be 
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explored in six periods: the developments prior to 1960, the independence of the 
Republic of Cyprus and the constitutional breakdown, the involvement of the UN SC in 
the crisis, 1974 Turkish intervention, peace negotiations between 1974-1983 and 
declaration of the TRNC and resumption of inter-communal talks.  
The UN has a crucial role in the evolution of the dispute, because it is the sole 
actor which has brought a number of settlement proposals and Resolutions and which 
continues its presence in the island with a peacekeeping force –UNFICYP- since the 
beginning of the dispute. In addition, the EU has continuously declared its support for 
the UN settlement initiatives. The factors that cause the EU`s incapability in the dispute, 
thus, can be understood by exploring the UN Resolutions related to the dispute and by 
analyzing the EU policies and decisions and its interactions with the parties in 
compliance with the UN peaceful settlement efforts.  
So, Chapter II investigates the historical background of the EU involvement in 
the Cyprus dispute in the light of the UN peaceful settlement efforts in order to examine 
how the Cyprus dispute has evolved as a result of the EU involvement. In this regard, 
because the direct involvement of the EU came into agenda following the EU 
membership application of the GCA and the dispute has mostly evolved in the context of 
Cyprus`s EU membership process, the first section of the chapter lays out the accession 
process of the GCA to the EU.  This section will be analyzed in terms of four phases 
which are determined according to the positioning of the EU in the dispute especially at 
its major summits. The first phase is the period between July 1990 and June 1994, the 
timeline between the application of the Greek Cypriots to the Union and the EU Summit 
at Corfu. The second phase is the period between the end of 1994 and the December 
1999 EU Summit at Helsinki. The third phase covers the period from the December 
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1999 Helsinki Summit to May 2004 when Cyprus is admitted as a full member of the 
EU. From May 2004 to present is considered as the fourth and last phase.  
The second section of Chapter II makes a brief analysis of the EU policies 
towards Turkey related to the Cyprus dispute. In this regard, the European Commission, 
European Council and European Parliament (EP) decisions and the EU Progress Reports 
on Cyprus will be explored. So, in Chapter II, only the key policies and decisions of the 
EU, rather than a comprehensive evaluation of the EU policies, will be given in a 
historical context, since the latter is the topic of Chapter III. That is, the aim of this 
chapter is not to comment on or interpret policies, but only to put forward them as a 
basic framework. 
The main analysis of this study will take place in Chapter III. Based on the EU 
policies and decisions provided in Chapter II, in this chapter, the EU involvement in the 
dispute will be evaluated in a detailed and comprehensive context. In this regard, the 
first section of Chapter III will interpret the challenges to the EU membership of the 
GCA. The second section will make an analysis of the approaches of the UN, EU and 
the Turkish side towards the Cyprus dispute in order to find out to what extent their 
preferences intersect with each other. When analyzing the UN approach, the Annan Plan 
will be explored in detail due to its difference from the general UN attitude to some 
extent as the most comprehensive settlement proposal. As for the EU, its stand in the 
origin of the Cyprus dispute, impartiality and credibility in the eyes of the parties, basic 
misperceptions and policy methods` efficiency will be examined. 
Turkey is a significant party of the dispute due to its guarantor country status 
since 1960, military presence in the island, economic interactions with the TRNC, non-
recognition policies towards the “Republic of Cyprus” and EU membership process in 
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exchange for its support for a settlement. So, Turkey`s preferences in Cyprus will also 
be incorporated. After examining Turkey`s general policy in the Cyprus dispute, the 
Turkish outlook against the UN and EU settlement efforts will be interpreted in a 
comparative perspective. The recent UN approach seems to respond the Turkish 
demands more than the EU approach does. However, taking into account the direct and 
inevitable involvement of the EU to the dispute, the question of how Turkey can shift 
the Cyprus dispute back to the UN platform or whether it has the ability and chance to 
do this will be answered.  
 The third section of Chapter III analyzes the impetus role of the EU whether it is 
a prospect for settlement or a catalyst for crisis in the island. The EU has had a strong 
belief in its capability for acting as a catalyst for peace in Cyprus. In order to find out 
what makes the EU such a catalyst, the Turkish and Greek side`s perceptions of the EU 
will be explored in this section. It will be found out that the Union can have a catalytic 
effect for a settlement due to the intersection of these two parties` interests at the EU 
platform. However, at that point, the questions of how the EU foresees and perceives the 
demands of the parties and the Cyprus conflict and to what extent it achieves to respond 
positively and accurately to their preferences will be raised. The fourth section of 
Chapter III will put forward some proposals for the future role of the EU in the Cyprus 
dispute. 
 In the final part, this study reaches to the conclusion that the role of the EU in the 
settlement of the Cyprus dispute has been a failure although the Union has a potential to 
be a catalyst for peace due to the EU interests of the parties. In addition to its interests in 
formulating Greek sided policies, the misperceptions and inefficient policies of the 
Union has also led to its failure in the Cyprus dispute.     
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CHAPTER-II 
 
HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE 
CYPRUS DISPUTE UNDER THE LIGHT OF EVENTS 
AND THE UN RESOLUTIONS 
 
 
Since the beginning of the Cyprus dispute till the EU involvement, the UN has 
brought a number of settlement proposals and Resolutions related to the dispute and 
continues its presence in the island with a peacekeeping force. In this way, the UN has 
been a crucial actor directly involved in the evolution of the conflict. So, this chapter 
provides a brief explanation of the origin of the Cyprus dispute and the key events in its 
evolution before the EU involvement within the legal and historical framework of the 
UN Resolutions. The historical background will be examined in six periods: the 
developments prior to 1960, the independence of the Republic of Cyprus and the 
constitutional breakdown, the involvement of the UN SC in the crisis, 1974 Turkish 
intervention, peace negotiations between 1974-1983 and declaration of the TRNC and 
resumption of inter-communal talks.  
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2.1 Historical Background prior to 1960 
 
 Latin domination over the island of Cyprus ended in 1571 and, “Cyprus was a 
part of the Ottoman Empire from 1571 until 1878; during that period the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots lived together” (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 282). With the 
Convention of Defensive Alliance signed between Great Britain and the Ottoman 
Empire on June 4, 1878, the Ottoman Empire transferred the administration of the island 
to the United Kingdom (UK) in exchange for the Great Britain’s engagement in the 
defense of the Ottoman territory against Russia (Convention of Defensive Alliance, 
1878: Art. 1). “If Russia restores to Turkey Kars and the other conquests made by her in 
Armenia during the last war, the island of Cyprus will be evacuated by England, and the 
convention of the 4th of June, 1878, will be at an end” (Annex to the Convention of 
Defensive Alliance, 1878: Art. 6).  
 On November 5, 1914, the UK annexed the island by a unilateral decision when 
Turkey sided with Germany against Britain (http://www.cyprus-
conflict.net/www.cyprus-conflict.net/chronology.html, last accessed on 21 February 
2007). The Treaty of Sevres of 1920 attempted to achieve the recognition of the UK 
annexation (Sevres Treaty, 1920: Art. 115-117), however due to the rejection of the 
Treaty of Sevres by the Ottomans and by her successor Turkey, it was the Lausanne 
Peace Treaty in 1923 when Turkey recognized the UK sovereignty on the island 
(Lausanne Treaty, 1923: Arts. 20-21). In this way, Cyprus became a British colony 
(crown territory) in 1925. 
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 Beginning from 1931, the Greek Cypriots intensified their “enosis” (unification 
of the island with Greece) campaigns with the support of Greece. Between 1954 and 
1958, the Greek government tried to internationalize the issue through their applications 
of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the 
population of Cyprus, however, they were rejected by the UN on the grounds of “not 
appearing appropriate to the General Assembly to adopt a resolution on the question” 
(UN GA Res. 814 (IX), 1954: Parag. 1). In 1957, the UN General Assembly (GA) 
decided to take the issue into its agenda and expressed its hope that negotiations would 
be resumed and continued for a peaceful, democratic and just solution (UN GA Res. 
1013 (XI), 1957: Parag. 2).  
1955 marked the start of the Greek Cypriot guerrilla struggle by the militant 
group EOKA which aimed to end British rule and unite the island with 
Greece… In 1958, Turkish Cypriot militants formed TMT (Turkish 
Resistance Organization) as a counter organization to EOKA aiming at 
preventing enosis and supporting partition (the partition of the island into a 
Greek and a Turkish state) (Demetriou, 2004: 4). 
 
While Britain was claiming that the Cyprus problem was its own internal issue, 
beginning from the 1950s, it began to emphasize the international feature of the issue in 
order to get rid of the Cyprus problem which caused both economic and internal policy 
problems for Britain. On the other hand, the main reason of this policy change was the 
shifting balances in the Middle East especially as a result of the Suez crisis in October 
1956. So, in December 1956, Britain offered some constitutional reforms called 
“Radcliffe's Proposals” (UK, Parliamentary Papers, 1956: Cmnd. 42, Parag. 4.) which 
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included greater autonomy and self-government for Cyprus at some indefinite time in 
the future and safeguards for the Turkish Cypriot community while remaining under 
British sovereignty.  These proposals were rejected by Greece and Greek Cypriot side. 
 In June 1958, Britain proposed another settlement plan which was called as the 
“MacMillan Plan”. According to that plan, a constitution would be made. As Fırat 
(2001a: 606) indicates:1   
For seven years the international status of Cyprus would be unchanged, that 
is the British sovereignty on the island would continue and at the end of that 
period, if Turkey and Greece agree on continuing to cooperate, Britain 
would be ready to share sovereignty with Turkey and Greece on the 
condition that the sovereignty of military bases and facilities would remain 
on British side. 
 
 The plan was begun to be implemented by the British, however, it was rejected 
by the Greek and Turkish governments and Makarios, the President of Cyprus. 
 
 
2.2 A New Era in Cyprus: Independence and Constitutional 
Breakdown 
 
 The Greek and Turkish sides came to agree on the establishment of an 
independent state of Cyprus in order to prevent the enosis and partition attempts and 
                                                 
1 For details, see, http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/macmillan_plan.htm 
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increasing violence in the island. So, on January 5, 1959, negotiations regarding the 
settlement of the Cyprus dispute commenced in Zurich. On February 11, 1959 the Greek 
and Turkish Prime Ministers Constantin Karamanlis and Adnan Menderes, the Greek 
and Turkish Foreign Ministers Messrs E. Averoff and F.R. Zorlu signed the Zurich 
Accord (Document) on the establishment of an independent state. On February 19, 1959, 
a memorandum was signed by the Prime Ministers of the UK, Greece and Turkey and 
then by the representatives of the two communities in London.  
 As a result of the Zurich and London Accords (Zurich and London Accords, 
1959), Cyprus became independent and the “Republic of Cyprus” was founded on 
August 16, 1960. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (The Constitution of the 
Republic of Cyprus, 1960) had its roots in treaties signed by the parties: The Treaty of 
Establishment pointed that the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the UK would 
undertake to consult and cooperate in the common defense of Cyprus and left two 
sovereign bases region to the UK (Treaty of Establishment, 1960: Arts. 2 and 3)2,  the 
Treaty of Guarantee made Turkey, Britain and Greece the guarantors of the 
independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 
Constitution and recognized the right to take action by each of these guaranteeing 
Powers with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs of Cyprus when common  
                                                 
2 Article 2: “The Republic of Cyprus shall co-operate fully with the United Kingdom to ensure the security 
and effective operation of the military bases situated in the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia 
Sovereign Base Area, and the full enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights conferred by this 
Treaty.”  
  Article 3: “The Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult and 
co-operate in the common defense of Cyprus”. 
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or concerted action is impossible (Treaty of Guarantee, 1960: Arts. 2 and 4/2)3 and the 
Treaty of Alliance which provided for the stationing of troops by Turkey and Greece 
(Treaty of Alliance, 1960: Art. 4)4.  
The Accords were based on bi-national independence, political equality and 
administrative partnership of the two communities (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 
282). These features of the new state reflect that the Republic of Cyprus is a sui generis 
federation. The Republic of Cyprus became a member of the UN in September 1960. 
One of the most significant consequences of the Zurich and London Accords was 
the return of the Turkish troops which left the island in 1878 to the island back (Bozkurt, 
2001: 15). On the other hand, although the new Republic was called as “independent and 
sovereign” in the Establishment Accords, the new state did not have the right to change 
the basic provisions of its Constitution without the consent of the guaranteeing powers 
and to recognize the British sovereignty in some parts of its territory. According to my 
point of view, this limits the sovereignty of the new state to a certain extent. 
 Between 1961 and 1963, disputes over certain basic articles of the Constitution 
such as separate municipalities, public service and the ratio in the Cypriot army and 
taxation caused a constitutional dispute between the two communities 
                                                 
3 Article 2: “Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of 
Cyprus set out in Article 1 of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial 
integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic 
Articles of its Constitution.”  
   “Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any 
activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition 
of the Island.”  
  Article 4/2: “In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three 
guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of 
affairs created by the present Treaty.” 
 
4 Article 4: “Greece and Turkey shall participate in the Tripartite Headquarters so established with the 
military contingents laid down in Additional Protocol No.I annexed to the present Treaty. The said 
contingents shall provide for the training of the army of the Republic of Cyprus.” 
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(http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/www.cyprus-conflict.net/chronology.html, last accessed 
on 21 February 2007). Due to those conflicts, Akritas Plan was formed. The Plan, 
written during the constitutional dispute by the Greek Cypriot Interior Minister, 
Policarpos Yorgadjis, called for the removal of undesirable elements of the constitution 
so as to lay the foundations for Cyprus’s union with Greece (Akritas Plan, 
http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/akritas_plan.html, last accessed on 12 March 2007).5 The 
Akritas Plan revealed that the enosis efforts of the Greek Cypriots continued even after 
independence.6 
 On November 30, 1963, Makarios proposed his constitutional amendments that 
covered 13 points (13 Points, 1963). Those proposals included the abolishment of the 
right of veto of the Vice-President which was within the unamendable provisions of the 
Constitution. So, the proposed constitutional changes were seen as a threat by the 
Turkish Cypriot side, for their constitutional guarantees, and also by Turkey and that 
caused the outbreak of inter-communal fighting on December 21, 1963 when a number 
of Turkish Cypriots were killed by the Greek Cypriots. This was the collapse of the 
system of the Greek government established under the 1960 settlement.  
This political crisis ended up with the isolation of the Turkish community 
into enclaves, forced evacuation of the Turkish Cypriots from the 
government of Cyprus at all levels and construction of the “Green Line” in 
1964. The period between 1963 and 1974 was an inter-communal violence 
and ethnic strife (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 282-283). 
                                                 
5 See, also, http://www.trncinfo.com/tanitmadairesi/2002/ENGLISH/DOCUMENTS/2a.HTM 
 
6 For further claims of the Greek Cypriots about achieving enosis with Greece, see,  
http://www.trncinfo.com/tanitmadairesi/2002/ENGLISH/DOCUMENTS/4.htm 
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The Green Line which passed through Nicosia divided the island into two regions: 
the Turkish Cypriot region in the North and the Greek Cypriot region in the South. 
 
  
2.3 The Involvement of the UN Security Council in the Inter-communal 
Crisis 
 
On December 26, 1963, a joint (sui generis) peacemaking7 force under 
British command, composed of the UK, Turkey and Greece forces was 
established under the Treaties of Alliance and Establishment in order to 
restore peace and order through the consent of the Cyprus government. A 
ceasefire was arranged and it was agreed to create a neutral zone along the 
Green Line between the areas occupied by the two communities in Nicosia 
in 1964 (http://www.unficyp.org/, last accessed on 12 January 2007). 
 
However, due to the increase in the inter-communal fighting and difficulties that 
the British (sui generis) peacemaking force encountered, on February 15, 1964, the 
representatives of the UK and Cyprus requested urgent action to be taken by the UN 
Security Council (SC). 
 On March 4, 1964, the SC unanimously adopted Resolution 186 (1964), by 
which the Council noted that the situation in Cyprus was likely to threaten 
                                                 
7 “Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as 
those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.” (An Agenda for Peace, 1992: Parag. 
20). 
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international peace and security (UN SC Res. 186, 1964: Preamble), recommended 
the creation of the United Nations Peacekeeping8 Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) with the 
consent of the government of Cyprus (Parag. 4), called on all member states to refrain 
from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign 
Republic of Cyprus or to endanger international peace (Parag. 1), asked the government 
of Cyprus to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in 
Cyprus (Parag. 2) and called upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act 
with utmost restraint (Parag. 3). By this Resolution, the UN disclosed that the dispute 
falls in principle under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter relating to pacific settlement of 
disputes (Charter of the United Nations). UNFICYP became operationally established on 
March 27, 1964.  
 UNFICYP`s mandate is to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting, 
to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order, and to contribute to a 
return to normal conditions (UN SC Res. 186, 1964: Parag. 5). UNFICYP mainly aimed 
to prevent potential intervention of Greece and Turkey to the inter-communal conflict 
and a possible war between the two communities by achieving stability in the island. 
Like the other peacekeeping forces, UNFICYP was not created to enforce peace, instead, 
it was stationed in the island to help the parties to maintain peace. At that point, the 
success of UNFICYP and the UN efforts depended on the cooperation and strict 
approval of the two Cypriot communities, Turkey and Greece. If one or both of them 
increase the tension resulting with an armed conflict, UNFICYP will not offer a serious 
                                                 
8 “Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as 
those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.”  
    “Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of 
all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and 
frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the 
prevention of conflict and the making of peace.” (An Agenda for Peace, 1992: Parag. 20). 
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obstruction because of having neither the mandate nor the resources to do so. In that 
sense, UNFICYP is an apparent sign of the limitations of peacekeeping despite its 
reputation as the most effective operation throughout the UN history.  
 In Resolution 186 (1964), there was a reference to Article 2/4 of the UN Charter 
by stating that “all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations” (Preamble). In 
Resolution 186 (1964), by using the term “likely to threaten”, the SC determined a 
potential, but not a direct threat to international peace and security and for that reason, it 
was acting within the scope of Chapter 6 relating to pacific settlement of disputes, that is 
there was no reference to enforcement measures in terms of Chapter 7. This means that 
the provisions of the Resolution are not legally binding unless the disputing parties 
expressly accept them. But, nevertheless, the Resolution politically binds the states.  
Also, in Article 2/7 of the UN Charter, the UN prohibits intervention in matters 
which are within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. However, the UN could get over 
the prohibition of domestic jurisdiction by taking the consent of the parties of the 
internal conflict. That is, in order to be applicable, recommendations of the SC under 
Chapter 6 would require the consent or acceptance of the parties concerned. At that 
point, as seen in the Resolution 186 (1964) the SC recommended the creation of the 
UNFICYP, “with the consent of the government of Cyprus”.  
 The Republic of Cyprus is quite explicit about giving its consent to UNFICYP 
because it is unable to match Turks militarily and is anxious about their presence. So, 
although the UN force gives it no protection against a determined intervention as 
happened in 1974, it sees UNFICYP at least as a guarantee of its physical security and a 
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watchdog for potential problems. Indeed, the Government of Cyprus indicated its desire 
that the stationing of the UN Force should continue.9 Also, the Turkish Cypriots, who 
feel themselves more secure because of the presence of the Turkish troops, see 
UNFICYP as a watchdog and a source for the maintenance of calm. The UN also had 
always made a practice of seeking the approval of the three guarantor powers. Turkey 
and Greece are content of the presence of UNFICYP by which they avoid trouble.  
However, there was no reference to the consent of the Turkish Cypriot Vice 
President Dr. Fazıl Küçük related to the creation of the UNFICYP in Resolution 186 
(1964). By recognizing the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) as the only 
representative of the Republic of Cyprus in Resolution 186 (1964), the SC overlooked 
the consent of the Turkish community indirectly and disregarded the bi-communal 
nature of the state according to the 1960 Constitution (Karaosmanoğlu, 2002: 103). So, 
Dr. Küçük wrote to U-Thant, the then UN SG, that it was imperative that in 
implementing the Resolution, the consent of both the President and Vice-President were 
                                                 
9 This is expressed in the UN SC Res. 194 (25 September 1964); 198 (18 December 1964); 201 (19 March 
1965); 206 (15 June 1965); 219 (17 December 1965); 220 (16 March 1966); 222 (16 June 1966); 231 (15 
December 1966); 238 (19 June 1967); 244 (22 December 1967); 247(18 March 1968); 254 (18 June 
1968); 261 (10 December 1968); 266 (10 June 1969); 274 (11 December 1969); 281 (9 June 1970); 291 
(10 December 1970); 293 (26 May 1971); 305 (13 December 1971); 315 (15 June 1972); 324 ( 12 
December 1972); 334 ( 15 June 1973); 343 (14 December 1973); 349 (29 June 1974); 364 (13 December 
1974); 370 (13 June 1975); 383 (13 December 1975); 391 ( 15 June 1976); 401 ( 14 December 1976); 410 
(15 June 1977); 422 (15 December 1977); 430 (16 June 1978); 443 (14 December 1978); 451 (15 June 
1979); 458 (14 December 1979); 472 (13 June 1980); 482 (11 December 1980); 488 (4 June 1981); 495 
(14 December 1981); 510 (15 June 1982); 526 (14 December 1982); 534 (15 June 1983); 544 (15 
December 1983); 553 (15 June 1984); 559 (15 December 1984); 565 (14 June 1985); 578 (12 December 
1985); 585 (13 June 1986); 593 (11 December 1986); 597 (12 June 1987); 604 (14 December 1987); 614 
(15 June 1988); 625 (15 December 1988); 634 (9 June 1989); 646 (14 December 1989); 657 (15 June 
1990); 680 (14 December 1990); 697 (14 June 1991); 723 (12 December 1991); 759 (12 June 1992); 796 
(14 December 1992); 839 (11 June 1993); 889 (15 December 1993); 927 (15 June 1994); 969 (21 
December 1994); 1000 (23 June 1995); 1032 (19 December 1995); 1062 (28 June 1996); 1092 (23 
December 1996); 1117 (27 June 1997); 1146 (23 December 1997); 1178 (29 June 1998); 1217 (22 
December 1998); 1251 (29 June 1999); 1283 (15 December 1999); 1303 (14 June 2000); 1331 (13 
December 2000); 1354 (15 June 2001); 1384 (14 December 2001); 1416 (13 June 2002); 1442 (25 
November 2002); 1517 (24 November 2003); 1548 (11 June 2004); 1568 (22 October 2004); 1604 (15 
June 2005) and 1642 (15 December 2005). 
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obtained (Dr. Küçük`s dispatch to the UN SG, 1964). On the other hand, all the parties, 
as well as the Turkish community, have continued to cooperate with UNFICYP, in 
military and civilian levels, and also in financial terms. This facilitated the SC`s duty to 
play a positive role in maintaining peace and stability.  
 The force has operated in an impartial manner. Law and order was interpreted in 
objective terms. “During its first years UNFICYP created an effective and impartial 
international force… Isolated shooting incidents had continued but UNFICYP was able 
to prevent them from getting out of hand…” (Boyd, 1966: 12). As the report of the then 
SG, U-Thant, indicated, considerable progress had been made towards the achievement 
of the first two major objectives: preventing a recurrence of fighting and contributing to 
the maintenance and restoration of law and order, but a return to normal conditions in 
the sense of restoring a situation which prevailed prior to December 1963 had not been 
achieved (Report by the UN SG, S/6228, 1965). While the attempts until 1974 were 
generally successful, some conflicts occurred -the most serious example in 1967- and 
UNFICYP`s presence has not resulted in the settlement of the problem. 
 
 
2.4 1974 Turkish Intervention and Afterwards 
 
On July 15, 1974, the Greek junta regime staged a coup d`etat against the Cyprus 
government headed by Makarios, claiming the annexation of the island to Greece and 
the change of the Greek Cypriot leadership. The UN SC condemned the Greek 
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intervention and aggressive violations against the independence of the Republic of 
Cyprus by stating for the Greek coup d`etat that:  
…It is clearly an invasion from outside, inflagrant violation of the 
independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. The so-called 
coup was the work of the Greek officers staffing and commanding the 
National Guard... The Greek officers serving with the National 
Guard....recruited many members of the terrorist organization EOKA-B... It 
may be said that it was the Cyprus Government which invited the Greek 
officers to staff the National Guard… (UN SC, 1974: 1780th Meeting).  
 
In response to the Greek coup d`etat, on July 20, 1974, Turkish military forces 
intervened to the northern part of the island (with the stationing of 40.000 troops) as co-
guarantor of restoring the independence and constitutional order of Cyprus and ending 
the aggression by claiming its right of intervention under Article 4 of the Treaty of 
Guarantee10 and under Article 2 of the Treaty of Alliance11.  
 So, on July 20, 1974, the Council adopted Resolution 353 (1974) by which it 
called upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of 
Cyprus (UN SC Res. 353, 1974: Parag. 1), called upon all parties to cease firing (Parag. 
                                                 
10 Article 4: “In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measure necessary to 
ensure observance of those provisions.  
    In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers 
reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the 
present Treaty.” 
 
11 Article 2: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, 
directed against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.” 
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2)12, demanded an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of 
Cyprus (Parag. 3), requested the withdrawal of foreign military personnel present 
otherwise than under the authority of international agreements (Parag. 4) - it was definite 
that the request of the withdrawal of the military forces in the island was directed to the 
Turkish side -, called on Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to enter into 
negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional 
government in Cyprus (Parag. 5) and called on all parties to cooperate fully with 
UNFICYP13 to enable it to carry out its mandate (Parag. 6) - thus indicating that 
UNFICYP was expected to continue to function despite the radically changed 
circumstances.  
 The legal basis of Resolution 186 (1964) is still valid in Resolution 353 (1974) 
with small changes in wording. In Resolution 353 (1974), the Council defines the 
situation as “a serious threat to international peace and security” and “a most 
explosive one in the whole Eastern Mediterranean area” instead of using the term 
“likely to threaten” (Preamble). So, what can be realized by this Resolution is the 
severeness of the situation defined by the word used “a serious threat”. The Resolution 
makes reference to Article 24 of the UN Charter by noting that “conscious of this 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of the international peace and security” 
(Preamble).  
                                                 
12 For the call for cease fire and an end to the use of force see, also, UN SC Res. 193, 25 September 1964, 
354 (23 July 1974), 355 (1 August 1974), 357 (14 August 1974) and UN GA Res. 3212 (XXIX), 1 
November 1974. 
 
13 The SC also asked for cooperation with the UNFICYP in UN SC Res. 193,  201, 206, 353, 361 (30 
August 1974), 364, 370 (13 June 1975), 383 (13 December 1975), 391 ( 15 June 1976), 401 (14 December 
1976), 410 (15 June 1977), 422 (15 December 1977), 541, 544, 553, 559, 565, 578, 585, 593, 597, 604, 
614, 625, 634, 646, 657, 680, 697, 723, 759, 831 (27 May 1993), 839, 889, 927, 969, 1000, 1032, 1062, 
1092 and 1117. 
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 As called for in Resolution 353 (1974), on July 30, 1974, the Foreign Ministers 
of Turkey, Greece and the UK agreed on the text of the Geneva Declaration concerning 
measures that involved action by UNFICYP. These measures included the creation of a 
security zone by the three powers at the limit of the areas “occupied” by the Turkish 
armed forces, evacuation of all Turkish enclaves “occupied” by the Greek or Greek 
Cypriot forces and protection of them by UNFICYP and police functions of UNFICYP 
in mixed villages (Geneva Declaration, 1974: Art. 3). The Ministers also agreed that 
there should be re-establishment of constitutional government in Cyprus and noted the 
existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that 
of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community.  
 Following the breakdown of the Geneva Conference, the second operation of 
Turkey began in Cyprus on August 14, 1974. The SC (UN SC Res. 360, 1974) defined 
the deterioration of the situation as a most serious threat to peace and security in the 
Eastern Mediterranean area (Preamble), recorded its formal disapproval of the unilateral 
military actions undertaken against the Republic of Cyprus (Parag. 1) and requested the 
withdrawal of foreign military personnel (Parag. 2). Also, all parties were called upon, 
as a demonstration of good faith, to take all steps in order to promote negotiations by the 
UN SC and GA (UN SC Res. 361, 1974: Parag. 2).14   
 As a consequence of July and August 1974 events, UNFICYP was faced with a 
situation that had not been foreseen in its mandate. “As laid down by the SC in 
Resolution 186 (1964), the functions of UNFICYP were conceived in relation to the 
inter-communal conflict in Cyprus, not to large-scale hostilities arising from action by 
                                                 
14 See, also, UN SC Res. 365, 13 December 1974, 367 (12 March 1975), 370 (13 June 1975), 383 (13 
December 1975), 391 ( 15 June 1976), 401 ( 14 December 1976), 410 (15 June 1977), 422 (15 December 
1977). 
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the armed forces of one of the guarantor powers.” (UNFICYP History at 
http://www.unficyp.org/, last accessed on 12 January 2007) “Instead of having to cope 
with an internal problem which had immediate international ramifications, the force 
found itself in the middle of an international problem” (James, 1989: 484). The nature of 
peacekeeping inevitably changed. 
 So, the mandate could not respond to the new situation. However, the original 
words of the mandate could still be seen as relevant. So, “while the basic mandate 
remained unchanged and the Force continued to receive regular six-monthly extensions 
from the SC, UNFICYP, with the consent and cooperation of the parties, was now 
tasked with four main duties: maintaining the ceasefire, maintaining the military status 
quo, restoring law and order, a return to normal conditions and humanitarian functions” 
(Ker-Lindsay, 2006: 411). So, the SC adopted a number of resolutions expanding the 
mandate of UNFICYP to include supervising a de facto ceasefire and preserving the 
integrity of a buffer zone between the lines of the Cyprus National Guard and of the 
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces.15 
 After the 1974 events, the other major functions of UNFICYP are to provide 
humanitarian activities and to protect the civilian population caught up in the hostilities - 
including both Cypriots and foreigners. It organizes a wide range of relief assistance for 
the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, provides humanitarian assistance to displaced persons 
(UN SC Res. 361, 1974: Parags. 4 and 6) and supervises the voluntary transfer of the 
Turkish Cypriots to north and Greek Cypriots to south (UNFICYP Background at 
                                                 
15 Ceasefire lines extend approximately 180 kilometers across the island and the buffer zone covers about 
3 percent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land. See, UNFICYP Background 
at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unficyp/, last accessed on 2 February 2007. 
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http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unficyp/, last accessed on 2 February 2007). In 
that context, the SC also demanded from all parties to cooperate with the force in 
carrying out its tasks related to humanitarian functions in all areas of Cyprus (UN SC 
Res. 359, 1974: Parag. 4). The SC expected from all parties concerned to fully respect to 
the international status of the UN force and to refrain from any action which might 
endanger the lives and safety of its members, when the parties directed violence and 
force against UNFICYP personnel in 1974 (UN SC Res. 359, 1974: Parag. 2).16 In the 
UN SC Resolutions, the mandate of UNFICYP has been extended for six-month periods 
in the light of the situation on the ground and of political developments on the grounds 
that the continued presence of the Force remains indispensable in the absence of a 
political settlement to the Cyprus problem (UNFICYP Background at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unficyp/, last accessed on 2 February 2007). 
 
 
2.5 Peace Negotiations: 1974-1983  
  
A de facto ceasefire came into effect on August 16, 1974. On February 13, 1975, 
the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) was proclaimed by the Turkish Cypriot 
community. Rauf Denktash declared that the objective of the proclamation of the TFSC 
was to unite with the Greek Cypriot community as a part of a federal Cyprus state. The 
UN SC regretted the decision of the Turkish Cypriot community to declare the TFSC 
(UN SC Res. 367, 1975: Parag. 2), on the other hand, it affirmed that this decision does 
                                                 
16 See, also, UN SC Res. 1092, 23 December 1996, 1117 (27 June 1997), 1146 (23 December 1997), 1178 
(29 June 1998), 1217 (22 December 1998), 1251 (29 June 1999). 
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not prejudge the final political settlement of the problem (UN SC Res. 367, 1975: Parag. 
3).17 The SC also requested all states to refrain from any action which might prejudice 
that sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment, as well as from 
any attempt at partition of the island or its unification with any other country (UN SC 
Res. 367, 1975: Parag. 1).18  
 As a result of the call for the start of negotiations in the SC Resolution 367 
(1975), the parties came together in Vienna in March 1975. The sole concrete step taken 
in the period of April 1975-February 1976 was the Population Exchange Agreement 
which came along with the Third Vienna Agreement. Through this Agreement, the 
Turks in the southern part of the island were transferred to the North and the Greeks in 
the northern part of the island were transferred to the South, depending upon the desire 
of these communities (Third Vienna Agreement, 1975: Arts. 1 and 3).19  
                                                 
17 “2. Regrets the unilateral decision of 13 February 1975, declaring that a part of the Republic of Cyprus 
would become a ‘Federated Turkish State’, as, inter alia, tending to compromise the continuation of 
negotiations between the representatives of the two communities on an equal footing… 3. Affirms that the 
decision referred to in paragraph 2 above does not prejudge the final political settlement of the problem of 
Cyprus and takes note of the declaration that this was not its intention.” 
 
18 See, also, UN SC Res. 1179, 29 June 1998, 1217 (22 December 1998) and 1251 (29 June 1999). 
 
19 According to the UNHCR registrations, following the 1963-1964 ethnic dispute and 1974 Turkish 
intervention to the island, “almost one third of the population of Cyprus (around 200.000 Greek Cypriots 
and 65.000 Turkish Cypriots) had to displace. The separation of the two communities via the UN patrolled 
Green Line prohibited the return of all internally displaced people.”  
      Following the declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, a number of the Greek 
Cypriots took their case to the European Court of Human Rights arguing that their homes are being 
occupied by migrant workers brought from Turkey with the intention of altering the demographics of the 
island. Through the years, a number of demonstrations have been made by the Greek Cypriots demanding 
to return to their properties by condemning Turkey.  
       In April 2003, the then Turkish Cypriot President “Rauf Denktash opened the border crossing for the 
first time since the island was divided, allowing both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to view their 
property since the separation of the two communities. Crossing procedures have since been relaxed 
allowing both Cypriots to move relatively freely across the island.” 
       The Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem (Annan Plan) 
proposed a bi-communal, bi-zonal state “with territorial concessions by the Turkish Cypriot state but only 
a limited right of return for displaced Greek Cypriots”. Regarding the territorial adjustment issue, the Plan 
pointed that any amendments or special arrangements in territories will provide orderly relocation to 
adequate alternative places. (Art. 9) Related to the property issue, the Plan emphasized that in areas 
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In Resolution 391 (1976), the SC declared that the usefulness of those 
negotiations depends upon the willingness of all parties concerned to show the necessary 
flexibility to take into account not only their own interests but also the legitimate 
aspirations and requirements of the opposing side (Preamble).20 Also, the SC 
emphasized the need for the parties to adhere to the Agreements reached at previous 
rounds of talks (Preamble)21 by pointing out the increased tensions and restrictions on 
the freedom of movement of the UN Force and its civil police in the north part of the 
island (Preamble).22 So, Rauf Denktash and Makarios signed the “Four Guidelines” for 
future inter-communal talks on February 12, 1977. According to this Agreement, Cyprus 
would become an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal and bi-zonal federal republic, 
a difference from the terms of the Constitution of 1960 (Four Guidelines, 1977: Art. 1). 
 As a second step towards a comprehensive settlement, the Ten-Point Agreement 
of May 1979 was signed between Rauf Denktash and Spyros Kyprianou, the President 
of the Republic after the death of Makarios, and basically reconfirmed the 1977 
Makarios-Denktash Agreement (Ten-Point Agreement, 1979). The SC urged the parties 
to proceed with the inter-communal talks within the framework of the Ten-Point 
                                                                                                                                                
subject to territorial adjustment, properties will be reinstated and in areas not subject to territorial 
adjustment, there wil be reinstatement, compensation or selling, leasing and exchange of the properties 
(Art. 10). However, Cyprus subsequently entered the EU as a divided island. See, Basis for Agreement on 
a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, 11 November 2002.  
See, also, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cypriot_refugees 
 
20 See, also, UN SC Res. 401, 14 December 1976, 410 (15 June 1977), 422 (15 December 1977). 
 
21 See, also, UN SC Res. 401, 14 December 1976, 410 (15 June 1977), 422 (15 December 1977). 
 
22 See, also, UN SC Res. 401, 14 December 1976, 410 (15 June 1977), 422 (15 December 1977), 1062 (28 
June 1996), 1092 (23 December 1996), 1117 (27 June 1997), 1146 (23 December 1997), 1178 (29 June 
1998), 1217 (22 December 1998), 1251 (29 June 1999). 
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Agreement (UN SC Res. 451, 1979: Parag. 2).23 However, the Ten-Point Agreement did 
not provide a concrete improvement in the Cyprus dispute. The Greek side continued its 
efforts for internationalization of the issue which remained as the permanent and 
unsettled problem of the UN. On the other hand, it should be stated that these two 
Agreements had a great significance because, for the first time, the two communities 
agreed to seek a settlement on the basis of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal republic. 
Also, these high-level Agreements continue to be valid till this day by providing the 
basic guidelines in the search for a settlement on Cyprus. 
 Greece became a member of the European Community, which was then called as 
the European Union (EU), in 1981. On May 13, 1983, the UN GA reaffirmed the 
principle of the inadmissibility of occupation and acquisition of territories by force, 
stated that part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus is still occupied by foreign 
forces and demanded the withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of 
Cyprus (UN GA Res. A/RES/37/253, 1983: Parag. 8). The GA also deplored all 
unilateral actions that aim to change the demographic structure of Cyprus or to promote 
fait accomplis (UN GA Res. A/RES/37/253, 1983). In this way, the term “occupation” 
was used by the UN for the first time. Also, the GA regretted that the resolutions of the 
UN on Cyprus have not yet been implemented and deplored the lack of progress in the 
inter-communal talks (UN GA Res. A/RES/37/253, 1983). So, since 1974, Cyprus has 
been de facto divided into two distinct political and territorial zones, Turkish Cypriot 
North and Greek Cypriot South. 
 
 
                                                 
23 See, also, UN SC Res. 458, 472, 482, 488, 495, 510, 526 and 534.  
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2.6 Declaration of the TRNC and Resumption of the Inter-communal 
Negotiations 
 
The Turkish Cypriots declared their state, the northern Cyprus, as the “Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) on November 15, 1983. This declaration carried 
the Cyprus dispute into a new dimension. The island has since then been divided into 
two different administrations, the internationally recognized GCA - diplomatically 
called as the “Republic of Cyprus” by the international community, however, not 
recognized by Turkey and the TRNC - and the TRNC that is only recognized by Turkey 
among the 192 members of the UN. That is, following the declaration of the TRNC, a 
dispute between two “states” - even if one of them is still not recognized by the 
international community - was the subject instead of a dispute between the two 
communities (Fırat, 2001b: 108). On the other hand, as Turkey also puts forward, in fact, 
the proclamation of the TRNC can be defined as the legalization of the existing de facto 
situation in the island since 1974. 
 The Turkish Cypriot Parliament declared that the declaration of the TRNC would 
facilitate the re-establishment of the partnership between two equal communities within 
a federal framework and the settlement of the dispute (Declaration of Independence of  
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the TRNC, 1983: Art. 22/b).24 In addition, the TRNC declared its determination to make 
every effort in this direction and not to unite with any other state (Art. 22/b). Through 
the declaration of the TRNC, the Turkish Cypriots also promised to pursue a policy of 
non-alignment and to adhere to the Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance 
(Art. 23/b and 23/e). On May 7, 1984, the Constitution of the TRNC came into force.  
 However, both the Greek Cypriot community and Greece called the declaration 
of the TRNC as illegal and inadmissible claiming that the Republic -staffed exclusively 
by the Greek Cypriots since 1974- legally represents the whole island. The SC defined 
the declaration as incompatible with the Treaty of Establishment and Treaty of 
Guarantee. As it did in 1975 with the declaration of the TFSC, the SC again deplored the 
act by considering it to be a purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus (UN 
SC Res 541, 1983: Parag. 1), so the Council defined the declaration of the TRNC as 
legally invalid and called for its withdrawal (Parag. 2). Also, the Council called upon all 
states not to recognize any other Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus (Parag. 
7).25 In other words, the call explicitly demanded for non-recognition of the TRNC. 
 The UN SC again emphasized its disapproval of the further secessionist acts in 
the “occupied” part of the Republic of Cyprus which it defined as violations of 
Resolution 541 (1983) (UN SC Res. 550, 1984: Preamble). It condemned all secessionist 
                                                 
24 Article 22/b: “Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti’nin ilanı, iki eşit halkın ve onların kurdukları 
yönetimlerin, gerçek bir federasyon çatısı altında yeniden bir ortaklık kurmalarını engellemez; tam aksine 
bir federasyonun kurulabilmesi için gerekli ön şartları tamamlayarak bu yoldaki samimi çabaları 
kolaylaştırabilir. Bu yolda her yapıcı çabayı göstermeğe kararlı olan Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti 
başka hiç bir devletle birleşmeyecektir.” (The declaration of the TRNC would not prevent the two equal 
communities and their governments to re-establish a partnership within a federal framework, on the 
contrary, it would facilitate sincere efforts by fulfilling the pre-conditions required for the establishment of 
a federation. The TRNC, which is determined to make every constructive effort in this direction, will not 
unite with any other state.) 
 
25 See, also, UN SC Res. 550, 11 May 1984. 
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acts including the purported exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkish 
Cypriot leadership and declared them illegal and invalid by calling for their withdrawal 
(Parag. 2). The Council considered any attempts to settle any part of Varosha (Maraş) by 
people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible and called for the transfer of that area to 
the administration of the UN (Parag. 5). 
 Also, as a result of the non-recognition of the TRNC by the SC, the Turkish 
Cypriot side`s approval for the extension of the mandate could not be formally sought. 
As a response to these attitudes, Turkey and the TRNC have indicated that they are 
unable to accept the resolutions extending UNFICYP`s mandate. So, “the extending 
resolutions no longer refer to the concurrence of the parties and from time to time, the 
TRNC makes the point that until the UN acknowledges its existence, the UN force can 
not be given authority to cross or operate in the TRNC” (James, 1989: 487). On the 
other hand, although the UN force does not formally recognize the TRNC, in operational 
terms no serious problem has arisen and in general, excellent cooperation is maintained 
on the ground between UNFICYP and the TRNC. The TRNC sees its dealings with 
UNFICYP as an opening to the international arena through its relations with the 
contributing countries. It should be noted that without the consent and cooperation of the 
TRNC, the UN could not operate. 
 Although these developments prevented the realization of negotiations between 
the two communities, the then UN SG, Javier Perez de Cuellar, continued to undertake 
efforts in order to reach a solution in Cyprus. In September 1984, the proximity talks on 
Draft Agreement (Draft Framework Agreement, 1986) began in New York. As a result 
of the mediation efforts of the then UN SG, Perez de Cuellar, the newly elected 
President of the Republic of Cyprus, George Vassiliou and Rauf Denktash met in 
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Geneva and New York in September and November 1988. In July 1989, Perez de 
Cuellar offered a “Set of Ideas” for the basis of a comprehensive settlement which was 
called as “Cuellar Plan” to both parties. According to that plan, the Republic of Federal 
Cyprus which was composed of two states would have a bi-zonal and bi-communal 
structure in constitutional terms (Fırat, 2001b: 122). However, this plan was rejected by 
Denktash and no solution was reached. In February 1990, the UN negotiations resumed, 
however the talks abandoned, because Denktash insisted on a “separate right to self-
determination for these two peoples” (http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/www.cyprus-
conflict.net/chronology.html, last accessed on 21 February 2007) and Vassiliou did not 
accept the self-determination right of the Turkish Cypriots. 
 So, the UN SC called upon the two communities to reach a solution providing for 
the establishment of a “federation” that will be bi-communal as regards the 
constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects in line with the 1977 
(the Four Guidelines for future inter-communal talks was signed between Rauf Denktash 
and Makarios on February 12, 1977) and 1979 (the Ten-Point Agreement was signed 
between Rauf Denktash and Spyros Kyprianou on May 19, 1979) high level Agreements 
(UN SC Res. 649, 1990: Parag. 3) and to exclude union in whole or in part with any 
other country and any form of partition or secession (Parag. 1).    
 Thus, despite numerous rounds of negotiations under the UN auspices, as a result 
of the reluctance of the two communities to modify their positions, the negotiations 
came to an end and that failed to reach a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus 
dispute. At that point, although UNFICYP continued to enjoy generally good 
cooperation from both sides since its establishment, the effectiveness of its efforts 
continued to be limited by the political problem. As Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 
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(2004: 109) argue, “the enforced change to UNFICYP`s mandate after the Turkish 
invasion of 1974 shows the inability of UNFICYP as a traditional peacekeeping 
operation to be successful independently of the wishes of the belligerents.” Also, the UN 
GA resolutions were not completely implemented by the parties of the dispute. So, the 
success of the UN settlement efforts and UNFICYP is dependent on the good will of the 
parties towards peace. Moreover, as Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the then SG, has repeatedly 
stated: 
The continuing quiet should not obscure the fact that there is only a cease 
fire in Cyprus, not peace. In the absence of progress towards a political 
settlement between the two sides, the overall situation remains subject to 
sudden tensions, generated by events outside the island as well as within 
(Report by the UN SG, 1994: S/1994/1407, Parag. 32).  
 
The Cyprus dispute would get into a new phase following the involvement of the 
EU in the issue in July 1990, upon the application of the Greek side for its membership 
to the EU.  
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CHAPTER - III 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS DISPUTE AFTER THE EU 
INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE UN DECISIONS 
 
 
This chapter investigates the historical background of the EU involvement in the 
Cyprus dispute in the light of the UN decisions. Because the EU directly involved in the 
dispute following the EU membership application of the Greek Cypriot Administration 
(GCA) - diplomatically called as the “Republic of Cyprus” by the international 
community, however, not recognized by Turkey and the TRNC - and the dispute has 
mostly evolved in the context of this process, the first section of the chapter lays out the 
accession process of the GCA to the EU. This section will be analyzed in terms of four 
phases reflecting the different positioning of the EU in the dispute. The first phase is the 
period between July 1990 and June 1994, the timeline between the application of the 
Greek Cypriots to the Union and the EU Summit at Corfu. The second phase is the 
period between the end of 1994 and the December 1999 EU Summit at Helsinki. The 
third phase covers the period from the December 1999 Helsinki Summit to May 2004 
when Cyprus is admitted as a full member of the EU. From May 2004 to present is 
considered as the fourth and last phase.  
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The second section of Chapter 2 makes a brief analysis of the EU policies 
towards Turkey related to the Cyprus dispute. In this regard, the European Commission, 
European Council and EP decisions and the EU Progress Reports on Cyprus will be 
explored.  
 
 
3.1 Accession Process of Cyprus to the EU  
 
The EU preferred not to be directly involved in the December 1963 events and 
the developments afterwards in Cyprus. On the other hand, the Consultative Assembly 
of the Council of Europe “condemned the coup d’état carried out in Cyprus (on July 15, 
1974) by officers owing allegiance to the Greek military dictatorship and regretted the 
failure of the attempt to reach a diplomatic settlement which led the Turkish 
Government to exercise its right of intervention in accordance with Article 4 of the 
Guarantee Treaty of 1960” (Consultative Assembly of Council of Europe, 1974: Parags. 
2-3).  
 However, the bilateral relations of the EU and Cyprus began with the signing of 
an Association Agreement in December 1972 that was complemented by a Protocol 
concluded in 1987 (Association Agreement, 1972). This Agreement contained 
arrangements on trade and customs matters and constituted the legal framework for the 
EU-Cyprus relations until the entry into force of the Accession Treaty on May 1, 
2004. Also, as a result of the July 20, 1974 Turkish intervention to Cyprus, “on July 22,  
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1974, the European Political Cooperation (EPC)26 issued a statement supporting the 
independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and their opposition to any intervention 
in Cyprus” (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 284). However, the EPC failed in its first 
attempt due to the Turkish response in Cyprus. 
 Afterwards, the EP declared its support for a settlement based on “the 
recognition of a sovereign, independent state and on the equality of rights of the two 
communities” (EP Res., April 1975: Parag. 3).27 The EP condemned the declaration of 
the independence by the TRNC on November 15, 1983 by defining it as “null and void” 
(EP Res., 1983: Parag. 3)28 and resembling it a “coup d`etat” (EP. Res., 1986: Parag. C). 
In addition, following the referendum, the presidential elections and the parliamentary 
elections held in the TRNC in 1985, the EP, for the first time, called the TRNC as the 
“Turkish-occupied section of Northern Cyprus” (EP. Res., 1986: Parag. B)29 and 
condemned these actions as “illegal and an obstacle” to the good offices efforts of the 
UN Secretary-General (SG) as similar with the UN practices (EP Res., 1985: Parag. 1).  
Despite of these interactions between the European countries and Cyprus and the 
non-binding declarations of the EP, the direct involvement of the EU in the Cyprus 
dispute apparently came into agenda by the application of the Greek Cypriots for the EU  
 
                                                 
26 “The EPC was created as a non-binding quasi institution of the European Community in 1974 in an 
attempt to coordinate member states` foreign policy with the expectation of eventual political 
integration… The EPC position was in line with the UN resolutions choosing a neutral and non-involved 
line in the 1970s.” (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 292) 
 
27 See, also, EP Res., 19 September 1975. 
 
28 See, also, EP Res., 13 September 1985, 10 July 1986 and 10 March 1988. 
 
29 See, also, EP Res., 9 July 1987, 10 March 1988 and 15 December 1988. 
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membership in the name of the whole island on July 3, 1990.30  
 
 
3.1.1 July 1990 - June 1994 
 
 Since the involvement of the EU in the Cyprus dispute, the EU has declared its 
support for the UN settlement efforts and initiatives in Cyprus in a number of 
decisions.31 Indeed, the Union has reaffirmed its support for the unity, independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus in accordance with relevant UN 
resolutions, high-level agreements and on the basis of the mission of good offices of the 
UN SG and has stated the relevance between the Cyprus dispute and EC-Turkey 
relations (Dublin Presidency Conclusions, 1990: 34). 
 The involvement of the EU in the Cyprus dispute goes back to the application of 
the Greek Cypriots for the EU membership in the name of the whole island on July 3, 
1990. The UN SC Resolution 649 (1990) by which the SC called upon the two 
communities in the island to exclude union in whole or in part with any other country 
and any form of partition or secession played a significant role in the application of the 
GCA to the EU (UN SC Res. 649, 1990: Parag. 1). On July 12, 1990, Rauf Denktash, 
                                                 
30 UN SC Res. 649 (1990) has played a significant role in this application. A broad explanation of the Res. 
649 (1990) will be given in p. 3. 
 
31 See, European Council Presidency Conclusions, Corfu 24-25 June 1994; Agenda 2000, 15 July 1997; 
European Council Presidency Conclusions, Vienna 11-12 December 1998; Helsinki 10-11 December 
1999; Nice 7-8-9 December 2000; Seville 21-22 June 2002; Thessaloniki 19-20 June 2003; Protocol No. 
10 on Cyprus, 23 September 2003; European Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels 25-26 March 
2004 and Brussels 11 December 2006. For the support of the EP see, EP Res., 15 March 1990; 12 July 
1990; 14 March 1991; 21 January 1993; 12 July 1995; 19 September 1996 and EP Res. on Cyprus`s 
membership application to the EU and the state of negotiations, COM(2000) 702-C5-0602/2000-
1997/2171(COS). 
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the then President of the TRNC, sent a memorandum (Turkish Cypriot Memorandum, 
1990) to the Council of Ministers and a Supplementary Note (1990) setting out his 
objections to this unilateral application of the Greek Cypriot community and advising 
that it would welcome the EU membership but only after a fair settlement of the dispute. 
The UN SC called on the parties concerned to refrain from any action or statement that 
could aggravate the situation by making a reference to the UN SC Resolution 649 (1990) 
(Statement by the President of the SC, 1990: 2930th Meeting).32  
 Nevertheless, in September 1990, the European Community (EC) member states 
unanimously agreed to refer the Cypriot application to the Commission for formal 
consideration. The EP, by pointing out the lack of the EC involvement in finding a 
solution to the Cyprus question, called on the European Council and the Council of 
Ministers to take the necessary steps for being a part of that process (EP Res., September 
1991: Parags. 5-6) . 
 In October 1991, as a new concept, the UN SC declared its support for “one State 
of Cyprus comprising two politically equal communities” (UN SC Res. 716, 1991: 
Parag. 4).33 Also, for an agreement on Cyprus, the SC requested Greece and Turkey to 
cooperate fully with the UN SG (UN SC Res. 716, 1991: Parag. 9).34 The UN SC 
reaffirmed that:  
A Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single 
sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its 
                                                 
32 For the reference to Res. 649 (1990), see, also, Statement by the President of the SC, 9 November 1990; 
28 March 1991; 23 December 1991; UN SC Res. 716, 11 October 1991 and 750 (10 April 1992). 
 
33 See, also, Secretary General Report S/21183, eleventh paragraph of Annex I, 8 March 1990 and UN SC 
Res. 1251, 29 June 1999. 
 
34 See, also, Statement by the President of the SC, 3024th meeting, 23 December 1991. 
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independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two 
politically equal communities, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and 
that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other 
country or any form of partition or secession (UN SC Res. 750, 1992: Parag. 
2; UN SG Report, 1992: S/23780).35 
  
The UN SC stated that “the Secretary-General`s mission of good offices is with 
the two communities whose participation in the process is on an equal footing…” (UN 
SC Res. 750, 1992: Parag. 6).36 However, the EU membership application of the Greek 
Administration is said to be an attempt which undermines this “equal footing” concept. 
 In June 1992, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, the then UN SG, invited the leaders of the 
two communities for discussions on a new UN initiative, namely the “Set of Ideas” for 
an overall framework agreement on Cyprus (Set of Ideas, 1992).37 The “Set of Ideas” 
covered practically all aspects of the Cyprus problem such as the constitutional aspects 
of the federation, security and guarantee, territorial adjustments38, displaced persons, 
economic development and safeguards, transitional arrangements and included a map 
                                                 
35 See, also, UN SC Res. 649, 12 March 1990, 716 (11 October 1991), 774 (26 August 1992), 939 (29 July 
1994), 1092 (23 December 1996), 1117 (27 June 1997), 1146 (23 December 1997), 1179 (29 June 1998), 
1217 (22 December 1998) and 1251 (29 June 1999). 
 
36 See, also, UN SC Res. 774, 26 August 1992.  
 
37 See, also, UN SC Res. 774, 26 August 1992, 789 (25 November 1992) and 1062 (28 June 1996). 
 
38 Related to the territorial adjustments, the “Set of Ideas” urged the Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
communities to agree on the territories of the federated states administered by each, taking into account 
the (12 February) 1977 High Level Agreement which states that “2. The territory under the administration 
of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land 
ownership”. The “Set of Ideas” also specified that “69. Persons affected by the territorial adjustments will 
have the option of remaining in the area concerned or relocating to the federated state administered by 
their own community.” It also urged the placement of Varosha under the UN administration. For further 
information, see, Set of Ideas, 1992. 
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delineating territorial adjustments for a future federation. It suggested a bi-zonal 
federation of two politically equal communities, possessing one international personality 
and sovereignty. As for the EU membership, the “Set of Ideas” emphasized that 
“Matters related to the membership of the federal republic in the European Economic 
Community will be discussed and agreed to, and will be submitted for the approval of 
the two communities in separate referendums” (Parag. 92). In this way, the UN left the 
decision on the EU membership of Cyprus to the approval of only the two communities 
in the island. 
 However, as a result of the joint meetings between the two leaders, which lasted 
from 28 October to 11 November 1992, an overall framework agreement did not 
materialize (UN SG Report, 1992: S/24830). At that point, as the UN SC did (Letter by 
the President of the UN SC, 1993), the EP also, in a number of decisions, accused of the 
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot side for the failure of the meetings between the two 
communities and for its lack of willingness for a settlement (EP Res., January 1993: 
Parags. 1,3 and 5).39 Although Denktash accepted the right of return and right to 
property, the Parliament adopted the position of the UN SC that the reason of the failure 
of the settlement talks is the fact that certain positions taken by the Turkish Cypriot side 
were, in a fundamental way, at variance with the “Set of ideas” - the concept of 
federation, displaced persons and territorial adjustments (EP Res., January 1993: Parag. 
1).40 With regard to the concept of federation, the UN SG said that the thrust of the 
position of the Turkish Cypriot side was based on the premise that there were at present 
                                                 
39 See, also, Resolution on the Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus Progress towards 
accession, COM(98)0710-C4-0108/99. 
  
40 See, also, UN SG Report, S/24830, 19 November 1992 and UN SC Res. 789, 25 November 1992. 
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two sovereign states with equal rights and that they would remain effectively sovereign 
in a future federation, however, he recalled that the resolutions of the SC concerning 
Cyprus from 1964 onwards had sought to preserve the territorial integrity and unity of 
Cyprus (UN SG Report, 1992: S/24830). 
 So, the UN SG set forth a number of Confidence Building Measures (1992-1994) 
between the two sides.41 The SC urged all concerned to commit themselves to the 
confidence-building measures (UN SC Res. 789, 1992: Parag. 8)42 which include “a 
significant reduction of the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus as a first 
step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces envisaged in the “Set of Ideas” and a 
reduction of defence spending in the Republic of Cyprus” (UN SC Res. 789, 1992: 
Parag. 8/a)43. The EP declared its full support for the UN SC proposals by urging the 
Turkish side to accept the confidence-building measures and to cooperate with the other 
parties (EP Res., January 1993: Parag. 5). As the UN stated in its several resolutions 
(UN SC Res. 774, 1992: Parag. 10),44 the EU has also taken the firm position that the 
present status quo in Cyprus is unacceptable and poses danger for the region (EP Res., 
January 1993: Parag. 2).45 So, the EP declared that the European Commission and 
                                                 
41 For the list of the Confidence Building Measures, see, UN Secretary-General Report, S/24830, 19 
November 1992; UN SC Res. 789, 25 November 1992 and 939 (29 July 1994). 
 
42 See, also, UN SC Res. 831, 27 May 1993 and 927 (15 June 1994). 
 
43  See also, UN SC Res. 831, 27 May 1993, 927 (15 June 1994), 889 (15 December 1993), 969 (21 
December 1994), 1000 (23 June 1995), 1032 (19 December 1995), 1062 (28 June 1996), 1092 (23 
December 1996), 1117 (27 June 1997), 1146 (23 December 1997), 1178 (29 June 1998), 1217 (22 
December 1998) and 1250 (29 June 1999). 
 
44 See, also, UN SC Res. 789, 25 November 1992, 831 (27 May 1993), 889 (15 December 1993), 939 (29 
July 1994), 1092 (23 December 1996), 1117 (27 June 1997), 1146 (23 December 1997), 1179 (29 June 
1998), 1217 (22 December 1998) and 1251 (29 June 1999). 
 
45 See, also, EP Res., 12 July 1995 and Agenda 2000, 15 July 1997. 
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European Council should contribute to the admission of Cyprus to the Community 
which will have positive effects on resolving the Cyprus problem (EP Res., January 
1993: Parag. 6).  
 On June 26-27, 1992, the EU stated that relations with Cyprus will be developed 
by building on their application for membership (Lisbon Presidency Conclusions, 1992: 
5). The European Council declared its support for the Commission's approach, which 
proposed, without awaiting a peaceful, balanced and lasting solution to the Cyprus 
problem, to use all the instruments offered by the Association Agreement to help with 
the economic, social and political transition of Cyprus towards integration into the EU 
(European Council Conclusions on Commission`s opinion, 1993).46 On June 30, 1993, 
the Commission stated that Cyprus's integration with the Community implies a peaceful, 
balanced and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question and increased security and 
prosperity and it would help bring the two communities on the island closer together and 
there will be a greater chance of narrowing the development gap between north and 
south (European Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus, 
1993: “Conclusions”, Parags. 3 and 5).47  
The Commission also declared that “even though they object to the conditions 
under which the application for membership was made, the leaders of the Turkish 
Cypriot community are fully conscious of the economic and social benefits that 
integration with Europe would bring their community” (“Conclusions”, Parag. 4). In this 
way, the Commission meant that the Turkish side will one day recognize its potential 
                                                 
46 See, also, the European Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for 
Membership, doc/93/5, 30 June 1993 and Protocol No. 10 on Cyprus, 23 September 2003. 
 
47 See, also, Conclusions of the EU Council of Ministers, 6 March 1995, Agenda 2000, 15 July 1997 and 
the European Council Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg 12-13 December 1997. 
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interests in the EU integration process and will adopt the proposed settlement efforts. 
The Commission also addressed the TRNC as a de facto authority - and the situation in 
the island as de facto partition (1998 Regular Report on Cyprus`s Progress towards 
Accession). 
 The European Commission also dismissed the TRNC`s counter statements about 
the application of the Greek Cypriots to the EU by stating that: “The Community, 
however, following the logic of its established position, which is consistent with that of 
the United Nations where the legitimacy of the government of the Republic of Cyprus 
and non-recognition of the ‘TRNC’ are concerned, felt that the application was 
admissible” (Parag. 8). In view of all these points, the Commission declared that the 
Community considers Cyprus as eligible for membership and that “as soon as the 
prospect of a settlement is surer”, the Community is ready to start the process with 
Cyprus that should eventually lead to its accession and the Commission is willing to 
begin immediately talks with the government of Cyprus (“Conclusions”, Parag. 6).48  
 One of the basic motivations for this attitude is said to be the fact that the EU 
was in a construction period in the post-Cold War era and without a settlement, the 
membership of Cyprus with its conflictual structure would cause disadvantages for the 
EU. So, in the period of 1990-1994, the EU established a linkage between Cyprus’s EU 
membership and the settlement of the dispute and Cyprus was rarely mentioned within 
                                                 
48 The Council welcomed this opinion regarding the eligibility and suitability of Cyprus to be a part of the 
EU. See, European Council Conclusions on Accession of Cyprus and Malta, Brussels 19-20 July 1993. 
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the EU`s enlargement plans. However, cease-fire violations continued, confidence 
building measures did not work49 and no progress was made towards a political solution. 
 
 
3.1.2 June 1994 - December 1999 
  
 At the Corfu Summit on June 24-25, 1994, the European Council declared that 
Cyprus would be involved in the next phase of enlargement (Corfu  Presidency 
Conclusions, 1994).50 This was the first time that the EU accession process of Cyprus 
and the condition of reaching a settlement to the Cyprus dispute were separated. That is, 
a settlement is not required before the accession of Cyprus to the EU. Especially two 
factors led to this decision. First, in that period, Greece put forward its veto as a threat to 
the Central and Eastern European countries enlargement if the Greek Cypriots were not 
accepted to the Union (Oğuzlu, 2002: 2). Second, Greece would lift its veto on Turkey’s 
accession to Customs Union in exchange for the start of accession talks with the Greek 
Cypriots (Ankara Paper 10: 45). Following the year 1993, the UN and EU decisions 
would generally be parallel to each other. 
 On July 5, 1994, the European Court of Justice banned the exports of some 
goods without the GCA health and transport certificates from northern Cyprus to the EU 
                                                 
49 The UN SC expressed its concern about the lack of progress towards a significant reduction in the 
number of foreign troops and of defence spending in Cyprus as provisions of the confidence building 
measures. See, UN SC Res. 927, 15 June 1994, 969 (21 December 1994), 1000 (23 June 1995), 1032 (19 
December 1995), 1062 (28 June 1996), 1092 (23 December 1996), 1117 (27 June 1997), 1146 (23 
December 1997), 1178 (29 June 1998), 1217 (22 December 1998), 1250 (29 June 1999) and 1251 (29 
June 1999). 
 
50 See, also, European Council Presidency Conclusions, Essen 19 December 1994 and Conclusions of the 
EU Council of Ministers, 6 March 1995. 
44 
 
states as a result of the Greek claims (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 286-287). 
Afterwards, on December 19, 1994, the EU-Turkey relations were further damaged 
when Greece blocked the final implementation of a customs union with Turkey.   
“Since 1995, the Cyprus problem has become an important EU foreign policy 
issue because of its implications for the EU`s relations with Turkey and the overall EU 
enlargement process” (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 286-287). On March 6, 1995, 
“the EU Council of Ministers reaffirmed the suitability of Cyprus for accession to the 
EU and confirmed the Union’s will to incorporate Cyprus in the next stage of its 
enlargement” (Conclusions of the EU Council of Ministers, 1995). So, when the EU 
opened the way for the start of the accession negotiations of Cyprus without any 
conditions, Greece removed its opposition to the customs union with Turkey. 
Consequently, Turkey and the EU signed the Customs Union Agreement on March 6, 
1995. The EU reaffirmed that negotiations on the accession of Cyprus to the Union will 
begin six months after the conclusion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
(Cannes Presidency Conclusions, 1995).51 In this way, as Tocci (2002: 108) argues, “the 
French Presidency skillfully linked the removal of the December 1994 Greek veto on the 
final stage of the Turkish-EU customs union with the initiation of Cyprus` accession 
negotiations after the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference”. 
 The EP declared its wish for a more decisive involvement by the EU in efforts to 
secure a lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem (EP Res., 1995: Preamble Parag. F). 
As the UN has declared, the EU, in a number of decisions, has also claimed its support 
for a solution related to the island`s reunification in the form of a sovereign, 
                                                 
51 See, also, European Council Presidency Conclusions, Madrid 15-16 December 1995 and Dublin 13-14 
December 1996. 
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independent, bi-zonal and bi-communal federation with a view to accession to the Union 
and considered the island of being a single entity, with a legitimate and internationally 
recognized government (EP Res. 1995: Parags. 2 and 3).52 The Parliament declared the 
GCA as the only State internationally recognized as representing the whole island (EP 
Res., 2001: COM(2000) 702-C5-0602/2000-1997/2171(COS), Preamble Parag. A). 
Also, the Union has continuously stated that the EU accession of Cyprus can help speed 
up a peaceful settlement in the Cyprus dispute and membership should benefit both 
communities (EP Res., 1995: Parag. 12)53 and has pointed to the positive role which 
Cyprus will play by enhancing the Union`s contribution to peace and security in Europe, 
particularly in the eastern Mediterranean (EP Res., 1995: Parag. 13).  
 On July 17, 1995, the European Council decided on structured dialogue to bring 
Cyprus closer to the EU and on November 21, 1995, the Council and the authorities in 
Nicosia concluded a Protocol on financial and technical cooperation. So, Turkey and the 
TRNC, as they stated in a number of declarations, made a joint declaration on December 
28, 1995, which asserted that they only approve the accession of Cyprus to the EU after 
a final settlement of the Cyprus problem and once Turkey has become a member as well 
(Joint Declaration, 1995: Parag. 3).54 Turkey and the TRNC also declared their support 
for “a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal settlement based on the sovereign equality 
                                                 
52 See, also, Conclusions of the EU Council of Ministers, 6 March 1995, European Council Presidency 
Conclusions, Luxembourg 12-13 December 1997 and Agenda 2000, 15 July 1997. 
 
53 See, also, EP Res., 24 October 1996, 17 September 1997, Agenda 2000, 15 July 1997, European 
Council Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg 12-13 December 1997 and European Parliament 
Resolution on Cyprus`s membership application to the EU and the state of negotiations, COM(2000) 702-
C5-0602/2000-1997/2171(COS). 
 
54 See, also,  Press Statement of Turkey and the TRNC, 4 July 1997 and Press Statement of the TRNC 
Government, 14 December 1997. 
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of the two sides” (Parag. 1) and stated that the relations between Turkey the TRNC 
would be strengthened in political and economic terms. 
In a number of Resolutions, the UN SC recognized that “the decision of the EU 
concerning the opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus is an important new 
development that should facilitate an overall settlement” (UN SC Res. 1062, 1996: 3, 
Parag. 13).55 This has been one of the views commonly shared by the UN and EU. 
 The UN and EU continued to put more emphasis on the Turkish side in 1996 as 
well. Indeed, the UN SC expressed its concern about the deteriorating situation in 
Cyprus (UN SC Res. 1092, 1996: Preamble)56 and deplored the excessive levels of 
military forces and armaments in the island57 and about the restrictions placed upon the 
freedom of movement of UNFICYP58 in the northern part of island.59 So, the UN urged 
all concerned, especially the Turkish Cypriot leadership, to lift all obstacles to 
diplomatic missions of the UN and stressed the importance of demilitarization of the 
                                                 
55 See, also, UN SC Res. 1092, 23 December 1996, 1117 (27 June 1997) and 1146 (23 December 1997). 
 
56 See, also, UN SG Report, 10 December 1996. 
 
57 UN SC Res. 1092, 23 December 1996, 1117 (27 June 1997), 1146 (23 December 1997), 1178 (29 June 
1998) and 1251 (29 June 1999). See, also, UN Security Council Resolution 1000, 23 June 1995, 1032 (19 
December 1995), 1062 (28 June 1996), 1217 (22 December 1998) and 1250 (29 June 1999). 
 
58 UNFICYP has not had the mandate to forcefully prevent the armaments of the two communities. 
 
59 Upon the TRNC`s views about the UN`s impartial attitudes, on June 30, 2000, the TRNC took some 
restrictive measures against UNFICYP: “UNFICYP`s entry to and exit from the TRNC will take place 
only through the Ledra Palace border gate, the Force will be required to have all UN vehicles used on 
TRNC territory insured by an insurance agency operating in the TRNC, UNFICYP will be required to pay 
for the water and electricity used at its camps located in the TRNC.” So, the UN SC urged the Turkish 
Cypriot side and Turkish forces to rescind these restrictions and to restore the military status quo at 
Strovilia. See, UN SC Res. 1486, 11 June 2003. See, also, UN SC Res. 1517, 24 November 2003, 1548 
(11 June 2004), 1568 (22 October 2004) and 1687 (15 June 2006). 
     On May 19, 2005 the Turkish Cypriot side lifted the restrictions imposed on the operations of 
UNFICYP as a result of the UN efforts and this would allow UNFICYP to restore its operational 
capabilities in and around the buffer zone. See, UN SG Report, S/2005/353, parag. 15, 27 May 2005 and 
UN SC Res. 1604, 15 June 2005. 
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“Republic of Cyprus” for a comprehensive settlement.60 The EP also condemned the 
murderers by declaring the Turkish security forces as “occupation” powers and the 
Denktash regime as “unlawful” (EP Res., September 1996). 
 In addition, in the suit brought by a Greek Cypriot national, Titina Loizidou, 
against Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) took a crucial decision 
sentencing Turkey for denying the control of her property with 6 votes for and 11 votes 
against (Case of Loizidou v. Turkey, 18 December 1996).61 The interesting part of the 
decision was the condemnation of Turkey instead of the TRNC because the TRNC is not 
recognized internationally. In the ECHR decision, it was stated that “the international 
community does not regard the TRNC as a State under international law and that the 
Republic of Cyprus has remained the sole legitimate Government of Cyprus…” (Parag. 
44). In the decision, the ECHR also defined Turkey as an “occupying power” in Cyprus. 
In addition to being a major political embarrassment for Ankara, the case also had severe 
financial implications as the Court ruled that Turkey should pay Mrs. Loizidou $825,000 
in compensation for the loss of use of her property. This landmark ruling led thousands 
of Greek Cypriot applications to the ECHR.  
 The relations became worse on January 5, 1997 when the GCA announced that 
they intended to purchase the Russian-made S-300 anti-aircraft missile system and they 
were purchased from Russia in 1998 by the then Greek Cypriot President, Glafcos 
                                                 
60 UN SC Res. 1062, 28 June 1996, UN SG Report, 27 June 1996, UN SC Res. 1092, 23 December 1996, 
1146 (23 December 1997) and Joint statement made after the Papadopoulos-Annan meeting, Paris 28 
February 2006. For the UN call from the parties to refrain from the threat or use of force as a means to 
resolve the Cyprus dispute, see, UN SC Res. 1218, 22 December 1998, 1250 (29 June 1999) and 1251 (29 
June 1999). 
 
61 See, also, European Court of Human Rights Case of Xenides-Arestis vs. Turkey, 46347/99, Strasbourg 
22 December 2005. 
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Clerides.62 Turkey`s perception of these missiles as a direct threat to its security led to a 
regional crisis (Press Release on the EU Membership of Greek Cypriot Administration 
of Southern Cyprus, 1998). Also, in 1997, Greece declared its threat to veto the 
enlargement process unless Cyprus is included in the first round of accession in 2003-
4.63  
 So, a Joint Declaration proposing economic and financial integration and partial 
foreign, defense and security policy integration was made by Turkey and the TRNC on 
January 20, 1997 (Joint Declaration between the TRNC and Turkey, 1997). Turkey and 
the TRNC believed that the GCA was trying to achieve indirect enosis through the EU 
membership. They declared that any attack against the TRNC would be considered an 
attack on Turkey and that “all steps taken by the Greek Cypriot Administration towards 
accession to the EU will accelerate the integration of the TRNC with Turkey” (Joint 
Declaration between the TRNC and Turkey, 1997: “Conclusions”, Parag. 2).64  
 Also, on July 4, 1997, a joint statement was made by Turkey and the TRNC by 
which they declared that in Cyprus there are two separate peoples and administrations, 
the approach of regarding the Greek Cypriot Administration as the legitimate 
government does not contribute to the settlement of the Cyprus problem, the acceptance 
of the Turkish Cypriot side`s equal political and legal status and lifting the restrictions 
                                                 
62 The missiles had to be moved to Greek island of Crete for safekeeping following huge pressure from 
Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. On December 19, 2007, defense ministers of Greece and Greek Cypriot 
Administaration have signed an agreement to formally transfer to Greece the controversial Russian S-300 
missiles. Cyprus transferred the ownership of the S-300 missiles in exchange for two other missile 
systems from Greece. See, China View Xinhua, 20 December 2007. 
 
63 The Greek Foreign Minister declared that “If Cyprus is not admitted, then there will be no enlargement 
of the Community”, November 1996.  
 
64 See, also, Press Statement of Turkey and the TRNC, 4 July 1997 and Joint Statement by Turkey and the 
TRNC, 20 July 1997. 
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on the TRNC in the international field will facilitate the efforts towards a settlement and 
1960 Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance would remain valid (Press Statement of Turkey 
and the TRNC, 1997). The EP “denounced the joint declaration signed by Turkey and 
the illegal regime in the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus, which threaten to 
annex the occupied part of the island to Turkey, as illegal, provocative…” (EP Res., 
September 1997: Parag. 1).  
 In July 1997, the EU defined the enlargement to include Cyprus as “an 
opportunity in terms of its security, its economy, its culture and its place in the world” 
(Agenda 2000, 1997: “Enlarging the Union”, Parag. 1). The EU declared its 
determination for playing a positive role in bringing about a just and lasting settlement 
in accordance with the relevant UN Resolutions (Agenda 2000, 1997: “Prospects for a 
Political Settlement”, Parag. 3). The Union also suggested that:  
The timetable agreed for accession negotiations to start with Cyprus means 
that they could start before a political settlement is reached... If progress 
towards a settlement is not made before the negotiations are due to begin, 
they should be opened with the government of the Republic of Cyprus, as 
the only authority recognized by international law (Agenda 2000, 1997: 
“Relations with the European Union”). 
 
The Turkish Cypriots responded to the Agenda 2000 by declaring that the EU 
decision would render useless the process of negotiations recommenced between the two 
leaders and by expressing their determination to deepen further the existing cooperation 
between Turkey and the TRNC (Joint Statement by Turkey and the TRNC, 1997: Parag. 
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4).65 Indeed, on August 6, 1997, an agreement establishing the Association Council 
between Turkey and the TRNC and aiming partial integration in economic, military and 
foreign policy means signed between the two parties (Agreement on the Establishment 
of an Association Council, 1997). 
 At December 1997 Luxembourg Summit, the March 30, 1998 was given to the 
GCA as the date to begin accession negotiations on the conditions for their entry into the 
Union and Turkey was excluded from the list of candidates for the next wave of the EU 
enlargement (Luxembourg Presidency Conclusions, 1997: Parag. 11). The Council 
stated that the accession of Cyprus should benefit all communities and help to bring 
about civil peace and political solution to the Cyprus dispute under the aegis of the UN 
which must continue with a view to creating of a bi-community, bi-zonal federation in 
the island (Parag. 28). In that context, the European Council requested the GCA to 
include representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community in the accession negotiating 
delegation (Parag. 28). The EP stated that the solution of the Cyprus problem will be 
facilitated by the accession negotiations, however the accession negotiations should be 
kept separate from efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem (EP Res., 1999: 
COM(98)0710-C4-0108/99). 
 As a result of the 1997 Luxembourg Summit decisions, the TRNC and Turkey 
decided to break off all contacts with the EU by claiming that the “EU membership of 
Cyprus can only be discussed and agreed to after an overall settlement, and upon its 
approval by the two sides through separate referenda, as envisaged in paragraph 92 of 
                                                 
65 See, also, Joint Declaration between Turkey and TRNC, 20 July 1999.  
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the UN ‘Set of Ideas’” (Press Statement of the TRNC Government, 1997).66 In addition, 
on March, Denktash stated that the Turkish side would not accept any delegation called 
“Cyprus Delegation” which was declared by the EU and the GCA (Press Statement by 
Rauf Denktash, 1998: Parag. 2). He declared that the EU accession negotiations were 
leaded by completely the Greek delegation and there had not been any government 
representing the two communities in the island for 35 years, so he emphasized that the 
Greek administration had neither the jurisdiction nor the right to take part in the so-
called conference on behalf of Cyprus and to extend a request to the Turkish side for its 
participation in the EU accession negotiations under the Cyprus Delegation (Parag. 2).  
 Indeed, as it was declared at 1997 Luxembourg Summit, the accession 
negotiations with Cyprus started on March 30, 1998 without the participation of the 
Turkish Cypriots. Symbolically, just one day after the start of the EU accession 
negotiations, the first meeting of the Association Council between Turkey and the 
TRNC held on March 31, 1998 through which they established a Joint Economic Zone 
(Declaration by the Association Council, 1998). At that point, the UN SC accused the 
Turkish leadership of the suspension of the holding of bi-communal events and urged 
both sides, and in particular the Turkish Cypriot side, to commit themselves to bi-
communal negotiations and to cooperate actively with the UN SG (UN SC Res. 1178, 
1998: Parag. 10).67  
 In response to the start of accession negotiations with Cyprus, on August 31, 
1998, Denktash announced that he would no longer accept federation as a basis for a 
                                                 
66 See, also, Press Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, 14 December 
1997. 
 
67 See, also, UN SC Res. 1179, 29 June 1998, 1251 (29 June 1999) and 1475 (14 April 2003). 
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settlement and proposed the Greek Cypriot side to establish together a Confederation in 
Cyprus. Denktash`s five point-proposal included a special relationship between Turkey 
and the TRNC, a similar relationship between Greece and the GCA, establishment of a 
Cyprus Confederation between the TRNC and the GCA, the continuation of the 1960 
guarantee system and a policy of accession of the Cyprus Confederation to the EU only 
as a result of the common will of the two sides (Call for peace from the Turkish side, 
1998). He also stated that the authorities of one party would not represent the other. In 
other words, the settlement would be based on the recognition of the TRNC as an equal 
state with the GCA. Turkey also declared its full support for this proposal (Turkish 
Republic National Assembly decision, 1999). The EP found Denktash`s proposal as a 
contradiction to the UN Resolutions and as a reward to “Turkish aggression and to the 
partial occupation of Cyprus” (EP Res., 1999: COM(98)0710-C4-0108/99). 
 On November 9, 1998, France, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands declared 
their anxiety about the start of negotiations with a divided Cyprus (Joint Statement Made 
by Italy, France, Germany and the Netherlands, 1998). However, given the Greek threat 
to veto the entire enlargement process unless Cyprus is included in the first round of 
accession, despite its explicitly negative impressions, any EU member state has not 
vetoed the entry of a divided Cyprus to the Union since then.   
 So, between 1994 and 1999, as the Europeans became pro-Greek Cypriot, the 
Greek Cypriots began to show their nationalistic attitudes more. Also, the link between 
Turkey-EU relations and the Cyprus dispute became apparent in that period. As the EU-
Turkey relations went down, Turkey made its policies about Cyprus hard. “While the 
accession negotiations with the Greek administration moved forward successfully, there 
was no progress on the resolution of the Cyprus problem. To the contrary, the inter-
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communal talks which broke down in 1997 were interrupted until December 1999” 
(Suvarierol, 2003: 64). The first round of proximity talks started on December 3, 1999. 
 
 
3.1.3. December 1999 - May 2004 
  
December 11, 1999 Helsinki Summit was a turning point in the EU-Cyprus 
relations. In the Helsinki Conclusions, “the Council welcomes the launch of the talks 
aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December (1999) in 
New York and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary General`s efforts to 
bring the process to a successful conclusion” (Helsinki Presidency Conclusions, 1999: 
Art. 9/a).  
 In Helsinki, conditionality on the “Republic of Cyprus” was explicitly 
abandoned. The European Council underlined that: 
A political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European 
Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession 
negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the 
above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all 
relevant factors (Art. 9/b).  
 
This means that if Turkey and Turkish Cypriot community do not take steps 
towards a settlement of the Cyprus dispute, the European Council will decide for the 
accession of the Greek Cypriot Community without waiting the settlement of the 
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problem in the way the Turkish side wants. The then President Denktash stated that the 
necessity to conduct this process between two equal parties has been ignored at the 
Helsinki Summit (Statement by Rauf Denktash, 1999).  
 In Helsinki, Greece lifted its opposition to the EU candidacy of Turkey, because 
the EU removed the necessity for a settlement in the EU membership process of Cyprus. 
In this way, in Helsinki, the European Council declared Turkey as a candidate State 
destined to join the Union (Art. 9/b). So, tensions between Turkey and the EU eased and 
in 2000, a new round of talks started in New York. However, tensions started to rise 
again over the island`s EU accession. 
 On September 12, 2000, the then UN SG Kofi Annan emphasized the political 
equality of the two communities on the island and the principle that each leadership 
could only represent its own community and no other (Tocci, 2002: 114). The Greek 
Cypriot House of Representatives rejected this statement defining it outside the 
framework of the UN principles and claiming it included unacceptable “confederal 
elements” (RoC, House of Representatives Resolution, 2000). On the other hand, as 
relations between Cyprus and the EU improved, the Turkish Cypriot position hardened. 
 However, perhaps realizing the gravity of the situation, as a result of Rauf 
Denktash`s proposal to Glafcos Clerides, the decision to start face-to-face talks was 
taken on December 4, 2001 (UN SG Report, 2003: S/2003/398, Parag. 10). “The EU 
thus continued to view the Republic of Cyprus as fulfilling its conditions as far as a 
settlement is concerned” (Tocci, 2002: 109). Indeed, at the Laeken Summit, the 
European Council declared its determination for bringing the accession negotiations 
with the candidate countries that are ready to a successful conclusion by the end of 2002 
(Laeken Presidency Conclusions, 2001: Parag. 8).  
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 Following several informal meetings between the two Presidents in November 
and December 2001, an intensive and open-ended rounds of negotiations between the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders began under the UN auspices on January 16, 2002, 
however, the talks soon became deadlocked (UN SG Report, 2003: S/2003/398, Parag. 
11). At the Seville Summit in June 2002, the EU, as it declared in a number of its 
decisions, put forward its continuing preference for the accession of a “reunited Cyprus” 
to the Union (Seville Presidency Conclusions, 2002: ).68 In that context, the Council 
called upon the leaders of the two communities to intensify their talks in order to reach a 
comprehensive settlement, consistent with the UN SC Resolutions, before conclusion of 
the negotiations (Parag. 24).69 The EU gave a commitment for making a substantial 
financial contribution in support of the development of the northern part of a “reunited 
island” (Parag. 24). Also, the European Council declared that “in respect of the 
accession of Cyprus, the Helsinki Conclusions (December 1999) are the basis of the 
European Union`s position” (Parag. 24).70  
 While the EP repeated the Helsinki decision stating that a political solution was 
not a precondition for Cyprus`s accession to the EU, it also stated that such a solution 
prior to accession is highly desirable (EP Res., 2001: COM(2000) 702-C5-0602/2000-
1997/2171(COS), Parag. H). The Parliament stated that “there is no possibility of 
separate negotiations with the two parts of the island, and no question of either accession 
                                                 
68 See, also, European Council Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen 12-13 December 2002, Brussels 12 
December 2003, Brussels 25-26 March 2004, European Commission Proposal, IP/03/786, Brussels 3 June 
2003, Council Regulation (EC) No 866/2004, 29 April 2004, Press Release, SC/8051, 4940th meeting, 2 
April 2004, European Parliament Resolution on Copenhagen European Council, 19 December 2002, 
European Parliament Resolution, 21 April 2004 and General Affairs and External Relations Council, 276th 
Council Meeting, Luxembourg 26 April 2004. 
 
69 See, also, European Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels 24 -25 October 2002. 
 
70 See, also, European Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels 24-25 October 2002. 
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for two Cypriot states or of accession of the northern part of the island upon Turkish 
accession” (“Political Situation”, Parag. 2) The Parliament declared that “the 
Government of Cyprus is negotiating EU accession on behalf of all Cypriots, and when 
the accession process is successfully concluded, the entire island and all its citizens will 
legally be part of the EU” (Parag. C).  
 The most comprehensive attempt to resolve the conflict came on November 11, 
2002, when the then UN SG Kofi Annan presented the “Basis for Agreement on a 
Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem” (Annan Plan). The Plan proposed 
the establishment of the United Cyprus Republic by bringing the island's two 
communities into a federation of two equal constituent states (Basis for Agreement on a 
Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, 2002: Art. 2/1/a). Also, in the Annan 
Plan, Cyprus is recommended to actively support the membership of Turkey in 
connection to accession of Cyprus to the Union (Art. 1/5). The Plan was welcomed by 
the EU due to its strong belief concerning the Plan`s achievement in meeting the 
demands of the sides. However, Rauf Denktash, who was recuperating from major heart 
surgery, refused to attend to the negotiations. 
 At the December 2002 Copenhagen Summit, the European Council stated that as 
the accession negotiations have been completed with Cyprus, Cyprus will be admitted as 
a new member state to the EU and the Union looks forward to welcoming Cyprus as a 
member from May 1, 2004 (Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions, 2002: Parag. 3 and 
10). The European Council also declared that “in case of a settlement, the Council shall 
decide upon adaptations of the terms concerning the accession of Cyprus to the EU with 
regard to the Turkish Cypriot community”, however, “in the absence of a settlement, the 
application of the acquis to the northern part of the island to the Union shall be 
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suspended, until the Council decides unanimously otherwise, on the basis of a proposal 
by the Commission” (Parag. 11). At that point, the then UN SG stated that: 
 Given economic and numerical disparities, the unrestricted application of 
the acquis communautaire in the north would be problematic for the Turkish 
Cypriots… and special arrangements would be needed for Cyprus... The 
European Union, with its acquis would never be an obstacle to finding a 
solution to the Cyprus problem (UN SG Report, 2003: S/2003/398, Parag. 
31). 
 
 The peace talks collapsed. The European Council urged all parties concerned, in 
particular, the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reconsider its position and reaffirmed its 
decisions taken at Copenhagen (December 2002) with regard to Cyprus`s accession to 
the EU (Brussels Presidency Conclusions, 2003: Parag. 85).71 In this way, the Council 
has put more emphasis on the Turkish side in failing to reach a settlement in the island. 
The EP gave its assent to the EU membership application of the GCA (EP Legislative 
Res., 2003: P5_TA-PROV(2003)0171). So, on April 16, 2003, Cyprus formally signed 
the EU Treaty of Accession which would enter into force on May 1, 2004 (Treaty of 
Accession, 2003).72  
 On June 3, 2003, as a response to the request of the European Council of 
Copenhagen in December 2002, the European Commission proposed a financial 
assistance for 2003, worth 12 million Euros, to the Turkish Cypriot Community and 
                                                 
71 For the emphasis put by the EU on Turkey and Turkish Cypriot side, see also, European Council 
Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki 19-20 June 2003 and Brussels 12-13 December 2003. See also, UN 
Security Council Resolution 1475, 14 April 2003. 
 
72 See, also, Informal European Council: Athens Declaration, 16 April 2003. 
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measures promoting trade between the northern part of Cyprus and the rest of the Union 
(Commission Proposal, 2003: IP/03/786).73 However, no financial aid would be 
provided to the Turkish Cypriot Community by the EU till 2006.  
Throughout the rest of the year there was no effort to restart talks. The Protocol 
No. 10 on Cyprus, attached to the Treaty of Accession signed on April 16, 2003, 
provides for the suspension of the application of the acquis communautaire in those 
areas of Cyprus, where the GCA does not exercise effective control (Protocol No. 10, 
2003: Art. 1). The Protocol states that in the event of a political settlement, the 
suspension of the application of the acquis communautaire in the Turkish Cypriot 
community would be lifted (Art. 4). It also notes that nothing in the Protocol shall 
preclude measures for promoting the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot 
community and such measures shall not affect the application of the acquis under the 
conditions set out in the Accession Treaty in any other part of Cyprus (Art. 3). In this 
way, the EU keeps the way of establishing financial relations with the northern part of 
the island open. 
 At the European Council Summit in December 2003, it was declared that 
“following a settlement, the Union is ready to provide financial assistance to the 
northern part of Cyprus and the Commission would be called upon to prepare all 
necessary steps for lifting the suspension of the acquis, in accordance with Protocol 10” 
(Brussels Presidency Conclusions, December 2003: Parag. 42). In this way, the EU 
made the commitment of providing financial assistance to the Turkish Cypriot 
                                                 
73 “Four financial protocols on financial co-operation were signed between the EU and the Republic of 
Cyprus, covering a period of 22 years (1978 till 1999). During this time, € 210 Million were made 
available under the form of loans (152 M€), grants (51 M€), and risk capital (7 M€)”, see,  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/past_enlargements/eu10/cyprus_en.htm 
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community and implementing the acquis to the northern part of the island on the 
condition that the Turkish Cypriots would reach an agreement with the Greek Cypriots.  
 After final adjustments, a fifth and final version of the Annan Plan was presented 
to the two sides on March 31, 2004. The EP expressed its support for the final version of 
the Plan so that reunited island can join the EU on 1 May and declared that there is no 
alternative other than the Annan Plan in a long period of time (EP Res., 2004: Parags. 2 
and 10). The Parliament assured both sides that the EU institutions will guarantee the 
implementation of settlement as this is a question touching upon their own credibility 
(Parag. 13). 
  On April 24, 2004, %76 of the Greek Cypriots rejected while %65 of the 
Turkish Cypriots approved Annan`s unity plan in a referendum held in the island (Eralp 
and Beriker, 2005: 178). Tasos Papadopulos explained the reason of the Greek Cypriot 
rejection by declaring that the plan gave the Turkish side and Turkey “nearly everything 
they wanted, more than they needed and more than was fair” and he believed that future 
negotiations would be successful if the Turkish side meets outstanding Greek Cypriot 
concerns (Press Release, 2005: SC/8422, 5211th meeting).  
 Due to the referendum results, the then SG regretted that the Turkish Cypriots 
would not equally enjoy the benefits of the EU membership as of 1 May and hoped that 
the ways would be found to compensate for this (Press Release, 2004: SC/8074, 4954th 
Meeting). Also, Special Adviser Alvaro De Soto expressed that “with the rejection of the 
settlement plan by the Greek Cypriots, the final opportunity to ensure that Cyprus 
acceded to the European Union as a united country rather than a divided one had been 
missed…” and “the Secretary-General welcomed the approval of the plan by the Turkish 
Cypriots who signaled their commitment to reunification and backed away from their 
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search for separate sovereign statehood” (Press Release, 2004: SC/8116, 4986th 
meeting). The then SG also called on the European Council to eliminate unnecessary 
restrictions and barriers that isolate the Turkish Cypriots and impede their development, 
but not for the purposes of affording recognition or assisting secession (Press Release, 
2004: SC/8116, 4986th Meeting). Two days after the referendum, on April 26, 2004, the 
European Council stated that:   
The Turkish Cypriot community has expressed its clear desire for a future 
within the European Union. The Council is determined to put an end to the 
isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification 
of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot 
community (European Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation, 
2004: COM(2004) 466 Final, 2004/0148 (ACC)).74  
 
 On July 7, 2004, the Commission proposed the Financial Aid Regulation and 
Direct Trade Regulation for the northern part of the island (European Commission 
Proposal for a Council Regulation, 2004: COM(2004) 466 Final, 2004/0148 (ACC)).75 
The Commission declared that the envelope amounts to 259 million Euros for the period 
2004-2006 (Commission Proposal IP/04/857, 2004). The legal basis of this financial 
assistance lies in the Protocol No. 10 of the Treaty of Accession 2003 in which the 
European Council states that the application of the acquis has been suspended in the 
northern part of the island, however, measures to promote the development of this area 
                                                 
74 See, also, General Affairs and External Relations Council, 276th Council Meeting, Luxembourg 26 April 
2004. 
 
75 See, also, General Affairs and External Relations Council, 276th Council Meeting, Luxembourg 26 April 
2004. 
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are not precluded by the suspension of the acquis (Protocol No. 10, 2003: Art. 1(1) and 
3(1)).76  
 The Greek side has opposed the Direct Trade Regulation due to the fact that it 
will lead to the abolishment of the embargo over the Turkish Cypriot Community and 
there can be no direct trade via ports and airports in Northern Cyprus as these are 
unrecognized. Instead, it has offered to allow the Turkish Cypriots to use the Greek 
Cypriot facilities, which are internationally recognized. This has been rejected by the 
Turkish Cypriots. 
 The Green Line Regulation (Council Regulation, 2004: No 866/2004) adopted on 
April 29, 2004 by the European Council defines the terms under which the provisions of 
the EU law apply to the movement of goods and persons across the line between the 
Turkish and Greek Cypriot territories (Communication from the Commission Annual 
Report, 2006: COM (2006) 551 final). The Regulation entered into force on May 1, 
2004. Since then, a number of amendments have been made in order to relax the 
crossing of persons from the line and to facilitate the trade in certain agricultural goods 
(Council Resolution, 2005: No 293/2005).77 While the movement of persons is 
encouraging78 despite its illegal structure, “Green Line trade remains very limited 
amounting to approximately € 161.089 per month (approximately € 2 million per year)” 
                                                 
76 See, also, European Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on specific conditions for trade with 
those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not 
exercise effective control, COM (2004) 466 Final, 2004/0148 (ACC), Brussels 7 July 2004. 
 
77 In that context, the list of crossing points has been extended by three additional crossing points, see, 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1283/2005, Brussels 3 August 2005 amending Annex I of the Green 
Line Regulation. And citrus fruits have been allowed to cross the Green Line without being subject to 
customs duties or charges, see, Commission Regulation (EC) No 1624/2005, Brussels 4 October 2005. 
 
78 In April 2003, the Turkish Cypriots had opened the Green Line and allowed for the first time in 30 years 
freedom of movement for people from both sides. Howeever, illegal migration through the Green Line 
increases.  
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(Communication from the Commission Annual Report, 2006: COM (2006) 551 final). 
On the other hand, according to the recent report provided by the Cypriot authorities, 
this amount rose to about € 3.3 million, however, several reported cases confirm that 
there are still many obstacles to the further development of Green Line trade due to the 
restrictions put by the Greek Cypriot authorities on the Turkish Cypriot vehicles and 
relatively limited amount of flow of goods (Annual Report on the Implementation of 
Council Regulation, 2007: COM(2007)553).79  
  
 
3.1.4 May 2004 and afterwards 
  
On May 1, 2004, the Greek Cypriot-controlled “Republic of Cyprus” became a 
full member of the EU. This has been a major turning point for the Cyprus dispute in 
terms of the division of the island since 1974. “This meant that while officially the 
whole of Cyprus entered the EU, the de facto EU border runs along the green line 
dividing the country between its Greek and Turkish parts” (Eralp and Beriker, 2005: 
187). That is, the terms of the acquis communautaire have been suspended in the north. 
Also, the Cyprus dispute has turned to be an internal problem of the EU since then. 
Turkey opposed the EU membership of the GCA declaring that:  
The Greek Cypriots can not claim authority, jurisdiction or sovereignty over 
the Turkish Cypriots, who have equal status, or over the entire island of 
Cyprus... The accession of Southern Cyprus can not prejudice in whatsoever 
                                                 
79 Annual Report on the Implementation of Council Regulation (EC) 866/2004 of 29 April and the 
situation resulting from its Application, COM(2007)553, Brussels 20 September 2007.  
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manner the rights and obligations of Turkey regarding Cyprus under the 
1960 Treaties (Press Release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 
2004: Parags. 9 and 11). 
 
On April 17, 2005, pro-EU and pro-unification candidate Mehmet Ali Talat was 
elected as the president of the TRNC by replacing Rauf Denktash. On February 27, 
2006, the EU approved the Financial Aid Regulation for the Turkish Cypriot 
Community by separating it from the Direct Trade Regulation, despite the rejections of 
the Turkish side (Council Regulation, 2006: No 389/2006). In this regulation, it was 
stated that “nothing in this regulation is intended to imply recognition of any public 
authority in the areas other than the Government of the Republic of Cyprus”. On June 
26, 2006, the EU took a decision to release 139 million Euros of the EU aid to the 
Turkish Cypriot community in order to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by 
encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot Community.80 In fact, 
the negative reactions drawn from the Turkish side against the EU, which has not 
implemented its commitments to the Turkish Cypriots after the Annan Plan, led to this 
surprising decision.  
 On July 8, 2006, Tasos Papadopoulos and Mehmet Ali Talat agreed on “5 Set of 
Principles” of which the most significant points are as follows:  
1. Commitment to the unification of Cyprus based on a bi-zonal, bi-
communal federation and political equality, as set out in the relevant UN SC 
                                                 
80 This aid had been planned as 259 million Euros two years ago, however, 120 million Euros of this aid 
was cancelled because the Regulation could not been approved until the end of 2005 due to the Greek 
opposition. 
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resolutions. 2. Recognition of the fact that the status quo is unacceptable and 
that its prolongation would have negative consequences for the Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots. 3. Commitment to the proposition that a comprehensive 
settlement is both desirable and possible, and should not be further delayed 
(Agreement between Mr Tassos Papadopoulos and Mr Mehmet Ali Talat, 
2006).  
 
Also, the two leaders agreed on meeting further to discuss of the issues that affect 
the day to day life of the people.  
 “On October 27, 2006, the EU released 38.1 million Euros as the first part 
(Commission Decision, 2006: C/2006/5000) and on December 15, 2006, 197.5 million 
Euros as the second and the last part of the anticipated aid package” (Hürriyet, October 
2006 and December 2006).81 On the other hand, the economic cooperation between 
Turkey and the TRNC continues to increase.82  
 In March 2007, the Turkish Cypriot side had pulled down a bridge at the 
Lokmacı border crossing on the Green Line dividing Nicosia to two. Dismantling the 
wall is a step towards reconnecting Ledra Street, which was first closed in the 1960s 
following the inter-communal strife. So, the demolition of the barrier, a bitter symbol of 
the island's 34 year division into a Greek Cypriot south and a Turkish Cypriot north, 
raised hopes for more progress towards reuniting Cyprus. 
                                                 
81 The General Affairs and External Relations Council, as regards the implementation of the Council 
Conclusions of April 2004, adopted that this work must resume without delay. See, General Affairs and 
External Relations, 2775th Council Meeting, 5462/07, Brussels 22 January 2007. 
 
82 On April 10, 2007, Turkey declared its plan to give 783.6 million in aid to northern Cyprus and on April 
25, 2007, Turkey and northern Cyprus signed a protocol to boost cooperation in customs-related issues. 
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 However, insolvability in the island continues today. Recently some problems 
were arisen among the parties as a result of an agreement for defense cooperation signed 
between France and Cyprus in March 2007 (Defence Cooperation Agreement between 
Cyprus and France, 2007) and also of the deals signed by the GCA with Egypt (2005) 
and Lebanon (2007) to delimitate the maritime exclusive economic zone between the 
“Republic of Cyprus”-Lebanon and the “Republic of Cyprus”-Egypt with a view to oil 
drilling (Agreement for the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone, 2007). 
Turkey protested these attempts of the GCA by claiming that these agreements were not 
in line with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and the international law on maritime 
boundaries (Press Release by Turkey, 2007).83  
 
 
3.2 The EU Policies towards Turkey related to the Cyprus Dispute 
  
 Most of the significant decisions about the EU including the enlargement process 
are taken in the European Council meetings, in other words at the Summits, where the 
heads of states and governments of all member states come together. So, the European 
Council meetings where important decisions about Turkey and the Cyprus dispute were 
taken will be analyzed in a general framework. The European Commission decisions 
which are influential in the formation of the European Council decisions and in the 
implementation of the decisions taken at the Summits have a great significance in the 
Cyprus dispute. Indeed, the evolution of the Cyprus dispute and the EU accession of the 
                                                 
83 See, also, Press Release by Turkey, 1 March 2007. 
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Greek administration are in general based on the opinions given by the Commission. On 
the other hand, it should be stated that there have not been any differences in the 
opinions of the European Council and European Commission. That is why the decisions 
of these two institutions will be analyzed under the same heading. 
 
 
3.2.1. The European Council and European Commission Decisions  
 
 Despite Turkey`s efforts for separating the Cyprus dispute from the process of 
Turkey`s EU membership, the EU institutions have tended to put the settlement of the 
Cyprus dispute as an obstacle in front of Turkey`s integration with the Union. 
 Turkey made its application for full membership to the EU on April 14, 1987. 
However, the December 1989 Opinion of the European Commission on the Turkish 
application stated that:  
Examination of the political aspects of the accession of Turkey would be 
incomplete if it did not consider the negative effects of the dispute between 
Turkey and one Member State (Greece) of the Community, and also the 
situation in Cyprus… At issue are the unity, independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Cyprus, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of 
the United Nations (Commission Opinion on Turkey´s Request for 
Accession to the Community, 1989: Parag. 9).  
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That is, Turkey has to solve the Cyprus dispute in order to be an EU member. In a 
declaration on the Cyprus issue, which was adopted at the EU Dublin Summit held in 
June 1990, cited “Cyprus question affects Turkey-EU relations” (Dublin Presidency 
Conclusions, 1990: 34, Annex VIII). From 1989 until 1994, the EU documents 
emphasized that the Cyprus dispute would emerge as a block before Turkey`s accession 
to the EU, where the Turkish politicians and some institutions simply disregarded this 
fact. 
 The European Council at its Dublin meeting in December 1996 “urged Turkey to 
use its influence to contribute to a solution in Cyprus in accordance with UN Security 
Council Resolutions” (Dublin Presidency Conclusions, 1996: “Turkey”, Parag. 3) At 
Luxembourg Summit, in December 1997, while a date was given to the Greek Cypriots 
to begin accession negotiations on the conditions for their entry into the Union, Turkey 
was excluded from the list of candidates for the next wave of EU enlargement 
(Luxembourg Presidency Conclusions, 1997: Parag. 11). Although the Council declared 
that “Turkey will be judged on the basis of the same criteria as the other applicant 
states” (Parag. 31), Turkey`s support for negotiations on a political settlement in Cyprus 
on the basis of the relevant UN SC Resolutions was mentioned as a precondition for 
strengthening Turkey's links with the EU (Parag. 35). This fact was also disregarded by 
the foreign policy makers of Turkey, and no positive steps were taken related to the 
settlement of the Cyprus problem. 
 However, due to the Luxembourg Summit Conclusions (December 1997), 
Turkey decided to break off all contacts with the EU and began to take steps towards an 
economic integration with the TRNC as a response to the improving relations between 
the EU and the GCA. “The EU, aware off the risk of alienating Turkey by excluding it 
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from the list of candidates, had invited it to the European Conference to show that 
Turkey would one day become a candidate for membership” (Suvarierol, 2003: 60). 
However, the EU conditioned the participation in the Conference to a commitment to 
respect for other countries` sovereignty and integrity and inviolability of external 
borders and settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means.84 In this way, the EU 
imposed the settlement of the Cyprus dispute and the Greek-Turkish problems. So, 
Turkey refused to participate in the European Conference. 
 At the Vienna Summit held in December 1998, the European Council underlined 
the great importance it attaches to the development of relations between the EU and 
Turkey while demanding the implementation of the European Strategy to prepare 
Turkey for membership in line with its conclusions at the December 1997 Luxembourg 
Summit in which Turkey`s support for a political settlement in Cyprus was brought as a 
precondition for Turkey`s EU accession (Vienna Presidency Conclusions, 1998: Parag. 
63). The EU decisions taken between December 1997 and December 1999 showed that 
Turkey hardened its position about the Cyprus dispute whenever the EU-Turkey 
relations worsened. 
 As the strategy of excluding Turkey from the candidate country list led to the 
hardening position of Turkey, the EU changed its policy towards Turkey. In December 
1999 Helsinki Conclusions, the European Council declared “Turkey as a candidate State 
destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other 
candidate States” (Helsinki Presidency Conclusions, 1999: Art. 9/b). With this decision, 
it was aimed that the EU accession process of Turkey would contribute to the settlement 
                                                 
84 For the text of the Presidency Conclusions of the Luxembourg Summit referring to the European 
Conference, see, European Council Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg 12-13 December 1997. 
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of the Cyprus dispute by modifying the position of Turkey. In fact, through this decision, 
the EU wanted Turkey to put pressure on the Turkish Cypriots to reach a settlement with 
the Greek Cypriots and not to take negative reactions of Turkey about accession of the 
divided Cyprus to the EU. This objective of the EU became apparent with the Article 9/b 
of the Helsinki Conclusions which means that if Turkey does not take steps towards a 
settlement of the Cyprus dispute, the European Council will decide for the accession of 
the Greek Cypriot Community without waiting the settlement of the problem in the way 
Turkey wants. That is, the settlement of the Cyprus dispute is not a precondition for the 
accession of the GCA to the EU and Turkey is expected to play an active role in 
reaching a solution in Cyprus. “Given this expectation and the noting of this issue as a 
short-term priority of Turkey`s Accession Partnership, Cyprus is a sine qua non for 
Turkey`s membership” (Suvarierol, 2003: 55). 
 Also, in the Helsinki Conclusions (December 1999), it was declared that “the 
European Council urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding 
border disputes and other related issues…” (Art. 4). So, although “the European Council 
recalled that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is a prerequisite for the 
opening of accession negotiations” (Art. 4), following the Helsinki Summit, the EU 
made clear that Turkey’s EU membership can be possible on the event that the Cyprus 
dispute and problems between Greece and Turkey are solved. Indeed, the Accession 
Partnership Document adopted by the Council of Ministers in March 2001 stated that 
“Turkey should support the UN Secretary General`s efforts to bring the process, aiming 
at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem to a successful conclusion” 
(Council of Ministers, 2001: 2001/235/EC).  
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 In June 2003, the European Council declared that in accordance with the 
December 1999 Helsinki Conclusions, fulfillment of the priorities set out in the 
Accession Partnership will assist Turkey towards EU membership (Thessaloniki 
Presidency Conclusions, 2003: Parag. 38). The European Council also urged Turkey and 
the Turkish Cypriot leadership to strongly support the efforts of the UN SG. At Brussels 
Summit held in December 2003, the European Council underlined the importance of 
Turkey`s expression of political will to settle the Cyprus Problem and declared that “in 
this respect, a settlement of the Cyprus problem would greatly facilitate Turkey`s 
membership aspirations” (Brussels Presidency Conclusions, December 2003: Parag. 40). 
The EU also urged all parties to commit to the negotiating process related to the Cyprus 
problem with the collaboration of the governments of Greece and Turkey (Brussels 
Presidency Conclusions, March 2004: Parag. 49). 
 “In May 2004, Turkey published a Decree extending the benefits of the EC-
Turkey Customs Union Agreement to all EU Member States except the Republic of 
Cyprus” (Regular Report on Turkey`s Progress towards Accession, 2004: Ch. 25). In the 
Brussels Summit in June 2004, the European Council invited Turkey to conclude 
negotiations with the Commission on behalf of the Community and its 25 member States 
on the adaptation of the September 1963 Ankara Agreement to take account of the 
accession of the new Member States -this group includes the Greek Cypriot state 
(Brussels Presidency Conclusions, June 2004: Parag. 31). This is put forward as 
Turkey`s obligation coming from Ankara Agreement (1963) and the Customs Union. 
Also, the Council welcomed the positive contribution of the Turkish Government to the 
efforts of the UN SG for a settlement in the Cyprus Problem (Parag. 32). “On 2 October, 
Turkey published a new Decree adding Cyprus to the list of countries to which the 
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Customs Union provisions apply” (Regular Report on Turkey`s Progress towards 
Accession, 2004: SEC(2004) 1201, Ch. 1.4 “Cyprus”, 52). 
 At the European Council Summit held in December 2004, October 3, 2005 was 
given to Turkey as the date for opening negotiations on the condition that Turkey 
worked towards the resolution the outstanding border disputes having repercussions on 
the accession process (Brussels Presidency Conclusions, December 2004: Parag. 
20). The announcement stated that the accession talks between Turkey and the Union 
would be “open-ended” (Parag. 23/4). 
 The European Council pointed the legal basis of this request by making a 
reference to the Article 6 (2) of the Act of Accession (2003) which requires the new 
member states to accede to the agreements concluded by the member states and the 
Community, acting jointly, with third countries (Council Decision, 2005: 2005/672/EC). 
On July 29, 2005, Turkey signed the Additional Protocol85 (Art. 1) extending its customs 
union to the EU-10 states issuing a declaration (Declaration by Turkey regarding the 
Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, 2005) saying that its signature did not 
mean its recognition of the “Republic of Cyprus”. In this way, the Greek Cypriot 
Administration which is not recognized by Turkey would be a party to the Association 
Agreement signed between the EEC and Turkey.  
 In the counterstatement of the EU to the Turkish declaration on Cyprus, issued 
on September 21, 2005:  
The European Community and its Member States made clear that this 
declaration by Turkey is unilateral, does not form part of the Protocol and 
                                                 
85 See, also,  
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/NR/rdonlyres/CC2CB422-22E0-4037-B82F-
E05C1274CF54/0/EKPROTOKOLMETNĐ.pdf 
72 
 
has no legal effect on Turkey’s obligations under the Protocol… (Parag. 2) 
The European Community and its Member States stress that the opening of 
negotiations on the relevant chapters depends on Turkey’s implementation of 
its contractual obligations to all Member States. Failure to implement its 
obligations in full will affect the overall progress in the negotiations (Parag. 
3) (Counterstatement to Turkish Declaration on Cyprus, 2005).  
 
At that point, the EU again underlined that they recognize only the “Republic of 
Cyprus” as a subject of international law (Parag. 4). It was also declared that 
“recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process. 
Accordingly, the EU underlines the importance it attaches to the normalization of 
relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, as soon as possible” (Parag. 5). In 
this way, the EU implied that the recognition of the “Republic of Cyprus” by Turkey is a 
requirement for the accession of Turkey to the Union.  
 Also, in Turkey`s Negotiating Framework, some of the requirements declared by 
the European Council in order to measure Turkey`s progress in preparing for accession 
were Turkey`s continued support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of 
the Cyprus problem, its progress in the normalization of bilateral relations with the 
“Republic of Cyprus” and the fulfillment of Turkey`s obligations under the Association 
Agreement and its Additional Protocol as declared also in the Accession Partnership 
Document (Negotiating Framework, 2005: Parag. 6).86  
                                                 
86 See, also, 2005 Regular Report on Turkey`s Progress towards Accession, 9 November 2005 and 
European Council Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg 15-16 June 2006. 
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 On May 30, 2005 the then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül 
suggested the implementation of these arrangements: 
a) Free movement of people, goods and services to and from the Turkish 
Cypriot side, as well as between the North and the South; b) Lifting of all 
restrictions applied to sea and airports, including direct flight; c) Elimination 
of restrictions regarding third-country citizens; d) Special arrangements for 
the direct inclusion of North Cyprus as an economic entity into the EU 
Customs Union and enjoyment of its full benefits by all Turkish Cypriots; e) 
Removal of all obstacles that prevent the Turkish Cypriot side to participate 
in international activities of sports, culture and etc. (Letter from Turkey to 
the UN SG, 2005: A/59/820-S/2005/355).   
 
The ports of the GCA have been closed to the Turkish vessels since 1974, 
however, the Turkish ports have been closed to the Greek Cypriot vessels as de facto 
since 1987 and officially since 1997. Turkey’s January 2006 initiative on 
Cyprus declared the following proposals:  
1. Opening of the sea ports of Turkey to Greek Cypriot vessels serving the 
trade of goods in accordance with the EC-Turkey Customs Union. 
2. Allowing Greek Cypriot air carriers to use the Turkish air space for over-
flights and to land at the Turkish airports in accordance with relevant 
international rules and procedures. 3. Opening of the ports in North Cyprus, 
including Gazimagosa (Famagusta), Girne, and Gemikonağı to international 
traffic of goods, persons and services under Turkish Cypriot management. 
4. Opening of Ercan Airport for direct flights under the Turkish Cypriot 
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management. 5. Special arrangements for the practical inclusion of North 
Cyprus, as an economic entity, into the European Union’s customs union. 
Unhindered direct trade between both sides of the island as well as with the 
outside world. 6. Participation of the Turkish Cypriot side in international 
sports, cultural and other social activities (New Initiative by Turkey on 
Cyprus, 2006).  
 
Finland, the then holder of the presidency of the EU (July-December 2006), has 
offered a verbal proposal in 2006. It includes opening the northern Cyprus seaport of 
Famagusta (Gazimagosa) to international trade under the supervision of the UN and 
withdrawal of the Turkish troops from this city, in return of the Turkish side`s handing 
over control of Varosha (Maraş) to the UN. In this way, by lifting the isolations on 
North Cyprus, the EU aims to convince Turkey to open its ports to the Greek Cypriot 
vessels. However, the Turkish side has demanded that any deal would also include the 
opening of the Northern Cypriot Airport, Ercan to international flights –currently only 
open to flights to and from Turkey. Also, the Greeks have claimed to veto any proposal 
for trade with Famagusta without return of Varosha to Greek Cypriots. 
  On December 11, 2006, “the Council decided in particular to suspend 
negotiations on 8 chapters87 relevant to Turkey`s restrictions as regards the Republic of 
Cyprus and will not close the other chapters, until it fulfills its commitments under the 
Additional Protocol to the EU-Turkey Association Agreement, which extended the EU-
                                                 
87 These 8 chapters are: Chapter 1: Free movement of goods, Chapter 3: Right of establishment and 
freedom to provide service, Chapter 9: Financial Services, Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development, 
Chapter 13: Fisheries, Chapter 14: Transport policy, Chapter 29: Customs union and Chapter 30: External 
relations.  
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Turkey customs union to the ten member states, including Cyprus” (General Affairs and 
External Relations Council, 2006: 2770th Meeting).88 In March 2007, the German 
Presidency reiterated Turkey's responsibility to achieve progress in the normalization of 
bilateral relations between Turkey and all EU member states, including the “Republic of 
Cyprus” (The New Anatolian, 21 March 2007). The Commission also called on Turkey 
to stop vetoing Cyprus's participation in international organizations like the OECD and 
NATO, an issue also rejected by the Turkish side, which implied that Turkey will 
continue to follow this tactic.  
 However, on March 31, 2007, the EU resumed membership talks with Turkey. 
So far, the EU have opened negotiations with Turkey on 5 chapters89 examining 
Turkey's general state of preparedness in these areas and provisionally closed on one 
(Science and Research).90 In this way, despite the French attempts for keeping a 
reference to “accession” or “membership” in connection with Turkey out of the EU 
Summit statement, the series of the meetings were called as "accession conferences" on 
the contrary to France`s support for the term of "intergovernmental conferences". 
However, during these accession conferences, the EU also underlined that “Turkey has 
to fulfill its obligation of full non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional 
Protocol to the Association Agreement” (Third Meeting of the Accession Conference 
                                                 
88 On December 15, 2006, the EU endorsed this decision in the conclusions on Turkey. See, European 
Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels 14-15 December 2006. 
 
89 “Enterprise and Industrial policy, Statistics, Financial Control” (Third Meeting of the Accession 
Conference at ministerial level with Turkey, 11233/07 (Presse 154), Brussels 26 June 2007), “Trans-
European Networks, Consumer and Health Protection” (Fourth Meeting of the Accession Conference at 
ministerial level with Turkey, 16734/07 (Presse 302), Brussels 19 December 2007). 
 
90 For details on the current situation of negotiations, see, http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=65&l=2 
See, also, 2007 Regular Report on Turkey`s Progress towards Accession, COM (2007) 663, 6 November 
2007. 
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with Turkey, 2007: 11233/07 (Presse 154) and Fourth Meeting of the Accession 
Conference with Turkey, 2007: 16734/07 (Presse 302)). 
  
 
3.2.2 The European Parliament Decisions 
 
 The European Parliament which represents various political formations in 
Europe has a potential to be an efficient pressure tool on the other EU institutions. 
Indeed, the efforts for strengthening the place of the Parliament in the decision-making 
process of the EU have shown the increasing importance of the Parliament declarations. 
The Parliament has taken decisions in the direction of the European Council and 
European Commission decisions, on the other hand, it is apparent that the approach of 
the Parliament towards the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey are said to be more 
negative than the ones of the Council and the Commission. 
 The EP, in its several resolutions, has declared Turkey as the “occupying” power 
in the northern part of Cyprus since 1974.91 The Parliament called upon Turkey to 
withdraw its “occupation” troops from Cyprus in accordance with the relevant UN 
Resolutions and called for the Turkish troops to be replaced by the UN peacekeeping 
forces.92 Because the Parliament considered that gradual demilitarization of the island 
would facilitate mutual understanding between the two communities (EP Res., April 
                                                 
91 See, EP Res., 13 September 1985, 10 July 1986, 9 July 1987, 10 March 1988, 15 December 1988, 12 
July 1990, 14 March 1991, 21 January 1993, 19 September 1996, 24 October 1996 and EP Res. on 
Cyprus`s membership application to the EU and the state of negotiations, COM(2000) 702-C5-0602/2000-
1997/2171(COS). 
 
92 See, EP Res., 9 July 1987, 21 January 1993, 19 September 1996, 24 October 1996 and EP Res. on the 
Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus Progress towards accession, COM(98)0710-C4-0108/99. 
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2004: Parag. 9), further ease tension and prepare for a lasting solution. However, “the 
Turkish army commander General Yaşar Büyükanıt said that Turkey would not 
withdraw even a single soldier from Cyprus without a permanent solution” (Eralp and 
Beriker, 2005: 187). The EP also accused Turkey of bringing the members of the 
Turkish extremist organization “Grey Wolves” to Cyprus so that they could enter into 
conflict with unarmed demonstrators and of causing the murders of a number of the 
Greek Cypriots without reason and called on Turkey to cooperate to put an end to these 
violent incidents (EP Res., September 1996: Parag. C).93 
 The Parliament also deplored the impassiveness of Turkey about not responding 
to the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights stating that Turkey was guilty of 
human rights violations in the northern part of Cyprus on May 10, 2001 (EP Res., 2001: 
COM(2000) 702-C5-0602/2000-1997/2171(COS)). So, it called on Turkey to respect the 
human rights and the fundamental freedoms of the Greek Cypriots and Marotines and to 
implement the provisions of the Third Vienna Agreement of 1975, particularly with 
regard to prisoners who are imprisoned in the “occupied part of Cyprus” (EP. Res., 
October 1996: Parag. E). The Parliament called upon the Member States to respond with 
firm pressure on Turkey with the aim of freeing the island of the presence of all Turkish 
troops, guaranteeing freedom of movement for all citizens and working for a just and 
peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem (EP. Res., October 1996: Parag. 6). 94 
 The EP declared that “the accession of Cyprus is an autonomous process and that 
Cyprus should not be a hostage of relations between the Union and Turkey” (EP Res., 
                                                 
93 See, also, EP Res. 24 October 1996. 
 
94 See, also, EP Res. 17 September 1997. 
 
78 
 
July 1995: Parag. 10). On the other hand, the Parliament reminded the Turkish 
Government that “relations between Turkey and the EU depend partly on the Turkish 
Government`s policy on Cyprus” (EP Res., October 1996: Parag. 4 and EP Res., 
September 1997: Parag. 7).95 and reiterated its decision to freeze financial cooperation 
with Turkey as well as the MEDA (“MEsures D`Accompagnement”-“Accompanying 
Measures” in French) programme (The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) with regard to 
Turkey, with the exception of the promotion of democracy, human rights and civil 
society (EP Res., October 1996: Parag. 4). The Parliament also called on the 
Commission and Council to put pressure on Turkey, by indicating that the quality of the 
EU-Turkey relations depends on the Turkish attitude towards the solution of the Cyprus 
problem (EP Res., 1999: COM(98)0710-C4-0108/99). So, it called on the Turkish 
authorities to maintain their constructive attitude in finding a settlement to the Cyprus 
question on the basis of the Annan Plan and the principles upon which the EU is 
founded (EP Res., September 2005: Parag. 7). 
 The Parliament also stressed that “if Turkey were to carry out its threat of 
annexing the north of Cyprus in response to Cypriot accession to the EU, it would put an 
end to its own ambitions of the European Union membership” (EP Res., 2001: 
COM(2000) 702-C5-0602/2000-1997/2171(COS), Parag. 3). The Parliament invited 
Turkey to regard the membership of Cyprus as an important contribution to the security 
and development of both of the communities, peace and stability in the region and 
strengthened partnership between Turkey and the EU (EP Res., 2001: COM(2000) 702-
C5-0602/2000-1997/2171(COS), Parag. 4). It also called on the Turkish authorities to 
                                                 
95 See, also, EP Res., 15 March 1990. 
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recognize the “Republic of Cyprus” as soon as possible by noting that the opening of 
negotiations obviously implies the recognition of Cyprus by Turkey and stresses that 
failure to do so will have serious implications for the negotiations and could lead to a 
halting of this process (EP Res., September 2005: Parag. 8).  
 On the other hand, the Parliament called on the Greek government to lift its 
opposition to the EU financial assistance being provided to Turkey in the framework of 
the EU-Turkey customs union (EP Res., 1999: COM(98)0710-C4-0108/99). It also 
called on the Council to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community 
and to reach an agreement on the financial aid package and on trade facilitation 
regulations concerning the Turkish Cypriot community in order that the EU honour its 
own commitments with respect to the Turkish Cypriot community (EP Res., September 
2005: Parag. 9). 
 The Parliament deplored that Turkey has not implemented all provisions of the 
Protocol extending the Ankara Agreement to the ten new Member States and stressed 
that the unilateral declaration by Turkey, which states that signing of this Protocol does 
not mean the recognition of the “Republic of Cyprus”, does not form part of the Protocol 
and has no legal effect on Turkey`s obligations under the Protocol and should not be sent 
to the Grand National Assembly for its approval (EP Res., September 2005: Parags. 2 
and 3). It reminded Turkey that by maintaining restrictions against vessels flying the 
Cypriot flag and vessels approaching from harbours in the “Republic of Cyprus”, in the 
form of denial of access to Turkish ports and against Cypriot aircraft, by denying them 
overflight rights and landing rights at Turkish airports, Turkey is in breach of the Ankara 
Agreement as this practice undermines the principle of the free movement of goods 
(Parag. 4). So, it calls on the Turkish authorities to abolish all existing restrictions 
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applying to ships flying the Cypriot flag and involved in trade relating to a Member 
State of the EU and to fully implement all the provisions of the Protocol (Parag. 3).96 
The Parliament stresses that failure in the implementation of this Agreement will have 
serious implications for the continuation of the negotiation process and could lead to a 
halting of this process. 
 However, Turkey refuses to open its ports and airports to the Cypriot vessels 
until the EU brings an end to the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community. 
In his recent statement Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan told that Turkey will 
continue to refuse trade privileges to Cyprus unless the EU eases the economic isolation 
of the breakaway Turkish Cypriots (EU Business, 4 October 2007).  
  
 
3.2.3 The EU`s Progress Reports on Cyprus 
 
 In the EU`s progress reports on Cyprus, the European Commission has declared 
that it has not been yet possible to reach a settlement in Cyprus. Also, the Commission 
stated that “progress towards accession and towards a just and viable solution to the 
Cyprus problem will neutrally reinforce each other” (Regular Report on Cyprus, 1998: 
14; 1999: 15). So, the Progress Reports have continuously recalled that Turkey as a 
guarantor country should show strong commitment to bring the two sides together by 
supporting the UN settlement efforts and Turkey could have an active and constructive 
                                                 
96 The head of the delegation, German MEP of the European People's Party Georg Jarzembowski stated 
that “It is clear that Turkey has to obey the treaties they have signed to open their ports and airports for the 
use by Cyprus and Cyprus-run companies” See, 
http://www.cyprusembassy.net/home/index.php?module=articles&id=4117. 
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role in this framework in order to reach a comprehensive solution that addresses the 
legitimate concerns of all parties and that is based on the establishment of a bi-zonal and 
bi-community federation (Regular Report on Turkey, 1998 and Regular Report on 
Cyprus, 1999: 14).97  
 In addition, the EU stated that “…the occupation by part of the territory of the 
Republic of Cyprus by the Turkish army was the de facto partition of the island…” and 
“despite numerous UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the 
Republic of Cyprus, Turkey has maintained its forces on the island” (Regular Report on 
Cyprus, 1998: 11-12). The Commission also emphasized that “Turkey has occupied 
northern Cyprus since 1974, maintaining an army nearly 35.000 strong there” (Regular 
Report on Turkey, 1998: 20). In the report, the Commission stated its opposition to the 
measures taken by Turkey such as the signing of the Association Agreement between 
Turkey and the TRNC declaring it as being incompatible with international law as 
expressed in the UN resolutions (1998:21). In addition, it was also indicated that “Since 
December 1997, the Turkish Cypriot authorities have banned most bi-communal 
contacts between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots (many sponsored by the EU)” 
(Regular Report on Cyprus, 1999: 12).  
 In the progress reports, it was also stated that Turkey was continuing to violate 
the rights of the Greek Cypriot Mrs. Loizidou by preventing her from going to her 
property located in the north (Regular Report on Cyprus, 2000: 19)98 and that the 
                                                 
97 See, also, 1999 Regular Report on Turkey`s Progress towards Accession, 13 October 1999, 2000 
Regular Report on Turkey`s Progress towards Accession, 8 November 2000 and 2001 Regular Report on 
Cyprus`s Progress towards Accession. 
 
98 See, also, 2000 Regular Report on Turkey`s Progress towards Accession, 8 November 2000 and 2001 
Regular Report on Cyprus`s Progress towards Accession. 
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Turkish Cypriot leadership was increasing the amount of the restrictions imposed on the 
presence of UNFICYP in the north (Regular Report on Turkey, 2000: 20). 
 In the reports, the EU emphasized its support for a re-united Cyprus within the 
EU (Regular Report on Cyprus, 2001)99, however the Commission also stated that “it is 
the preference of the EU that a settlement under UN auspices be reached before 
Cyprus`s accession, although, in line with the Helsinki European Council Conclusions 
(December 1999), this is not a pre-condition for Cyprus`s accession” (Regular Report on 
Cyprus, 2001: 23). In this way, the Commission has opened the way for the EU 
accession of the GCA in the name of the two communities. Also, in the reports, it was 
declared that:  
EU membership, in the framework of a settlement, will provide the most 
effective means for the northern part of the island to catch up in terms of 
economic modernization, growth and development. The economic reforms 
associated with EU accession will reduce disparities in incomes and in living 
standards on the island (Regular Report on Cyprus, 2001: 23).100   
 
 The Commission indicated its disappointment that the expressions of support 
(coming from the Turkish authorities) have not been followed by concrete actions to 
facilitate a settlement of the Cyprus problem (Regular Report on Turkey, 2001: 30)101 In 
the reports, the EU representatives repeatedly urged Turkey to encourage the Turkish 
Cypriot leadership for reaching a settlement before the conclusion of the accession 
                                                 
99 See, also, 2002 Regular Report on Cyprus`s Progress towards Accession. 
 
100 See, also, 2002 Regular Report on Cyprus`s Progress towards Accession. 
 
101 See, also, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey`s Progress towards Accession, 6 October 2004. 
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negotiations with Cyprus and this would allow the Turkish Cypriots to participate in the 
EU accession negotiations (Regular Report on Turkey, 2001: 31).102 So, the EU invited 
Turkey to give practical support to the resumption of the UN process without additional 
preconditions. This is an apparent evidence of the link between Turkey`s relations with 
the EU and Turkey`s interests in Cyprus. 
 On August 8, 2003, Turkey signed a framework agreement aiming to establish a 
customs union with the northern part of Cyprus. However, the Commission in its report 
declared that “Such an agreement which has no validity under international law, would 
be in breach of Turkey`s commitments in its customs union with the EC” (Regular 
Report on Turkey, 2003: 41). So, Turkey indicated that the agreement would not be 
ratified or come into effect. 
 In its 2004 report, on the one hand, the Commission again deplored the unclear 
position of Turkey in contributing to the settlement of the Cyprus dispute until 2003, and 
on the other hand, it mentioned about the active role Turkey played in 2004 especially in 
the referendum process of the Annan Plan (Regular Report on Turkey, 2004: 19). 
However, in the reports, it was also stated that Turkey has continued to impose its veto 
on Cyprus`s membership of certain international organizations, to block its participation 
in the EU-NATO strategic cooperation and to oppose its accession to the Wassenaar 
Arrangement103 on the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and Dual-Use Goods (Regular  
                                                 
102 See, also, 2002 Regular Report on Turkey`s Progress towards Accession, 9 October 2002. 
 
103 “The Wassenaar Arrangement has been established in order to contribute to regional and international 
security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional 
arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations. Participating 
States seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the 
development or enhancement of military capabilities, and are not diverted to support such capabilities.” 
For further details, see, http://www.wassenaar.org/ 
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Report on Turkey, 2005: 131).104  
 Turkey was expected to ensure continued support for efforts to find a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework, to 
implement fully the Protocol adapting the Ankara Agreement to Cyprus and to take 
concrete steps for the normalization of bilateral relations with all Member States 
including the “Republic of Cyprus” as soon as possible (Regular Report on Turkey, 
2006: 24). Also, the EU expected the removal of all obstacles to the free movement of 
goods, including restrictions on means of transport (Regular Report on Turkey, 2007: 
50). In the report, it was stated that Turkey has continued to deny access to its ports to 
vessels flying the Republic of Cyprus flag and to its air ports. The Commission 
reminded the Turkish government that implementing the Protocol is a legal obligation 
which must not be linked to the situation of the Turkish Cypriot Community.  
The European Commission stated that since the Council`s decision of December 
2006, Turkey has made no progress towards implementing fully the provisions of the 
Additional Protocol and on normalizing bilateral relations with the “Republic of Cyprus” 
(Regular Report on Turkey, 2007: 24). It was emphasized that as long as restrictions 
remain in place on the free movement of goods carried by vessels and airplanes 
registered in Cyprus or where the last port of call was Cyprus, Turkey will not be in a 
position to fully implement the acquis relating to the eight chapters delayed by the EU in 
December 2006. The 2007 Report also indicated the existence of the restrictions on the 
property rights of the Greek Cypriots in the Northern part of Cyprus and the issue of 
missing persons.  
                                                 
104 See, also, 2006 Regular Report on Turkey`s Progress towards Accession, SEC(2006) 1390, Brussels 8 
November 2006 and 2007 Regular Report on Turkey`s Progress towards Accession, 6 November 2007. 
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 Thus, the progress reports issued by the Commission put forward the negative 
opinion of the Union about Turkey`s role in the settlement attempts of the Cyprus 
dispute. However, it should be mentioned that while the accession process of the GCA 
to the EU was completed successfully, the conflict settlement efforts of the Union have 
not moved forward. The Turkish Cypriots are still suffering from economic isolation 
from the international community and the TRNC is still not internationally recognized 
while it is represented under the Greek Cypriots at the EU level. On the other hand, 
the EP continuously urges Turkey to recognize the “Republic of Cyprus” and to open its 
ports to traffic from there. Also, the EP wants Turkey to pull back its forces in northern 
Cyprus on the grounds that these forces occupy the territories of an EU member country. 
So, the current picture of Cyprus indicates that insolvability still exists in the island 
today, and a settlement in the near future is also far away. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EU INVOLVEMENT  
IN THE CYPRUS DISPUTE 
 
 
 In the 1990s, the structure and dynamics of the Cyprus dispute fundamentally 
changed following the involvement of the EU as a party to the conflict due to the EU 
membership application of the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) - diplomatically 
called as the “Republic of Cyprus” by the international community, however, not 
recognized by Turkey and the TRNC. Since then, the evolution of the Cyprus dispute 
has been shaped by the EU integration prospects and the EU perceptions of the parties of 
the dispute. On the other hand, these interests were also shaped by the Union policies 
and approach related to the Cyprus dispute. In that context, the evaluation of the EU 
involvement in the dispute gains significance in understanding how it has been come to 
the current point in the Cyprus dispute.  
Therefore, in this chapter, the major reasons of the Union`s failure in the 
settlement efforts of the dispute will be found out. The first section of this chapter 
questions the legality of the EU membership of the GCA. The question of whether the 
GCA has a jurisdiction or right to make an application to the EU in the name of the 
whole island will be answered in this section. In the second section of the chapter, the 
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EU position in the Cyprus Dispute will be analyzed within a comparative analysis of the 
attitudes of the UN and Turkish side. The EU has continuously declared its support for 
the UN-led settlement efforts. So, in order to understand to what extent the UN and EU 
attitudes in the dispute are parallel to each other, these two organizations’ approaches 
towards the dispute will be examined. Afterwards, the Turkish outlook against the UN 
and EU policies will be analyzed. In that context, at which points the Turkish 
preferences and the settlement proposals of the UN and EU intersect and which of these 
two organizations is the most appropriate platform where the dispute should be held 
from the Turkish perspective will be analyzed.  
In the third section of this chapter, the potential of the EU in playing an impetus 
role in the Cyprus dispute will be evaluated. The EU can act as a catalyst for a 
comprehensive settlement in the island by attracting the EU integration interests of the 
parties. However, the success of the Union in this regard depends on its capability to 
respond accurately to these expectations. In the final section of the chapter some 
proposals about the future role of the Union in the dispute will be given.  
 
 
4.1 Challenges to the Legality of the EU Membership of the Greek  
Administration of Southern Cyprus  
 
The enlargement process of the EU has played a significant role in effecting the 
settlement of the Cyprus dispute. The accession of the GCA to the EU has two 
reflections in both communities: as a catalyst for the settlement of the Cyprus dispute 
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and as an illegal act which violates the 1960 Cypriot Constitution. While the Turkish 
Cypriots have perceived the EU membership of the Greek Cypriots as a threat to the 
possibility of the settlement of the dispute, the Greek Cypriots have underlined the 
benefits of the EU membership in the way of a solution. In the light of the Turkish and 
Turkish Cypriot persistent views, the EU membership of the GCA should be analyzed in 
terms of its legality and appropriateness.105 
 First, it should be mentioned that as the Turkish side argues, the EU’s adoption 
of the Greek Cypriots` application to the Union cannot be legitimate in the fact that de 
facto Greek government cannot represent the whole island under the name of the 
“Republic of Cyprus”. Because, as Sonyel (1997: 152) argues, as a result of the division 
of the RoC, “...the fact remained that there were still two separate communities (the 
TRNC and the GCA) in Cyprus, with a legal background which recognised their 
separateness and political equality”. So, none of these two states neither has the right or 
jurisdiction to represent the other nor can claim to be called as the “Republic of Cyprus” 
or the successor of the “Republic of Cyprus” (Atun, 2002: 43). Also, it is said to be 
unlawful for the international community to perceive the Greek Cypriots as the 
“Republic of Cyprus” and to behave them as the only legitimate state of Cyprus. Indeed, 
Turkey and the TRNC objected the unilateral application of the Greek Cypriots on the 
grounds that this application was made and processed in the absence of a joint authority 
competent to act on behalf of the whole island 
(http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/Cyprus/TermsofNegotiatedSettl
                                                 
105 For more interpretations in favour of the Turkish Cypriot claims related to the EU membership of the 
GCA, see, Çiler Eminer and Gülden Đlkman (eds.), Avrupa Birliği ve Kıbrıs, (Lefkoşa: Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Ministry Public Information Office). 
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ement.htm). Moreover, through its application for the EU membership, the GCA showed 
that it has not taken into account the Turkish Cypriot administration in political terms 
and has seen the Turkish Cypriots as an ethnic minority (Tamçelik: 167). 
 Second, the Treaty of Guarantee (1960: Art. 1/2) indicated that “It undertakes not 
to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State 
whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or 
indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the island”. Also, the 
principle of no union or no separation and indivisibility of the Republic are emphasized 
in the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960: Art. 185). At that point, the 
question was whether this statement aimed to prevent the membership of Cyprus to 
international organizations, however, Zorlu and Averoff made it clear that with this 
statement, it was intended to prohibit enosis and partition and there would be no 
objection to the membership of Cyprus to the international organizations of which 
“both” Greece and Turkey were members (Mendelson, 2001: 35). 
As Mendelson (2001: 76) argues, “membership of the EU would constitute 
participation in whole or in part in an economic union and at least in part in a political 
union. The conclusion must be, therefore, that this would be contrary to the Treaty of 
Guarantee”. Also, in the so-called article, the Republic promised to refrain from “any 
activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly union of Cyprus with any other state”. 
When the legal basis established by the 1960 system and its provisions are taken into 
account, it is understood that the term “state” was used to refer to “de facto integration” 
which Cyprus is prohibited to achieve (Topur, 2002: 375). However, EU membership 
would mean “likely to promote, directly or indirectly, union with” Greece politically, 
economically and militarily, because the EU means a union between its members.  
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 In addition, it should be mentioned that this was not the undertaking of only 
Cyprus, but also of the guarantor states. In the Treaty of Guarantee (1960: Art. 2/1), 
Greece, Turkey and the UK recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial 
integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus and also the state of affairs established 
by the Basic Articles of its Constitution. Moreover, the Treaty of Guarantee (1960: Art. 
2/2) indicated that “Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to 
prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, 
either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the island”. That is, Greece 
and the UK are under international obligations to seek to prevent such accession by the 
exercise of their veto. If accession will be achieved, this will create serious legal and 
practical obstacles and difficulties for both the GCA and the EU. 
 Third, the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960: Art. 50) declared that 
“The President and the Vice President of the Republic, separately or conjointly, shall 
have the right of final veto on any law or decision of the House of Representatives or 
any part thereof concerning foreign affairs, except the participation of the Republic in 
international organizations and pacts of alliance in which the Kingdom of Greece and 
the Republic of Turkey both participate or concerning defence and security”. That is, the 
veto power is also valid if only one of the two states is a member to an international 
organization, which includes the EU. So, Cyprus cannot join an international 
organization of which Greece and Turkey are not members. In other words, as long as 
Turkey is not a member of the EU, Cyprus cannot join either.  
 Fourth, the Constitution (1960: Art. 170) guarantees “most-favoured nation” 
treatment to each of the Guarantors -Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom- for all 
agreements whatever their nature might be. However, the entry of the GCA to the EU 
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would cause Greece and the UK to receive considerably more favourable treatment in 
the EU than Turkey, which is not a member (Mendelson, 2001: 71).  
Also, treaties may be terminated either by the consent of the parties, or by virtue 
of a rule of law authorizing their termination (Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 1969: Arts. 54-72). Here, there has been no suspension of the treaties and no 
agreement of all the parties to the termination of the 1960 Agreements. In addition, the 
articles mentioned above were amongst the select group of unamendable basic articles of 
the Republic of Cyprus’s Constitution. If an amendment was intended to make in the 
Constitution, it would be legally invalid without the consent of the Guarantor States. 
Also, in order to amend the Constitution, first, the founding treaties have to be changed. 
So, “…enabling Cyprus to join the EU would only be possible if any amendment to the 
Constitution were preceded by parallel alterations to be made in the founding Treaties -
naturally with the approval of the States Parties thereto” (Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary 
Committee, 2001: 17). However, there has not been any amendment approved by all 
Guarantor States and the two communities in order to open the EU membership road to 
Cyprus.  
 On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot administration emphasized that after a 
political settlement under equal standing of all parties was reached, the Turkish Cypriots 
would be in favour of the EU membership of the “whole Cyprus” only if both 
communities would be affected on an equal footing by the consequences of this 
integration. (Turkish Cypriot Memorandum, July 1990: Parag. 19).  
 So, the Turkish government and its Parliament have declared its objection to the 
Greek application in a number of decisions (Resolution by the Turkish Grand National 
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Assembly, 1997).106 The Turkish Grand National Assembly pointed that “The unilateral 
application of the GCA for membership in the EU is contrary to the 1960 Treaties. The 
realization of such membership will only pave the way to the division of Cyprus and the 
responsibility will be belong to the EU” (Resolution by the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, 1997). In addition, the negotiations related to the settlement of the Cyprus 
dispute and the UN SC Resolutions do not support the integration of the Greek Cypriots 
with any other entity and their unilateral application towards any kind of such 
integration (Topur, 2002: 376; Sonyel, 1997: 156).107 In that context, I am at the belief 
that the EU and the GCA seem to violate the Treaty obligations, as Turkey officially 
argues, due to the EU membership. 
 
 
4.2 The EU Position in the Cyprus Dispute: A Comparative  Analysis 
with the Attitudes of the UN and Turkish Side 
 
 While the UN is a global organization which has considerable contributions in a 
number of international disputes all around the world, the EU emerges as a significant 
regional power which plays an important role in the political and economic integration 
of Europe. The EU tries to develop efficient policies and reforms in order to take place 
                                                 
106 See, also, Circular Note Sent to the Embassies of the EU Member States Concerning the Greek Cypriot 
Application to the EU, 30 June 1997 and Resolution of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 15 July 
1999. 
 
107 The UN declared that “...settlement (in Cyprus) must exclude union in whole or in part with any other 
country or any form of partition or secession.” See, UN SC Res. 649, 12 March 1990, 716 (11 October 
1991), 750 (10 April 1992), UN SG Report on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, S/23780, 3 April 
1992, UN SC Res. 774, 26 August 1992, 939 (29 July 1994), 1092 (23 December 1996), 1117 (27 June 
1997), 1146 (23 December 1997), 1179 (29 June 1998), 1217 (22 December 1998) and 1251 (29 June 
1999). 
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in the international fora as a global power. In that context, both the UN being aware of 
its global security responsibilities and the EU aiming to prove itself as a global power 
have involved in the Cyprus dispute through settlement efforts. There occurred some 
differences as well as similarities between their images in the eyes of the parties of the 
dispute, approaches towards the dispute and decision making capabilities.     
  
 
4.2.1 The Analysis of the UN Approach 
 
4.2.1.1. A General Evaluation 
  
 When the UN decisions taken in 1964 and 1974 are analyzed, it is seen that the 
UN has adopted the GCA as the only legitimate representative of the Cypriot people 
under the name of “Republic of Cyprus” without defining it exactly. That is, “de facto 
Greek Cypriot partner continued to be viewed as the ‘Government of Cyprus’ with no 
acknowledgement of the Turkish Cypriot partner in it, nor the latter’s status within the 
Cyprus problem” (Mehmet, 2002: 195-196). On the other hand, the UN declared that it 
did not approve the change of the status quo established by the 1960 Treaties by a 
military intervention or of any kind of use of force. In the UN SC decisions, the Turkish 
military troops in the island, contrary to the official Turkish views, are called as “foreign 
troops” and “non-Cypriot forces” and are urged to withdraw from the island 
immediately. Also, the UN SC supports a new Cypriot state which does not include 
military units under the spirit of the 1960 agreements. It is clear that these interpretations 
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of the UN SC are incompatible with Denktash`s views related to the missions that 
Turkey would implement in the island. Also, these UN SC decisions inevitably increase 
the security concerns of the Turkish Cypriots in the island.  
The UN SC has responded negatively to the Turkish initiatives such as the 
declaration of the TFSC on February 13, 1975 and the TRNC on November 15, 1983 by 
the Turkish Cypriots. The SC deplored these two acts by considering them to be a 
purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus, so the Council called the decision 
of the declaration of the state of TRNC as legally invalid (UN SC Res. 541, 1983; UN 
SC Res. 550, 1984). Also, the Council called upon all states not to recognize any other 
Cypriot state other than the “Republic of Cyprus” (UN SC Res. 541, 1983; UN SC Res. 
550, 1984). While the UN SC regretted the unilateral decision of the Turkish Cypriots 
about the TFSC (UN SC Res. 367, 1975: Parag. 2), no such “regret” was registered in 
March 1964 concerning the Greek Cypriot attack towards the 1960 Constitution (UN SC 
Res. 186, 1964; UN SC Res. 367, 1975).108   
So, the UN, in a number of Resolutions, declared that the present status quo in 
Cyprus is unacceptable.109 In that context, according to the UN SC decisions, the 
proposal offered by the UN for the settlement of the Cyprus dispute can be summarized 
as follows: i) The settlement must be based on single sovereignty, single international 
identity, single citizenship and one Cypriot state whose independence and territorial 
integrity is safeguarded, ii) the two communities which form this state are politically 
equal, iii) this state is a federation which is bi-communal constitutionally and bi-zonal 
                                                 
108 See, also, Mehmet, 2002: 196. 
 
109 See, UN SC Res. 774, 26 August 1992, 789 (25 November 1992), 831 (27 May 1993), 889 (15 
December 1993), 939 (29 July 1994), 1092 (23 December 1996), 1117 (27 June 1997), 1146 (23 
December 1997), 1179 (29 June 1998), 1217 (22 December 1998) and 1251 (29 June 1999). 
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territorially, iv) such a settlement excludes union in whole or in part with any other 
country and any form of partition or secession. Briefly, the UN demands from the two 
communities to form a new state based on a federation by coming together due to the 
1960 Agreements and the Republic of Cyprus Constitution that founded a sui generis 
federal state. 
On the other hand, as the then UN SG, Kofi Annan, pointed in his report, 
Denktash favoured a solution proposing a Confederation of Cyprus founded by two pre-
existing sovereign states. Annan also stated that Denktash`s “Confederation would have 
a single international legal personality but would be sovereign only to the extent that 
sovereignty was given to it by the founding states” (UN SG Report, 2003: S/2003/398, 
Parag. 18).110 That is, the Turkish side has demanded the full implementation of the 
equal status of the two communities and maintenance of its separate and sovereign 
status. As the then UN Secretary-General stated in his report, “the dispute (between the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots) was clear –would a solution be one pre-existing state which 
would continue in existence and federalize itself under a new Constitution or two pre-
existing states which would found a new confederal or partnership structure?” (UN SG 
Report, 2003: S/2003/398, Parag. 18). 
 However, the initiatives of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots’ demand for the 
recognition of the TRNC have faced with criticisms from the UN and have failed. In 
addition, the other states have been put under moral pressure for not recognizing the 
TRNC due to the UN SC Res. 541 and 550. As far as this Turkish proposal is not 
                                                 
110 According to legal practices, a federation has a single international personality and sovereignty, 
whereas in a confederation each partner has its own international personality and sovereignty. So, it can be 
said that Denktash’s confederation is sui generis due to its single international personality despite of the 
two constituent states composing the confederation.  
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supported by the UN and is not approved by the GCA and Greece, it seems very difficult 
to be accepted by the international community. 
 Although the decisions of the UN GA are not binding legally, they have become 
international norms that are respected by the international community and are used in 
questioning the legality of state practices. So, Turkey, which has not found adequate 
support about Cyprus in the SC, has to seek this support in the GA despite the SC 
Resolutions (Doğan, 2002: 91). This is a crucial step in the way of reaching a settlement 
of the dispute. However, we can not see the support of the GA for Turkey and the 
TRNC. The GA decisions generally confirm the SC decisions and practices. As the SC 
does, the GA also sees the GCA as the only representative of the Cypriot people under 
the name of the “Republic of Cyprus”, states that the territorial integrity and 
independence of Cyprus should be safeguarded and approaches negatively to Turkey`s 
military and political support for the TRNC. In addition, since 1983, the GA has left the 
settlement attempts of the dispute to the SC by removing the Cyprus dispute out of its 
agenda and giving importance to the financing of the UNFICYP in the island (Doğan, 
2002: 91).  
Unfortunately, these UN decisions are apparently contrary with the Turkish side’s 
proposal based on the establishment of two equal states (in a federation), however they 
are said to be similar with the EU attitude in the Cyprus dispute. On the other hand, 
November 11, 2002 settlement plan of the then UN SG, Kofi Annan, is said to be a new 
opening among all the UN settlement efforts and Resolutions in terms of restablishing 
the equal status of the two communities.   
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4.2.1.2 The Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement 
 of the Cyprus Problem (The Annan Plan) 
 
 The “Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus 
Problem” (Annan Plan), which was proposed by Kofi Annan, the then UN SG on 
November 11, 2002, was a significant and almost sole concrete and comprehensive 
attempt for solving the Cyprus dispute. The Plan was ten thousand pages in length with 
its annexes making reference to various multilateral agreements and was very complex 
for the Cypriots to understand in a very short period of time and less than two hundred 
were circulated. However, “the Cypriot people were asked to vote after only three weeks 
of public debate on a plan whose official text was released to the parties one day before 
the referenda” (Evriviades, 2005: 6) while the Plan was composed of several 
uncertainties in some important issues.  
Despite the short period of time for learning about what the plan proposes for the 
Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots opposed the Plan with a majority claiming that it did not 
meet their fundamental needs and interests. According to my point of view, this 
argument of the GCA was far from being sincere. As it is well known, the Annexes of 
the Plan included some multilateral agreements and the GCA was a party to these 
agreements. In addition, most of the multilateral agreements that were named in the 
Annex had an erga omnes effect and they used to bind GCA due to their nature and 
customary rules of international law just like the GCA claims if it is, in legal and 
political terms, a state. 
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 The Annan Plan proposed the establishment of the “United Cyprus Republic” 
which is an independent state with a federal government and two equal “constituent 
states”, the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot state. The intended Republic 
would have a single international legal personality and single sovereignty. Denktash 
opposed the proposed single sovereignty concept of the Republic by suggesting that the 
constituent states should have separate sovereignties while ceding certain sovereign 
powers to the centralized government. At that point, the Plan proposed that the United 
Cyprus Republic would be based on political equality, bi-zonality and, as a factor for 
pleasing Denktash, the equal status of the “constituent states” (Art. 2/1/a). The Plan 
emphasized that “Within the limits of the Constitution they (the two ‘constituent states’) 
sovereignly exercise all powers not vested in the federal government, organizing 
themselves freely under their own Constitutions.” as well as providing for no hierarchy 
between federal and constituent state laws (Arts. 2/1/c and 2/3). In this regard, the 
United Republic of Cyprus was modelled on the status and relationship of Switzerland 
that is the only country which is called Confederal but its constitution is Federal (UN SG 
Report, 2003: S/2003/398, Parag. 76).  
At that point, Melakopides (2006: 80) argues that the UN was contradicting 
directly with its resolutions 541 and 550 by “elevating the illicit secessionist regime to a 
constituent state” in the Annan Plan. However, by defining the Turkish Cypriot 
administration as a “constituent state”, the UN now aims to recognize the de jure 
formation of the already existing de facto situation in the island as this is the way it has 
to be. That is, this view in somewhat terms now targets to reflect a reality of a de facto 
situation and has been a significant improvement for the UN settlement proposals. 
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 According to the Plan, each part would have its own parliament. There would 
also be a bi-cameral parliament on the federal level. “The Chamber of Deputies shall be 
composed in proportion to persons holding internal ‘constituent state’ citizenship status 
of each ‘constituent state’, provided that each ‘constituent state’ shall be attributed no 
less than one quarter of seats” (Art. 5/a). That is, in the Chamber of Deputies, the 
Turkish Cypriots would have 25% of the seats. While no accurate figures are currently 
available, the split between the two communities at independence in 1960 was 
approximately 80:20 in favour of the Greek Cypriots. The Senate would have composed 
of an equal number of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (Art. 5/a). Each community 
would also have the right to veto all legislation. Also, the Supreme Court should have 
equal number of judges from each constituent state (Art. 6). 
 According to the Plan, the Treaty of Guarantee which gave Britain, Greece and 
Turkey a right to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs in the 
island, would remain in force. While, many Turkish Cypriots conceived the continuation 
of the presence of the Turkish troops in the island as a guarantee of their security, most 
of the Greek Cypriots perceived it as a threat for allowing Turkey to have a greater role 
in the island`s affairs. In the Plan, the Greek and Turkish contingents were permitted to 
be stationed under the Treaty of Alliance (“Additional Protocol”, Art. 1) in “the Greek 
Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State”, however, proposing the gradual reduction 
in the number of Greek and Turkish troops on the island at the same time (Art. 8).111 So, 
                                                 
111 “Greek and Turkish contingents shall be permitted to be stationed under the Treaty of Alliance in the 
Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State respectively as follows: i. each contingent not to exceed 
6,000 all ranks, until 2011, ii. each contingent not to exceed 3,000 all ranks, thereafter until 2018 or the 
European Union accession of Turkey, iii. The Greek contingent not to exceed 950 all ranks and the 
Turkish contingent not to exceed 650 ranks thereafter, subject to three-yearly review with the objective of 
total withdrawal” (Comprehensive Settlement Plan for Cyprus, 2004: Art. 8). 
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the Plan aimed full demilitarization of the island. Also, the Plan declared the prohibition 
of some weapons and the necessity of Cyprus to take the consent of both constituent 
states and until the accession of Turkey to the EU, the consent of Greece and Turkey 
while putting its territory at a disposal of international military operations (Art. 8).  
 The Annan Plan also allowed many Turkish citizens who had been brought to the 
island after 1974 to remain. However, it would be meaningless to remove these settlers 
who were born and raised in the island. The Plan adopted ‘a single Cypriot citizenship’ 
and at the same time, maintenance of ‘internal constituent state citizenship status’ 
emphasizing that “this status shall complement and not replace Cypriot citizenship” 
(Art. 3). In this way, the UN put the common Cypriot citizenship at the top of both 
communities` separate citizenship aspects. 
As for the EU integration process of Cyprus, the Annan Plan declared that Treaty 
of Accession to the EU would be signed and ratified by Cyprus unless this is opposed by 
the federal Parliament and both constituent state legislatures (Art. 19/7) and Cyprus was 
recommended to actively support the membership of Turkey (Art. 1/5). The Republic 
should ensure that Cyprus could speak and act in one voice internationally and in the 
EU. In this way, the UN emphasized the single international personality of the proposed 
“United Cyprus Republic”. The Plan pointed that while fulfilling the obligations of 
being an EU member, Cyprus would protect its integrity, borders and resources. It was 
also highlighted that the consent of the guarantors was required until the accession of 
Turkey to the EU. 
 Although the UN proposals, especially the ones in the Annan Plan, can be seen 
as an improvement when compared with the Republic of Cyprus model created by the 
1960 Treaties, they are still far from meeting the Turkish demands for the recognition of 
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the TRNC and the continuation of the military presence of the Turkish troops in the 
northern part of the island. Former Chief Prosecutor (and member of the Greek Cypriot 
negotiation delegation) Mr. Markides stated that in the fifth (and final) version of the 
Annan Plan 8 amendments in favor of, and 3 against the Greek Cypriot side were made  
(Fileleftheros, 4 April 2004).112 That is why some of the UN decisions have not been 
implemented by the Turkish side (Turkey and the TRNC and Denktash) such as the 
withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the island. So, probably, the Turkish side at first 
seemed to oppose a settlement and that is why Kofi Annan had to release a report in 
March 2003 (UN SG Report, 2003: S/2003/398). However, the referenda held on April 
24, 2004 proved the contrary as a result of the Greeks’ rejection of the Annan Plan. 
 On the other hand, putting the blame on only the UN in the failure of the 
settlement efforts regarding the Cyprus dispute would be unfair. It should be taken into 
account that the UN has not adequate political or economic power for persuading the 
countries that are not willing to do something. That is, as long as all parties of the 
dispute are determined to show their political will for reaching a settlement, the UN can 
be successful, however, this has not mostly been the case in Cyprus (Joseph, 1997: 78). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
112 “The favorable changes were in the areas of human rights; Greek Cypriot residency rights in the 
Turkish Cypriot State; freedom of movement; ratification of the settlement agreement by the Turkish 
Parliament prior to its entry into force; better transitional periods; strengthened role of the UN in the 
territories subject to adjustment; better provisions for the Central Bank and economic viability; and 
increase of property claims” (Fileleftheros, 4 April 2004). 
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4.2.2 The Analysis of the EU Approach 
 
When the EU decisions and policies in the Cyprus dispute are analyzed in 
general, it will be seen that the EU, in a number of its decisions, has been a significant 
pressure tool for the implementation of the UN SC Resolutions, which were adopted as 
recommendations under Chapter VI, by urging the sides to fully comply with these 
decisions and Resolutions for the settlement of the dispute. In that context, since the 
involvement of the EU in the Cyprus dispute, the European countries have always 
claimed their support for a solution related to the foundation of a federal structure with 
the two communities and two zones in Cyprus. The Union has also emphasized its 
support for the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus in 
accordance with relevant UN resolutions and high-level agreements on the basis of the 
mission of good offices of the Secretary-General and has stated the relevance between 
the Cyprus dispute and EU-Turkey relations. In addition, the EU has declared its strong 
preference for the accession of a “reunited Cyprus” to the Union for several times. The 
EU has also taken the firm position that the present status quo in Cyprus is unacceptable 
and poses danger for the region.  
The EU institutions have seen the EU accession process as a catalyst for reaching 
a political solution to the Cyprus dispute and increased security for the region. The EU 
believes that economic cooperation can solve political and military problems. In fact, 
this view is similar with the settlement proposals of the EU in the disputes occurred in 
Europe and in other parts of the world, especially, in the former Yugoslavia countries, 
however, this strategy has failed in the settlement of the problems regarding the former 
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Yugoslavia and NATO under the leadership of the UN had to use force in that region 
(Doğan, 2002: 96). Today, the EU has been implementing the same strategy in Cyprus 
without foreseeing its negative consequences on the evolution of the Cyprus dispute. In 
this regard, main policies and perceptions of the EU should be analyzed in detail in order 
to understand the basic reasons underlying its failure in Cyprus. 
 
 
4.2.2.1 The EU Stand in the Origin of the Cyprus Dispute  
 
 Most of the European authorities have perceived the July 1974 events started by 
the Greek coup d`etat as the origin of the Cyprus dispute and have based their attempts 
and claims on this argument by ignoring the collapse of the 1960 Constitution by the 
Greek Cypriots. In this way, the EU has not questioned the legitimacy of the Greek 
Cypriot part by overlooking the legal structure established by the 1960 system (Topur, 
2002: 369). However, as Müftüler-Bac and Güney (2005: 284) state, “the Cyprus 
problem had not started in 1974 with the Greek coup d`etat. It had started in 1963 when 
the 1960 federal constitution that has a sui generis federal nature was overthrown by the 
Greek Cypriots…” This has been an apparent evidence of the unfounded perceptions of 
the European authorities.  
In addition, as Topur (2002: 369) argues, the EU preferred not to be involved in 
the December 1963 events and the developments afterwards in Cyprus and the Union as 
a whole looked at these developments solely within the framework of the UN SC 
decisions. The Community perceived and evaluated the Cyprus dispute as an issue of the 
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UN, Britain or the US, not as its own issue. Also, the EEC, for the 1974 Turkish 
intervention, did not use phrases such as “the use of force or occupation of one associate 
country in another associate country” as Turkey and the GCA were associate countries 
of the Community in those years (Topur, 2002: 369). The Community merely pointed to 
the significance of the stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and independence and 
territorial integrity of Cyprus. The EU was not a direct party to the dispute till the 
application of the Greek Cypriots for the EU membership in July 1990.  
 
 
4.2.2.2 Impartiality and Credibility of the EU Approach 
 
It cannot be said that the EU completely applied to impartiality in its settlement 
efforts in the Cyprus dispute. The EU declared, in a number of decisions, that the 
settlement of the dispute would facilitate the EU membership of Cyprus, on the other 
hand, even if a settlement was not reached before the negotiations were due to begin, the 
accession negotiations would be started with the GCA (Agenda 2000, 1997; Helsinki 
Presidency Conclusions, 1999). In other words, although the EU had continuously 
declared its preference for the accession of a united Cyprus to the Union, only the Greek 
Cypriots, who rejected the Annan Plan about which the EU declared its full support, 
entered into the EU before solving the Cyprus problem, while the settlement has been a 
precondition for the Turkish side. This was the most significant factor that put a huge 
obstacle in front of a permanent solution and undermined the trust of the Turkish 
Cypriots to the EU.  
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Although the EU has seen enlargement as an impetus for peace in the island, 
following the accession of the Greek Cypriots to the EU, the Greek Cypriots have gained 
the opportunity to direct the problem according to their interests by playing the veto card 
against Turkey`s EU membership. They have also catched the chance of influencing the 
EU authorities for the non-recognition of the TRNC. In this way, the EU approach 
regarding the accession process has inevitably changed the equal status of the two 
communities in favor of the Greek Cypriots by letting them speak on behalf of the whole 
island and making their positions harder instead of motivating them towards a 
compromise.   
As Sonyel (1997: 156) also states, “the Greek Cypriot action (unilateral 
application to the EU membership)… exacerbates the already crucial situation, as it 
contravenes paragraph 5 of the Security Council Resolution 649 (1990), and imposes a 
dilemma on the EU... The application of the GCA should be rejected.”113 “On November 
9, 1998, France, Italy and Germany reiterated their position stating that the accession of 
Cyprus to the EU should benefit both communities and pointing out the problems 
involved in negotiations with a divided island” (Joint Statement made by Italy, France, 
Germany and the Netharlands, 1998).114 However, “given the historic importance of the 
fifth enlargement –the inclusion of the Central and Eastern European countries-, it is 
highly unlikely that any EU government would veto a divided Cyprus`s EU 
membership, despite the potentially negative consequences this could have” (Tocci, 
2002: 109).  
                                                 
113 See, also, UN SC Res. 649, 12 March 1990, Parag. 5: “5. Calls on the parties concerned to refrain from 
any action that could aggravate the situation.” 
 
114 See, also, Tocci, 2002: 137. 
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In general, the EU decisions support the Greek policy based on putting the 
Turkish side into a minority status under a single Cyprus Republic. The EU, as similar 
with the UN, accepted the GCA as the only legitimate state internationally recognized as 
representing the island under the name of the “Republic of Cyprus”.115 At that point, as 
Tocci (2005: 117) argues, during the accession negotiations with Cyprus, the EU served 
the strengthening of the political claims of the Greek Cypriot leadership and reinforced 
the unjust hierarchy between the parties by only mentioning the Turkish Cypriot 
participation to the accession negotiations without veto rights under the Greek Cypriot 
negotiation team and extending this invitation through the GCA. However, being aware 
of that point, the Turkish Cypriots rejected this proposal.  
Moreover, since 1963, all the official meetings were held between the GCA and 
the EU while the Turkish Cypriots could only express their views occasionally in 
unofficial meetings. The Association Agreement (1972) and the Customs Union 
Agreement (1987) were signed between the GCA on one hand and the EU on the other. 
So, the Turkish Cypriots were behaved as a community while the Greek Cypriots were 
perceived as a state (Atun, 2002: 44).  
 Also, there has been a general tendency in the EU towards putting greater 
emphasis on the role Turkey has to play for the settlement of the dispute by overlooking 
the role of Greece in the emergence and evolution of the dispute. Within that framework, 
the EU both directly in its own decisions and indirectly by making references to the 
relevant UN decisions has put the blame on the Turkish side for the failure of the 
                                                 
115 See, UN SC Res. 541, 18 November 1983 and 550 (11 May 1984) and EP Res. on Cyprus`s 
membership application to the EU and the state of negotiations, COM(2000) 702-C5-0602/2000-
1997/2171(COS). 
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settlement efforts116 and has called the presence of the Turkish troops on the island as an 
occupation of the northern part of the island by defining this as a violation of 
international law.117 Following the accession of the GCA to the EU, Turkey has begun to 
be viewed as an illegal occupier of the EU territory as well.  
 In this regard, the Union has legitimized the claims of the Greek Cypriots about 
the so-called “negative” Turkish attitude in the dispute. The following statements of 
Evriviades (2005: 4) reflect the Greek views which are parallel with the EU opinions118:  
It is common knowledge that attempts for a solution failed because of 
Ankara`s negativism and the obduracy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, 
since its objective had always been to legitimize the results of the invasion 
(1974). Turkey`s anachronistic dreams to place Cyprus under its strategic 
control, even perhaps its complete military control, and its disregard of the 
wishes and well-being of the Greek Cypriot community repeatedly frustrated 
efforts for any solution.  
 
Evriviades (2005: 5) also stated that “the colonization of the occupied part of 
Cyprus by Turkey” is in clear violation with the UN GA resolutions, the decisions of the 
Council of Europe and international law.  
                                                 
116 See, EP Res., 21 January 1993, Resolution on the Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus 
Progress towards accession, COM(98)0710-C4-0108/99, European Council Presidency Conclusions, 
Brussels 20-21 March 2003, Thessaloniki 19-20 June 2003 and Brussels 12-13 December 2003. 
 
117 See, EP Res., 13 September 1985, 10 July 1986, 9 July 1987, 10 March 1988, 15 December 1988, 12 
July 1990, 14 March 1991, 21 January 1993, 19 September 1996, 24 October 1996, 1998 Regular Report 
on Cyprus`s Progress towards Accession and EP Res. on the Regular Report from the Commission on 
Cyprus Progress towards accession, COM(98)0710-C4-0108/99. 
 
118 See, also, the recent statements of the Foreign Minister of the GCA Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis in Al-
Ahram Weekly Online, 20-26 December 2007. 
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Also, the economic isolation of the Northern Cyprus from the international 
community and the cultural and social division between the two communities have 
widened due to the partial involvement of the EU in the Cyprus dispute. The economic 
differences between the two communities have become apparent as a result of the 1973 
Association Agreement signed between the European Community and Cyprus. The 
Agreement declares that “The rules governing trade between the contracting parties may 
not give rise to any discrimination between the member states or between nationals or 
companies of these states or nationals and companies of Cyprus” (Association 
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Cyprus, 
1972: Art.5).119  However, as Müftüler-Bac and Güney (2005: 289) state, “in the Cyprus 
case, this was difficult to implement due to the non-recognition of Turkish Cypriots` 
political equality. As would be expected, problems arose in its implementation, because 
there were no two sovereign, independent and diplomatically recognized states on the 
island…” So, especially following the EU membership of the GCA, the negative 
consequences of the Association Agreement on the economic and political situation in 
the island have increased.  
“By accommodating only the Greek Cypriot aspirations for Europe, and 
altogether ignoring those of the Turks, Brussels has already sharpened this division” 
(Ahmad, 2002: 52). That is, the EU has not responded positively to the recognition 
demands of the Turkish Cypriots and has been too late in providing economic assistance 
to the Turkish Cypriot Community despite the Turkish Cypriots’ approval of the Annan 
Plan and apparent flexibility in their confederal approach. Instead of removing the trade 
                                                 
119 See, also, Brewin, 2000: 22-23. 
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embargo on the TRNC, the EU has recently preferred providing only a small amount of 
financial aid in return for a compromise which is compatible with the EU settlement 
proposals. Late economic relations between the EU and Turkish Cypriot community 
have delayed their release from economic isolation and backwardness. This has led to 
the widening of the economic gap between the two communities in favour of the Greek 
Cypriots120 and increasing the dependence of the Turkish Cypriots on Turkey. Also, the 
dependence of the Turkish Cypriots on Turkish unstable economy emerges as an 
obstacle in the release of the TRNC from its economic problems. In addition, because of 
the accession of only the Greek Cypriots to the EU, freedom of political, economic, 
social and cultural rights which are counted among the goals of the EU can hardly be 
exercised over the entirety of the island`s territory.  
 Also, the EU drew a pro-Greek picture in order to prevent a potential Greek veto 
against the EU accession process of Central and Eastern European Countries. For 
instance, “in 1994, the Court of Justice overruled Article 5 of the Cyprus Association 
Agreement that basically aimed the protection of the Turkish Cypriot economy, but had 
never been implemented due to the political problems” (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 
285). Again, in that context, the ban which was put by the EU on the Turkish Cypriots` 
exports in 1994 was a result of the Greek claims that these exports were drawn from the 
“invaded” properties of the Greek Cypriots (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 285). This 
partial decision played a role in affecting almost 60% of the sum of the Northern 
                                                 
120 The Southern Cyprus economy has been growing much faster than expected over the past two years. 
The main economic indicators of the South Cyprus are better than several EU countries while the Northern 
Cyprus economy remains the same. For detailed economic data, see, 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l25093.htm  
See, also, EU Business, 21 December 2007. 
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Cyprus`s exports and legitimizing the property claims of the Greeks on the island which 
is still an obstacle in front of the settlement.  
 In addition, despite the rejections of the Turkish side121, the EU separated the 
Financial Aid Regulation from the Direct Trade Regulation for the Turkish Cypriots as a 
result of the Greek Cypriots` demands. The Greek side opposes the Direct Trade 
Regulation due to the fact that it will lead to the abolishment of the embargo over the 
Turkish Cypriot community.122 The GCA proposes instead that all trade between the 
north and the rest of the EU goes through Greek Cypriot ports in the Greek Cypriot 
controlled areas under the EU supervision. This proposal has not been accepted by the 
Turkish Cypriots and the Direct Trade Regulation has never been approved by the EU. 
 It is a fact that the EU membership of Greece has played a significant role in 
making the EU closer to the Greek position. As Tocci (2005: 115-116) argues:  
The decision to include Cyprus in the next wave of enlargement was taken at 
the June 1994 Corfu Summit under the Greek Presidency. The March 1995 
decision allowing for the initiation of accession negotiations with the ‘RoC’ 
was linked (although not explicitly) to Greece`s removal of its veto on the 
Turkey-EU customs union… The decision to explicitly remove 
conditionality on the ‘RoC’ was linked to Greece`s acceptance of Turkey as 
an EU candidate. 
  
                                                 
121 For the rejections of the Turkish Cypriot side, see, the statements of the Turkish Cypriot Prime 
Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer in Turkish Mass Media Bulletin, 28 March 2006. 
 
122 See, also, the declarations of the Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer in Turkish Daily 
News, 13 March 2007. 
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In addition, although some of the EU countries like Germany, Netherlands, 
France and Italy pointed to some potential problems that might emerge as a result of the 
EU membership of the Greek Cypriots before a settlement was reached despite the 
Greek pressure (Press Release on the EU Membership of Greek Cypriot Administration 
of Southern Cyprus, 1998),123 Greece having a veto power has influenced most of the 
member states towards the accession of Cyprus to the Union. That is, Greece has had a 
significant role in the formation of the EU policies related to Cyprus.  
 The mentioned partial attitudes of the Union have prevented the potential 
positive impacts of the enlargement process on the parties` demands for the settlement of 
the dispute and have undermined the Union`s potential role as an objective party in the 
dispute. As a result of the EU approach in favour of the Greek Cypriots, the Greek 
Cypriots do not need to establish a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation with the 
Turkish Cypriots and the Union suffers from credibility crisis in the eyes of the Turkish 
Cypriots. This is one of the most significant reasons for the continuation of the 
insolvability in Cyprus for 44 years (Evran: 20). 
  
 
4.2.2.3 Basic Misperceptions of the EU 
  
 Some basic assumptions of the EU have caused its failure in transforming the 
expectations of the parties to the EU to policies that will bring a permanent solution. At 
that point, first, the EU has a wrong assumption that “not only the Turkish Cypriots but 
                                                 
123 See, also, Joint Statement made by Italy, France, Germany and the Netharlands, 9 November 1998. 
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also the Greek Cypriots will soften their negotiating positions” (Oğuzlu, 2002: 10). 
However, the most important reason of the Greek Cypriots` application to the EU was to 
legitimize their political claims over the island and to realize their interests under the EU 
umbrella. In that context, the EU membership makes Greeks secure in both economic 
and political terms. So, the Greeks do not feel themselves forced to give concessions to 
or even negotiate with the Turkish Cypriots and do not accept sharing their 
internationally recognized territories with the Turkish Cypriots. The inter-communal 
talks in the second half of 1997, the negotiations between December 1999 and 
November 2000 and the Greek position in the referendum regarding the Annan Plan 
have put forward the hardening of the Greek Cypriots` negotiation positions (UN SG 
Report, 2003: S/2003/398, Parags. 138 and 139).  
 Also, the EU’s wrong conviction that Turkey would give support to all EU 
efforts in the Cyprus dispute in order to guarantee its EU membership road becomes 
significant (Oğuzlu, 2002: 11). However, Turkey`s freezing relations with the EU in 
order to protest the Union`s decision against Turkey in the December 1997 Luxembourg 
Summit and definitely rejecting to pull its forces in the northern Cyprus back and to 
open its ports to the Greek Cypriots are the facts that undermine this assumption of the 
EU. The Turkish governments believe that their troops stay in the island because of 
international treaties. Also, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots accelerated their intention 
to integrate with each other as a response to the EU`s 1997 Luxembourg Summit 
decisions and replaced the federal solution by a confederal approach. That is, as the EU 
integrated more with the Greek Cypriots and excluded the Turkish side from the EU 
integration process, the Turkish side has felt obliged to integrate in itself.  
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4.2.2.4 Efficiency of the Policy Methods of the EU 
 
 The EU has not resorted to effective policy methods in contributing to the 
settlement of the Cyprus dispute. The EU has seen the prospect of EU integration 
process as a conflict resolution project. Eralp and Beriker (2005: 176) define the 
structural prevention and conflict transformation as the main tools of the conflict 
resolution. They define the aim of the structural prevention as “to change the incentive 
structure of the disputing parties, with an expectation that this will lead the parties to 
change their conflict behaviour”. They define conflict transformation as “the effort to 
reach accommodation between parties in conflict through interactive processes that lead 
to reconciling tensions, redefining interests or finding a common ground” (Eralp and 
Beriker, 2005: 177).   
 As Eralp and Beriker (2005: 188) argue, the EU`s policy methods have mostly 
remained at the stage of conflict prevention mechanism which consists of holding and 
withdrawing rewards like membership prospects or financial assistance and of resorting 
to threats and punishments like embargoes in order to change the attitudes of the 
conflicting parties. However, the EU has overlooked the conflict transformation 
mechanism which is composed of applying methods of compromise between the sides 
through mediation/facilitation and indeed, its mediation potential has been very limited 
(Eralp and Beriker, 2005: 177). Even in the conflict prevention mechanism, the Union 
did not make credible policies especially about Turkey’s EU membership. However, 
complexity and multi-polarity of the Cyprus dispute require more comprehensive 
approach to the issue.  
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 On the other hand, the Cyprus dispute has several dimensions like the EU`s 
enlargement policies, Turkish-Greek relations, Turkey`s EU membership negotiations, 
the ethnic, social and economic differences between the two communities, the EU 
accession process of the GCA, the US-EU rivalries in global conflicts. So, it can be 
thought that the failure of the EU in contributing to a permanent settlement might partly 
be due to the complexity and multi-polarity of the dispute.  
 
 
4.2.3 The Preferences of Turkey in the Cyprus Dispute   
 
A solution in Cyprus has to be compatible with the interests of Turkey as one of 
the guarantors of the island and a historical party of the Cyprus dispute. So, the success 
of the UN and the EU in the Cyprus dispute depends on to what extent these two 
organizations` settlement efforts meet the expectations and interests of Turkey as well. 
 
 
4.2.3.1. Turkey`s General Policy in the Cyprus Dispute  
 
 “Turkey has traditionally held the view that Turkish-Greek conflict of interests 
should be solved through bilateral negotiations rather than through resort to international 
mediation and arbitration” (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 289). Turkey and the 
Northern Cyprus have followed a “wait and see” policy since the declaration of the 
TRNC in 1983, that is only if a counter act occurred, the Turkish side has felt itself to 
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respond to these acts and has not made comprehensive policies for a long-term period. 
However, the situation today shows the inefficiency of the “wait and see” policy. In 
addition, the Turkish side has always come up with the argument defending the illegality 
of the Greek Cypriot membership to the EU, but without any success to convince any 
EU member state. 
However, since the election of Tayyip Erdoğan`s Justice and Development Party 
(JDP) at the November 2002 general elections, Turkey has been implementing a less 
conservative policy in Cyprus. The JDP has been the first political party, albeit the 
military opposition, that has recognized the link between the EU membership of Turkey 
and the settlement of the Cyprus dispute (Manisalı, 2003: 118). In this regard, “an 
interesting impact of the EU`s accession process is that when Turkey`s accession 
process became credible, the Turkish government began to take the European Court of 
Human Rights decisions on Cyprus seriously” (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 290; 
Tocci, 2002), such as the Loizidou case. This shows the new expansion in Turkey`s 
Cyprus policy as a result of the increasing EU involvement. 
However, as a historical stand, Turkey`s unamendable and basic policies in 
Cyprus consist of guaranteeing security and well-being of the Turkish Cypriots and 
preserving the strategic balance between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. So, the 
Turkish side which has supported a settlement based on the establishment of a 
confederation since August 1998, demands the recognition of “two sovereign units”. 
Indeed, the Turkish Grand National Assembly declared that “…Unless this reality (the 
existence of two separate states in Cyprus) is acknowledged and equal treatment is 
accorded to the two states, a settlement cannot be achieved” (Resolution of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly, 1999).  
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However, the Turkish side has recently tended to replace the confederation 
approach by a federal solution to some extent, but not in the meaning of a federal state 
within the terms of the declaration of the TRNC and Turkey’s official policies since 
1974. That is, the recognition of the TRNC and the guarantee of the equal rights of the 
two communities remain the main conditions of the Turkish side for the change of the 
status quo. On September 20, 2007, the Turkish President Abdullah Gül told reporters in 
a press conference that “the basic parameter of the Cyprus issue is political equality and 
balance. Today, it will be a false hope to think that the Turkish Cypriots will relinquish 
their own rule, equal status and equal partnership and accept living as a minority” 
(Today’s Zaman, 20 September 2007).124  
When the minority status of the Turkish side in the island is remembered, the 
Turkish side`s proposal based on two sovereign and equal units beyond the creation of 
bi-zonal and bi-communal formation seems very reasonable and natural. Also, Turkey 
calls upon all relevant parties –the Greek Cypriot government and the international 
community- to simultaneously lift all restrictions related to border crossings on the 
island and economic embargo (Letter from Turkey to the UN SG, 2005: A/59/820-
S/2005/355). On the other hand, the most important point is to what extent these 
settlement proposals of Turkey will be adopted and accepted by the Greek leadership 
and also by the international community.   
 
                                                 
124
 “The solution of the Cyprus dispute depended on the acceptance of the realities that existed on the 
island, as well as the recognition of two separate peoples, democracies and states”, Gül said. See, 
Ntvmsnbc, 4 January 2008. 
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 4.2.3.2 The Turkish Outlook against the UN and EU Settlement 
 Efforts 
 
The overall approaches of the UN and EU to the Cyprus dispute seem to be 
parallel with each other. In this regard, there have been some crucial differences between 
the opinions of these two international organizations and the Turkish side related to the 
structure of the new state in Cyprus. Today, in international politics, the settlement of 
the Cyprus dispute means the change of the divided status of the island. The Greeks, the 
UN and EU have stated that a change has to be made in the direction of bi-zonal and bi-
communal federation while preserving the general structure of the Republic of Cyprus 
established by the 1960 Treaties (Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 20-26 December 2007).  
The recognition demands of the Turkish side are excluded by the international 
community and the Greek side, because, the recognition of the TRNC will lead to the 
participation of the Turkish side to the administration on an equal footing and the 
recognition of the rights of the Turkish side in the problematic issues. However, the 
Greek side sees the Turks as minority, so it does not stand close to a settlement which 
would give equal status and rights to the two sides. Indeed, President Tassos 
Papadopoulos said that the various problems, which are constantly arising, will only be 
resolved once the Cyprus issue is settled and the country, divided since the 1974 Turkish 
“invasion”, is reunited (Financial Mirror, 17 December 2007). The Greek Cypriots 
proposed a free-standing federal government with representation based primarily on 
population ratios, however, the Turkish Cypriots emphasized the need to prevent 
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domination and to maintain their separate status and identity (UN SG Report, 2003: 
S/2003/398, Parag. 19). 
 In a federation model as proposed by the UN and EU, the units compromising 
the federal state transfer their international jurisdictions to the federal organ by losing 
their international personalities. Also, the units under the federal state share their 
sovereignties with the federal state such as signing treaties while the units fully preserve 
their sovereignties in a confederation. Although the units can have their own 
constitutions apart from the federal constitution, in case of a disagreement between 
them, the constitution of the federal state is taken as superior to the other ones. In that 
context, under the federation proposal of the UN and EU, the Turkish side does not want 
to transfer its sovereignty to a federal state which will be called as the “Republic of 
Cyprus” and where the GCA forms the majority.   
 In addition, Turkey and the TRNC have been facing with a threat of being 
excluded from the EU integration process while remaining under a political and legal 
pressure regarding the Cyprus dispute from the international community. Although the 
settlement of the Cyprus dispute is not part of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria for the 
enlargement of the EU, a direct relation has been established between the EU 
membership process of Turkey and the Cyprus dispute due to the membership of Greece 
and inevitably Cyprus since both states have a right to “veto” any resolution or decision 
related to Turkey in the EU. At that point, the reunification of the island has been put 
forward as a catalyst for Turkey`s accession to the Union. So, the EU holds the 
advantage in its hands for not admitting Turkey to the EU membership by claiming that 
Turkey has not worked enough to convince the Turkish Cypriots to reach an agreement, 
which was in somewhat terms true till the referenda, due to the Cyprus policies of the 
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former Turkish governments. Therefore, the evolution of the Cyprus dispute plays a 
significant role in Turkey`s journey towards the EU. So, the Turkish side has to deal not 
only with the UN in a global dimension and also with the EU in a regional dimension 
about the Cyprus dispute. 
Also, as the EU has done, the UN has also put the Turkish Cypriots in a different 
position through its non-recognition policies, as seen especially in the UN SC 
Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984).125 The UN SC has taken nearly all of its 
decisions unanimously and in the UN GA, the decisions related to Cyprus have been 
adopted with a huge majority. For instance, the 3212 GA decision (UN GA Res. 3212 
(XXIX), 1 November 1974) has been adopted with a 117 positive and 0 negative votes 
and the 3395 GA decision (UN GA Res. 3395 (XXX), 20 November 1975) has been 
adopted with 117 positive votes and 1 negative vote of Turkey (Doğan, 2002: 100).126 
That is, Turkey has not found adequate economic and political power to decrease the 
pressure of the UN and EU on the Turkish side, to change the manner of the European 
countries and the UN institutions related to the dispute and to emerge as an alternative 
economic source for the TRNC against the international community.  
On the other hand, in the academic and political arena, it is said that there are 
some differences between the roles of these two organizations in the Cyprus dispute. 
Some argue that “while the Turkish and Greek Cypriots have been treated as politically 
                                                 
125 In these two Resolutions, the SC defined the declaration of the state of the TRNC as “legally invalid” 
and called for its withdrawal. Also, the Council called upon all states not to recognize any other Cypriot 
state other than the Republic of Cyprus. 
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 These Resolutions are related to the 20 July 1974 Turkish military intervention to Cyprus. The General 
Assembly calls upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-
alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it and 
urges the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from 
the Republic of Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs. 
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equal communities during the UN-designed inter-communal talks, the EU`s accession 
process has changed this status by according the Greek Cypriots legitimacy to speak on 
behalf of the two communities” (Oğuzlu, 2002: 12). The EU has not referred to the term 
“political equality” of the two communities in its decisions and instead, the Union 
preferred only declaring that the Cyprus dispute should be solved within the framework 
of the UN settlement efforts.  
Also, “the UNSG and Security Council have underlined that the SCGA (Southern 
Cyprus Greek Administration) cannot become a member of the EU on its own terms, 
and that this is an issue to be negotiated by the parties within the framework of the 
efforts for a settlement” (Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee, 2001: 15).127 
However, the EU took decisions to admit the GCA for the EU membership before a 
settlement by overlooking the decisions of the UN institution and the UN Secretary 
Generals’ statements. In that sense, there is also a possibility that following the EU 
membership of the GCA, the international community, specifically the EU countries, 
begin to question the status of the UNFICYP whether or not it has any jurisdiction to 
protect the borders of an EU member state.128  
In addition, to some extent, the Annan Plan of the then UN SG can be perceived 
as a significant improvement of all the international settlement efforts in the sense that 
the Plan proposes that the Constitution of the United Cyprus Republic would be based 
on political equality and equal status of the “two constituent states” in the island. On the 
other hand, while the EP, only in one of its Resolutions, declared its support for the Plan 
(EP Res., April 2004), the EU has referred to the terms of neither the “two constituent 
                                                 
127 See, also, Set of Ideas on an Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus, 1992: Parag. 92. 
 
128 See, also, Oğuzlu, 2002: 13. 
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states” by implying the Northern Cypriot and the Southern Cypriot administration, nor 
the “United Cyprus Republic” preferring instead to call the proposed Cypriot state as the 
“Republic of Cyprus” which is controlled by the GCA.    
 On the contrary to the expectations from the EU involvement in the dispute, the 
parties of the dispute have become more distant from each other. Indeed, in an interview, 
Andrew Duff, member of the liberal group in the EP, indicated that:  
The accession of the Cyprus to the EU was a great mistake. On the contrary, 
the EU membership of Cyprus made the solution more difficult. 
Papadopulos should be forced to contribute to the integrity of the island. He 
should also show the generosity and effort that Talat has shown for the 
solution of the dispute. The Greek Cypriots are not eager about reaching a 
solution (Forum Gazetesi, 25 July 2006).129  
 
Also, Graham Watson, the chair of the liberal group in the EP, declared that the 
Greek Cypriots do not represent the whole island (Forum Gazetesi, 25 July 2006) and 
members of the EP told that linking the Cyprus issue and Turkey’s accession was not the 
answer, as it could slow down efforts for a solution (Financial Mirror, 8 February 2008). 
In addition, while being represented under the GCA at the EU level and isolated from 
the interntional community in economic and political terms, the TRNC established 
liaison offices in 15 European countries, including the EU countries.130 These realities 
                                                 
129 For recent statements of Andrew Duff, see also, Arca Haber Ajansı, 29 July 2007. 
 
130 The TRNC is permitted to keep non-diplomatic representative offices in some cities such as Brussels, 
London, Washington, New York, Islamabad and Abu Dhabi.  
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and statements have been some of the confessions that undermine the EU`s own 
policies. 
Being aware of these facts, the Turkish side has determined its stand against the 
two organizations. As a result of the February 2005 elections, the center-left party of 
Mehmet Ali Talat, the Republican Party (Cumhuriyet Türk Partisi-CTP) established the 
new government which supports the EU integration process of the TRNC. However, 
especially the new opening of the UN in the Annan Plan has played a significant role in 
the increasing support of the Turkish side for the UN. “Noting that the TRNC wants to 
start negotiations in line with the UN parameters and UN good-faith initiatives, the 
TRNC Prime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer said their principle is a bi-zonal and bi-
communal solution which will be based on political equity under Turkey's guarantee” 
(Turkish Press, 10 October 2007).  
Also, Abdullah Gül, the present President of Turkey, told reporters in a press 
conference that the Cyprus issue should be solved through mediation by the UN and the 
Greek side has refused to resort to this solution, undermining existing processes 
(Today’s Zaman, 20 September 2007).131 Also, Gül (Financial Mirror, 11 January 2008) 
and Erdoğan, the present Turkish Prime Minister, (Turkish Press, 9 February 2008) 
encouraged the UN SC and UN SG to take action on Cyprus problem. In an interview, 
Germany's ambassador to Turkey Eckart Cuntz said that like Turkey, Germany -the then 
term president of the EU- believes that the UN, not the EU, is the correct address for 
reaching a solution to the decades-old Cyprus issue. He said, advising: "We should not 
relate the Cyprus issue to [Turkey's] negotiation process. Otherwise we will block 
negotiations." However, this is not the case when we look at the EU policies in practice.  
                                                 
131 See, also, Ntvmsnbc, 4 January 2008. 
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 “The survey of 1,000 Greek Cypriots, 1,000 Turkish Cypriots and 300 people 
living within the UN Buffer Zone (100 Turkish Cypriots and 250 Greek Cypriots), 
conducted in February 2007 found that both communities consider the UN has an 
important role to play and welcomed its continuing presence across the island. But a 
majority of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots believed that the UN was biased in 
favour of the other community” (UN News Center, 29 April 2007). In a recent poll 
commissioned by the University of Nicosia, the Greek Cypriots were asked to choose 
from a list the best way to undertake initiatives on Cyprus. “More than 81 percent said 
the EU should become more actively involved; 75.92 per cent thought more pressure 
should be brought to bear on Turkey; 71.25 per cent said Turkey should be 
democratised...” (Cyprus Mail, 20 September 2007). In this way, on contrary to the 
Turkish side, the Greek Cypriots have shown their support for the EU involvement in the 
dispute and their belief that the settlement efforts have failed due to Turkey`s 
unwillingness for a compromise and so-called “undemocratic system”.  
Thus, the Turkish side has been dealing with not only Greece and the GCA, but 
also with the international community in the Cyprus dispute. Although the Annan Plan 
has tried to take a new step close to the Turkish view, it can mainly be said that there are 
still many differences between the “Cypriot state” which the Northern Cyprus and 
Turkey want to establish and the new Cypriot state that has been proposed by the UN 
and the EU. Both the UN and the EU propose the establishment of a Cypriot state 
similar to the Cypriot state structure created in 1960 by ignoring the present de facto 
situation in the island. As Turkish side claims, this attitude contradicts with the 
impartiality and good will concept of the international organizations.  
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In other words, the TRNC has not been recognized and Turkey has not found 
adequate political power in order to change the attitudes of the international 
organizations in the Cyprus dispute. However, the problematic issues of how the 
legislative, executive and judicial powers will be arranged, how many troops the sides 
will be able to keep in the island, on which issues the sides will sign treaties or cooperate 
with third countries, how the common state will be represented abroad will be answered 
depending on the recognition of the TRNC as a state (Doğan, 2002: 98).  
  
 
4.3 Impetus Role of the EU in the Cyprus Dispute: A Prospect for 
Settlement or a Catalyst for Crisis? 
 
Since the European Commission`s 1993 favorable opinion on Cyprus, the EU has 
consistently emphasized that the prospect of accession to the EU would be a catalyst for 
the settlement of the dispute in the island (European Commission Opinion on the 
Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership, 1993: doc/93/5).132 At that 
point, the views of the EU and the Greek Cypriots have been parallel to each other. 
Indeed, Euripides L. Evriviades, ambassador of Cyprus to the United States, stated that 
“…Membership means economic improvement and enhanced world stature… EU 
membership ensures democratic institutions and the rule of law and, hence security and 
stability not only for Cyprus but in the broader region of the eastern Mediterranean” 
(Evriviades, 2005: 2). Also, the Enlargement Commissioner Gunter Verheugen states 
                                                 
132 See, also, Tocci, 2002: 104. 
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that the EU accession presents the “best tool” to ensure the peaceful coexistence of the 
two communities (Cyprus Weekly, 2 July 2001). In almost every EU decisions and 
statements this opinion was declared.  
Some claim that the EU plays a significant role in achieving a permanent solution 
in the island by transforming the mentalities or behaviours of the parties (Joseph, 1997: 
85; Diez, 2002: 1; Savvides: 2). Within this framework, as Tocci (2002: 106) argues, the 
EU offered “appetizing carrots” to the parties of the dispute in the form of future 
integration with the Union some of which are conditional upon progress in the 
settlement of the dispute. At that point, Savvides argues about the Turkish Cypriots that 
due to these promises “for the first time one observes a strong wave of resistance against 
traditional Turkish policies with Turkish-Cypriot non-governmental organizations and 
political parties demanding a change of policy and accession into the EU” (Savvides: 2). 
Therefore, the questions of why the EU is thought to have such an impetus role for peace 
and to what extent the EU has achieved this role by meeting the parties` expectations 
from the Union should be answered.  
 
 
4.3.1 The Turkish Perspective 
 
The Turkish Cypriots view the EU as a source of release from their economic and 
political isolation from the international community, especially as an award in expense 
for their “yes” votes to the Annan Plan. The EU membership would mean economic aid 
packages and transfer of structural funds from the Union to this region. So, the EU being 
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aware of the dependency of the TRNC on international economic sources has offered 
some promises which are in fact economic and political conditional carrots in order to 
convince the TRNC for a compromise in the island. That is, the Union has tried to play 
the economic aid card against the Turkish Cypriots in order to gain their support for the 
settlement efforts and the EU membership of the GCA in the name of the whole island.  
On the other hand, economic considerations alone cannot persuade the Turkish 
Cypriots to show more flexibility in the Cyprus issue, but also the preservance of their 
security, status questions and balanced attitude of the EU towards the two communities 
matter for the Turkish Cypriots (Eichinger, 1997: 199).133 In this regard, because of the 
non-recognition of the TRNC by the EU, the carrot of the EU membership of the TRNC 
was also made conditional upon the settlement of the dispute by the Union (Tocci, 2002: 
106). However, the EU embargo on the Northern Cyprus since 1994 served the 
hardening of the positions of the Turkish Cypriots.  
In addition, as Ahmad (2002: 51) states, “with the EU enlargement bid for 
Cyprus, there has indeed emerged a possibility of bridging the diverging perceptions of 
the two ethnically and religiously different communities by involving them equally in 
the EU accession and integration process”. So, if the Turkish Cypriots were made a part 
of the EU accession process with an equal footing with the Greek Cypriots, they might 
have developed an equal stake in entering the EU fold and would have probably been 
more compromising (Ahmad, 2002: 51; Tocci, 2002: 131). In fact, the EU`s expected 
catalytic effect has been based on the interests of the Turkish Cypriots in accession to 
the Union. Without these interests, the conditionality of the EU cannot work.  
                                                 
133 See, also, Oğuzlu, 2002: 10. 
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 As for Turkey, integration with Europe has been a historical objective for Turkey 
and it has been put to the first ranks of the Turkish foreign policy especially since 
Turkey`s EU membership application in 1987. In Turkey, the Cyprus issue has settled to 
the core of the discussions about the advantages and disadvantages of the EU 
membership. As Tocci (2002: 106-107) argues, “the EU believed that Turkey`s own 
inclusion in the EU accession process, and the threat of Cyprus`s EU membership 
without a settlement, would encourage Turkey to pursue a compromise more 
actively.”134 At that point, the EU put a great emphasis on the change of Turkey`s 
position for a settlement in Cyprus. The Union`s December 1999 Helsinki Summit 
decision that gave Turkey a candidate country status has to be thought in that context.  
 In fact, the settlement of the Cyprus dispute was not an explicit condition for 
Turkey`s EU membership. However, it has been declared by the EU officials and in 
most of the EU documents –e.g. the December 1999 Helsinki Conclusions- that 
Turkey`s contribution to the settlement of the Cyprus dispute and its support for the UN 
settlement efforts would facilitate its path to the Union. Melakopides argues that 
“Ankara’s application for the EC accession was rejected in December 1989 in part 
because of its Cyprus guilt” (Melakopides, 2006: 79). Therefore, as Tocci also states, 
“the EU is likely to continue to impose some form of conditionality on Turkey regarding 
Cyprus unless a settlement is found” (Tocci, 2002: 108).  
 So, also being aware of the negative consequences the entry of the divided island 
to the EU, the EU expected Turkey to play a greater role in the search for a settlement 
before Cyprus` accession to the Union. According to the EU, especially the European 
                                                 
134 See, also, Gazioğlu, 2002: 87. 
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Commission, although the Turkish side now objects to the EU membership of Cyprus, it 
will one day recognize its potential interests in the EU integration process and adopt the 
proposed settlement efforts (European Commission Opinion on the Application by the 
Republic of Cyprus for Membership, 1993: doc/93/5).135 However, the uncertainty and 
lack of credibility of the EU promises about Turkey`s potential membership and the 
TRNC cause a great deal of unwillingness of Turkish side to take positive steps in the 
Cyprus dispute. 
So, especially since the mid-1990s, the Turkish Cypriots preferred to harden their 
positions following the 1994 Corfu Summit decision which included the GCA in the 
next round of enlargement. Before the TRNC government’s confederation demands 
which were declared on August 31, 1998, the Turkish Cypriots were supporting the 
constitution of a two mutually recognized states that would transfer their sovereignties 
into one internationally recognized state voluntarily.  
 On the other hand, it should be mentioned that the domestic political 
environment in the TRNC has also served to the deepening of the failure of the EU. 
Since the partition of the island, the nationalist camp –especially Derviş Eroğlu`s 
National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi-UBP) and Serdar Denktash`s Democrat Party 
(Demokrat Parti-DP)- was in power in the TRNC and also Rauf Denktash who is known 
with his strong nationalistic views was the President of the TRNC from 1983 to 2005.  
However, following the increasing role of the moderate center-left parties which 
support the EU membership, the attitude of the TRNC government towards the EU has 
changed to some extent. For instance, the Turkish Cypriots have put forward their 
                                                 
135 See, also, 1998 Regular Report on Cyprus`s Progress towards Accession. 
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compromising positions by casting “yes” votes to the Annan Plan in a referendum held 
on April 24, 2004 and Turkey has declared its full support to the Plan. However, Turkey 
has also sometimes hardened its position through potential integration policies136 with 
the TRNC, however the basic reason for that was to prevent the EU membership of a 
divided island. On the other hand, this policy and political threat of Turkey failed before 
the EU and among the majority of the TRNC citizens who had acquired the EU 
nationality via the GCA citizenship. 
 
 
4.3.2 The Greek Perspective 
 
 The Greek Cypriots see the EU membership as a guarantee of their security 
against 40.000 Turkish troops settled in the Northern part of the island and as a source of 
democratic acquisition and economic development. “Sophisticated exit polls –for 
example, by Nicosia’s TV Channel MEGA- demonstrated that 75 percent of the “no 
voters” had placed insecurity as their primary objection to the (Annan) Plan, whereas the 
issues of properties and the ‘illegal’ settlers followed the first” (Melakopides, 2006: 86). 
These insecurity concerns have derived from the continuing presence of the Turkish 
troops, the permission to allow 650 Turkish troops to remain in Cyprus and the plan’s 
                                                 
136 See, Joint Declaration Between Turkey and the TRNC, 28 December 1995, Joint Declaration Between 
the TRNC and Turkey, 20 January 1997, Press Statement of Turkey and the TRNC, 4 July 1997, Joint 
Statement by Turkey and the TRNC, 20 July 1997, Agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the Establishment of an Association Council, 6 
August 1997, Declaration by the Association Council Between Turkey and the TRNC, 31 March 1998, 
Joint Declaration, 23 April 1998, Joint Statement, 14 November 1998 and Turkey-TRNC Joint 
Declaration, 20 July 1999. See also, the Turkish Republic National Assembly decision, 15 July 1999. 
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granting Turkey a right of intervention militarily in island’s affairs (Melakopides, 2006: 
86).137 As Tocci (2002: 118-119) states: 
While EU membership could allow a continuation of the Turkish role and 
presence in Cyprus’ security, the Greek Cypriots feel this role would be 
restricted and monitored by the EU following Cyprus` membership... 
According to the RoC, it is highly unlikely that guarantor Turkey, as a 
candidate EU member, would intervene militarily in EU member Cyprus 
following a breach of a future settlement. 
 
In addition, the EU membership of the GCA would lead to the liberalization of the 
four freedoms which are movement of capital and services, settlement, owning of 
property and trading and provide some advantages related to these issues against the 
Turkish side.  
In fact, following the EU membership of Greece in 1981, the desire of the Greek 
Cypriots for being a part of the Union was strengthened due to the fact that their EU 
membership would mean in some terms an enosis with Greece within the EU borders 
(Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 285). In April 2003 when Cyprus signed its Accession 
Treaty with the EU, Costas Simitis, the then Prime Minister of Greece, declared that 
“enosis had been achieved” (Turks.US Daily News, April 2003) and “this was the result 
of years of common effort, with common aim of enosis. We will continue in this way in 
the future” (Turks.US Daily News, 20 April 2003). These statements can be seen as 
some of the foundations of illegal Greek demands related to their EU integration. 
                                                 
137 See, also, The Comprehensive Settlement Plan for Cyprus” (Final Version), 31 March 2004. 
131 
 
 As for Greece, while Greece seemed as an obstacle for Turkey`s EU road during 
the 1980s and early 1990s, Greece has begun to seem as a supporter of the improvement 
of Turkey-EU relations as a result of its EU interests since 1995, but especially since 
1999 and during the December 1999 European Council at Helsinki. Under that policy, 
Greece aims to prevent Turkey from applying military options or threats in vulnerable 
issues among them by supporting Turkey`s democratization process (Savvides: 2). Also, 
according to the Greek view, the EU membership of the Greek Cypriots would force the 
Turkish army to withdraw from Cyprus and would strengthen their political position in 
dealing with key issues such as restrictions on settlement and property ownership in the 
northern Cyprus (Zervakis, 1997: 148).  
In addition, since the EU membership of Greece in 1981, the role of Greece in the 
EU-Cyprus-Turkey triangle has increased significantly. Greece has encouraged the 
relations between Cyprus and the EU. “Particularly since the 1993 Commission Opinion 
on Cyprus, member state Greece lobbied intensively for the acceleration of Cyprus-EU 
ties and the removal of conditionality on the RoC concerning conflict settlement” 
(Tocci, 2002: 115). According to the rules of the EU Treaty, accession to the EU has to 
be approved by the EP and ratified by all national parliaments. So, Greece also still 
continues to handle the trump of playing the veto card against Turkey`s EU membership 
in order to get concessions from Turkey in problematic issues like Cyprus. At that point, 
the EU`s involvement in the Cyprus dispute emerges as a significant opportunity for 
Greece as well as for the Greek Cypriots.  
Because of these advantages from the EU integration process, the Greek 
governments have not agreed to take positive steps and to make some concessions for 
the settlement of the dispute before the accession to the EU. That is, the hardening 
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positions of the Greek Cypriots have strengthened following the removal of 
conditionality on them related to the settlement efforts. Also, the negative Greek 
approach towards the Turkish side has showed an increase as a result of the catalytic role 
of the EU. The Greek Cypriot government has put a great pressure on the international 
community and the EU countries for the condemnation of the Turkish Cypriot 
government and Ankara for their “illegal” policies and statements in the Cyprus dispute 
as the driving forces of the conflict.  
In addition, as Tocci (2002: 114) argues “increased Greek Cypriot aggressiveness 
was evident in security and defense policies. Since November 1993, the Greek Cypriots 
underwent significant military upgrading through the “Common Defense Doctrine” with 
Greece”.138 The Doctrine envisages the planning of joint military strategies and 
operations between the two parties. The Greek Cypriot leadership`s policies to deploy 
Russian S-300 missiles in Cyprus were also significant in that sense.139 Probably due to 
these realities the UN SC, in several Resolutions, has made references to disarmament 
and arms race in the island.140 
 On September 12, 2000, Kofi Annan referred to the political equality of the two 
communities and each leadership could only represent its own community and no other. 
However, this statement was refused by the Greek Cypriot government and the then 
                                                 
138 See, also, Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee, 2001: 28. 
 
139 The missiles were purchased from Russia in 1998 by then Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides but had 
to be moved to Greek island of Crete for safekeeping following huge pressure from Turkey and Turkish 
Cypriots. On 19 December 2007, defense ministers of Greece and Greek Cypriot Administaration have 
signed an agreement to formally transfer to Greece the controversial Russian S300 missiles. Cyprus 
transferred the ownership of the S300 missiles in exchange for two other missile systems from Greece. 
See, China View Xinhua, 20 December 2007. 
 
140 See, UN SC Res. 1092, 23 December 1996, 1117 (27 June 1997), 1146 (23 December 1997), 1178 (29 
June 1998) and 1251 (29 June 1999). See also, UN Security Council Resolution 1000, 23 June 1995, 1032 
(19 December 1995), 1062 (28 June 1996), 1217 (22 December 1998) and 1250 (29 June 1999). 
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President Glafcos Clerides had postponed the proximity talks demanding the change of 
this statement. The rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots on the April 24, 
2004 referendum has been the most significant indicator of the Greek position in the 
settlement efforts and of the impacts of the EU involvement in the Cyprus dispute.  
In my point of view, one of the most significant reasons for the Greek rejection 
was the Greek Cypriots` demand for the continuation of the 43-year old status quo in 
Cyprus.141 That is, although the GCA has continuously emphasized its support for the 
UN and EU settlement proposals declaring that a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation 
including single sovereignty, one international personality and single citizenship should 
be established in the island (Statement addressed by the then President of GCA, 2000: 
1)142, in fact, it wants the continuation of being recognized as the sole legitimate 
government of Cyprus and the non-recognition of the constituent Turkish Cypriot state 
by the international community.143 As Oğuzlu (2002: 10-11) states:144 
Rather than writing a new constitution that would take its legitimacy from 
the consent of the two communities, the Greek Cypriots claim that it would 
be enough to make some amendments to the existing constitution. However, 
the legitimacy of the 1960 constitution was lost in the eyes of the Turkish 
Cypriots. 
                                                 
141 See, also, Efegil and Görgüner, 2002: 126. 
 
142 See, also, the recent statement of Cyprus' Foreign Minister Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis published in Al-
Ahram Weekly Online, Issue No. 876, 20-26 December 2007. 
 
143 For claims against the reasons put forward by the Greek Cypriots for their  rejection of  the Annan 
Plan, see, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/Cyprus/AnnanPlan_GreekCypriot_NoFalseReaso
nsandClaims.htm 
 
144 See, also, Efegil and Görgünler, 2002: 127; Tocci, 2002: 126. 
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So, especially through the Annan Plan, the actual Greek position has revealed. On 
the other hand, the EU has tended to perceive the Greek Cypriots as supporters of the 
search for a settlement in the island. Despite some obstacles put by the then Greek 
Cypriot leader in the proximity talk process, the Commission, in several reports and 
progress reports, has repeatedly concluded that the “Republic of Cyprus” has fulfilled its 
EU priorities such as the Copenhagen political criteria and economic requirements of the 
EU accession.145  
Thus, as Oğuzlu argues, “for the EU to contribute to peace and security in and 
around Cyprus, the first precondition is that all the interested parties share the belief that 
the EU`s involvement in the dispute is something positive for them to seize upon” 
(Oğuzlu, 2002: 9). Indeed, the EU membership has been one of the historical targets of 
the parties of the Cyprus dispute as close cultural and economic links has been 
established with Europe for decades. That is, the perceptions of the parties about the EU 
in the dispute reveal that their interests intersect at the prospect of integration with the 
Union and their attitudes towards the dispute are mostly shaped by these interests. So, in 
its efforts for solving the dispute, the EU has tried to change the parties` attitudes by 
utilizing from these weak points of the parties and attracting the sides` interests. Only 
through the desire and interests at integrating with the EU, the parties’ attitudes and 
perceptions towards the Cyprus issue have tended to show some changes to some extent. 
However, the EU cannot transform the expectations of the parties from the Union 
and their attitudes in the dispute to policies that will bring a permanent solution. 
                                                 
145 See, Agenda 2000, 15 July 1997, 1999 Regular Report on Cyprus’s Progress Towards Accession, 6 
October 1999, 2000 Regular Report on Cyprus’s Progress Towards Accession, 8 November 2000, 2001 
Regular Report on Cyprus’s Progress Towards Accession, SEC(2001) 1745, Brussels 13 November 2001 
and 2002 Regular Report on Cyprus’s Progress Towards Accession, COM(2002), Brussels 9 October 
2002. 
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Additionally, the Cyprus dispute has deteriorated following the EU involvement since 
the 1990s. The pressures of the enlargement process have failed to persuade the parties 
for a comprehensive agreement. In fact, they caused the hardening of the negotiating 
positions of all parties of the dispute except some compromising steps recently taken by 
the Turkish side such as their support for the Annan Plan. So, although the EU had an 
opportunity for contributing to the establishment of the settlement in the island through 
its catalytic role, this potential effect of the EU integration process has been inefficient. 
 
 
4.4 Proposals for the Future Role of the EU in the Cyprus Dispute  
 
In Cyprus, “a solution would be expected to address the following issues: 
Constitutional framework, territorial adjustments, return of property to pre-1974 owners 
and/or compensation payments, return of displaced persons, demilitarization of Cyprus, 
residency rights/repatriation of Turkish settlers, future peacekeeping arrangements” 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyprus_dispute). All of these problematic issues still 
remain unsolved despite the EU involvement in the dispute as a potential contributor. 
The apparent linkage between the EU membership of the sides and settlement of the 
Cyprus dispute increases the potential positive impacts of the EU decisions on shaping 
the Cyprus dispute. In that context, although a great role falls on the EU in changing the 
positions of the parties through its catalytic structure, the EU has failed as a result of its 
miscalculated conditionality policies and misunderstanding of the parties’ interests.  
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As the international community, specifically the EU, continues to perceive the 
GCA as the only legitimate state of Cyprus, the insolvability of the Cyprus dispute 
gradually deepens (Atun, 2002: 44). Also, the adoption of the GCA to the Euro by the 
EU on January 1, 2008 has made the situation in Cyprus more complicated by leading 
the deepening of the division between the two communities.146 However, the two 
communities in the island should be behaved on an equal footing within the framework 
of the legal facts. The EU should develop efficient policies for protecting the political 
rights of the Turkish Cypriots who are not allowed to be involved in the EU acquis 
communataire.  
In addition, the EU should be the non-military guarantor for the protection of the 
constitutional order and the EU principles in Cyprus and by this way the Union should 
compensate for the security concerns of the Turkish Cypriots (Tocci, 2002: 129). On the 
other hand, Turkey`s legitimate rights drawn from the 1960 Treaty should be protected 
in order to provide the safety of the Turkish Cypriots. The EU should support the 
guarantorship rights of Turkey and let the special relationship between the Turkish 
Cypriots and Turkey continue. The settlement of the Cyprus dispute will also contribute 
to the stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and will lead to a decrease in the defence 
expenditures of Turkey and Greece. 
The EU should develop policies to lift the trade restrictions on the TRNC in order 
to reestablish its credibility in the eyes of the Turkish Cypriots and the international 
community and to decrease and to eliminate the economic imbalance between the two 
communities. Also, derogations to the freedoms of property and settlement between the 
                                                 
146 This means that the northern part of the island will continue to use Turkish Lira while the southern part 
of the island will use Euro in its financial affairs by January 1, 2008. 
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two parties are significant issues for the Turkish Cypriots when the economic and 
political advantages of the Greek Cypriots are taken into account.  
On the other hand, some argue that easing of the Turkish Cypriot isolation is 
essential, but must not lead to any kind of legal recognition of the TRNC (Eichinger, 
1997: 202). Because, there are some doubts about the issue of “whether the almost total 
international isolation of the Turkish Cypriots is necessary in order to avoid legal 
recognition, and whether Northern Cyprus would not be an easier partner to deal with if 
the isolation were eased” (Eichinger, 1997: 202-203). However, on the contrary to these 
views, as seen in the referendum for the Annan Plan, the Turkish Cypriots have tended 
to soften their positions about the UN and EU settlement proposals as the EU has taken 
some decisions to release economic aid to the TRNC. 
 There are some views in the press and academic arena pointing out that the 
settlement of the Cyprus dispute in fact depends on the closeness of Turkey and Greece. 
Manisalı (2002: 78-79) argues that:  
The solution of the Aegean problem (between Turkey and Greece) would 
directly affect Cyprus. The matter of balance in Cyprus and the Aegean 
cannot be separated from each other... since the dispute in Cyprus is not only 
between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots but also between Turkey and 
Greece.  
 
However, it should not be expected from the Turkish side to make a compromise 
with the Greek side in every issue in order to create a common Cypriot state. The 
Turkish side, according to Turkey’s point of view, should preserve its potential 
acquisitions in Cyprus. At that point, the EU should offer credible and positive carrots in 
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order to encourage Ankara to take some positive steps in the Cyprus dispute. Because, 
the creation of a democratic state where the two communities can live together in 
Cyprus would be compatible with the interests of not only the two communities of the 
island, but also with Turkey and Greece.  
On the other hand, given a long history of mistrust and conflict between the two 
communities, the attempts of the UN and EU to create a single sovereignty and single 
international identity in Cyprus are convicted to fail. So, the international community 
should recognize the existence of two separate and sovereign nations in Cyprus. Only if 
the two nations hold an equal status in the island, a true federation can be formed 
(Ahmad, 2002: 53). So, as Oğuzlu (2002: 17) argues, a loosely centralized federal 
arrangement can be a good solution for the island. In order to meet at this common 
point, both sides should accept giving some concessions. The Turkish Cypriots should 
completely give up their insistence on the recognition of two independent states under a 
strict confederal roof and the Greek Cypriots should leave their interest in a unitary 
federal establishment in the island by accepting the politically equal status of the Turkish 
Cypriots. Indeed, a unitary arrangement cannot work efficiently due to the huge numbers 
of economic, social and political divergences between the two communities since 1963.  
At that point, the Presidential elections which was held on February 17, 2008 in 
the southern part of the island has a significance due to the prospects it created for the 
reunification of the island. Tassos Papadopoulos, who had led the Greek Cypriots in 
rejecting the UN reunification plan for the divided island,147 was eliminated from 
Cyprus's presidential election race against his challengers who are mostly supporters of 
                                                 
147 Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos said, on 8 February 2008, that he would oppose any effort to 
revive a U.N. plan to reunite the island if he is re-elected (Hürriyet, 10 February 2008).  
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reunification and are backed by the Turkish Cypriots.148 Communist party leader 
Demetris Christofias won in Cyprus's presidential election on February 24, 2008 and 
immediately declared to launch a new attempt to reunite the island stating that “I offer a 
hand of friendship and cooperation to the Turkish Cypriots and their leadership” 
(Hürriyet, 24 February 2008).149 
The main point in the Cyprus dispute is the creation of an environment where the 
two communities would live peacefully without being imposed to achieve their 
unification. Any settlement in the island should meet the interests of the whole 
population and should be respected by the international community. Whatever the kind 
of the settlement be in, the Turkish and Greek Cypriots as the primary owners of the 
right of the say in Cyprus` s sovereignty have to be the only actors who will decide on 
the island`s destiny (Set of Ideas on an Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus, 1992: 
Parag. 92). 150 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
148 Final results taken on February 17, 2008 showed an EP member and former Foreign Minister of the 
conservative DISY party Ioannis Kasoulides with a very slight lead, with 33.51 percent compared to 33.29 
percent for the Cyprus Communist party leader Demetris Christofias. Papadopoulos was close behind with 
31.79 percent (Financial Mirror, 18 February 2008). 
149 In the run-off vote on February 24, 2008, Christofias secured 53.36 percent of the vote against 46.64 
percent for Kasoulides.  
150 See, also, Gazioğlu, 2002: 82.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis aimed to examine the role of the EU in the settlement of the Cyprus 
dispute. More specifically, it tried to find out whether the settlement efforts of the EU 
reflect a failure and if it is a failure, what the reasons of this failure are. In the light of 
the analysis of the EU policies, decisions and perceptions in the dispute within the 
framework of the UN Resolutions, this thesis reached to five main conclusions. 
First, following the EU membership application of the GCA in July 1990 and 
especially its EU membership in May 2004, the dynamics of the Cyprus dispute have 
changed. This has deepened the division of the island by drawing a de facto EU border 
between the two communities. The economic and political isolation of the Northern 
Cyprus from the international community and the cultural and social division between 
the two communities have widened and the political claims of the Greek Cypriot 
leadership related to its status in the island have strengthened. Also, the Cyprus dispute, 
which had been held at the UN platform before, has been an internal issue of the EU 
through the exceptional and politically problematic position of the divided island. Also, 
the linkage between the EU integration prospects of the parties and settlement of the 
dispute has become more apparent. That is, the parties’ EU integration interests have 
shaped the evolution of the Cyprus dispute.  
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At that point, second, the Union has been in the belief that the EU integration 
process can act as a catalyst for reaching a solution by softening the positions of the 
parties and can bring an increased security and prosperity to the region. So, the Union 
has tried to utilize from these prospects of the parties by giving rewards or applying 
sanctions related to their EU integration processes. However, due to the EU’s 
misperceptions of the parties’ interests and incredibility of its carrots, the impetus role of 
the EU has been a catalyst for crisis in the island instead of a prospect for peace. 
Third, the EU has not completely applied to impartial policies in the Cyprus 
dispute. In this regard, the EU has adopted the GCA as a full member in the name of the 
whole island before a settlement while declaring its support for the accession of a 
reunited Cyprus and putting the settlement of the dispute as a precondition for the 
Turkish side. In this way, the Greek Cypriots have gained the opportunity to lead the 
dispute and Turkey’s EU membership process in the direction of their interests. So, the 
Greek Cypriots do not need to fulfill the settlement efforts proposed by the international 
community. However, as Turkey officially argues, according to the system established 
by the 1960 Treaties, neither the GCA have a jurisdiction or right to make an application 
to the EU on behalf of the whole island, nor it is legal for the Union to accept the GCA 
as an EU member while excluding the northern part of the island.  
Also, the EU has put more emphasis on the Turkish side in the failure of the 
settlement attempts and, at the same time, has responded negatively to the Turkish 
Cypriots’ demands for the abolishment of the economic and political isolation of the 
TRNC despite the Turkish Cypriots’ approval of the Annan Plan on the contrary to the 
Greek Cypriots’ rejection. The EU has tended to put Turkey’s support for the settlement 
of the Cyprus dispute as a precondition in front of its EU membership although this is 
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not part of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria for the enlargement of the EU. Also, the EU 
has continuously urged Turkey to recognize the Greek-Cypriot controlled “Republic of 
Cyprus” and to open its sea and air ports to the Greek Cypriot vessels. The EP has 
wanted Turkey to pull back its forces in northern Cyprus by calling the presence of the 
Turkish troops as an occupation of the northern part of the island. Due to these impartial 
attitudes, the EU has lost its credibility in the eyes of the Turkish side. 
Fourth, the overall approaches of the UN and EU seem to be parallel. In this 
regard, their proposals about the intended structure of the Cypriot state are far from 
responding the Turkish demands. While the UN and EU propose the establishment of a 
bi-zonal and bi-communal federal state with a single sovereignty and single international 
personality, the Turkish side wants the recognition of the two separate sovereignties and 
political equality of the two communities. The two organisations have also recognized 
the GCA as the only legitimate government under the name of the “Republic of Cyprus” 
while rejecting the recognition demands of the TRNC.  
On the other hand, fifth, the then UN SG’s Annan Plan reflects a differentiation 
from the EU decisions in the sense that it puts forward that the proposed Constitution of 
the intended “United Cyprus Republic” would be based on political equality and equal 
status of the “two constituent states” in the island. However, the EU has preferred not to 
refer to the recognition of the “two constituent states”. In that context, the Plan 
approaches to the Turkish demands.  
So, on the contrary to the Greek side, Turkish support for the UN as the most 
appropriate platform for the settlement of the dispute, rather than the EU, has increased. 
However, even Turkey as a significant direct party in the dispute has neither the political 
nor the economic power to decrease the pressure of the UN and EU and to change the 
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manner of the UN and European countries in the direction of its preferences. Since the 
dispute became a significant internal issue of the EU as a result of the EU membership 
of the GCA and Greece, it will even be difficult for Turkey to shift the issue from the 
EU back to the UN platform, without the support of major global powers and through 
the decisions of the UN SC since the SC is still seized with this dispute.  
On the other hand, although the recent UN initiatives, particularly the Annan 
Plan, have tried to take a new step close to the Turkish position, it can mainly be said 
that the overall approaches of the two organizations, of especially the EU, contradicts 
with the Turkish approach by ignoring the present de facto situation in the island.  
These differences create fundamental obstacles in front of a permanent solution 
in Cyprus. Moreover, there are still uncertainties about the future status and structure of 
the Cypriot state. The Turkish Cypriots are still suffering from economic isolation from 
the international community. Also, the TRNC is still not internationally recognized 
while it is represented under the GCA at the EU level, however, despite this reality, the 
TRNC established liaison offices in 15 European countries, including the EU countries. 
Also, the military presence of the parties in the island continues to be a problematic 
issue among the parties. 
In conclusion, although the EU has a potential to act as a catalyst for peace in the 
island due to the parties’ interests in the Union, its miscalculations about the dispute, 
partiality, incredibility and ineffectiveness of its policies and policy methods have led to 
the EU’s failure in the dispute. Thus, given the maintenance of the insolvability in 
Cyprus and the EU approach, the success of the EU in contributing to a permanent 
solution in the Cyprus dispute has been very limited on the contrary to the expectations 
from it. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
SELECTED ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, 1960 
APPENDIX D: PART 3 
ARTICLE 50 
1. The President and the VicePresident of the Republic, separately or conjointly, shall 
have the right of final veto on any law or decision of the House of Representatives or 
any part thereof concerning-  
(a) foreign affairs, except the participation of the Republic in international 
organisations and pacts of alliance in which the Kingdom of Greece and the 
Republic of Turkey both participate.  
For the purposes of this subparagraph "foreign affairs " includes  
  
(i) the recognition of States, the establishment of diplomatic an. consular 
relations with other countries and the interruption of such relations. The 
grant of acceptance to diplomat). representatives and of exequatur to 
consular representatives The assignment of diplomatic representatives 
and of consular representatives, already in the diplomatic service, to posts 
abroad and the entrusting of functions abroad to special envoys already in 
the diplomatic service. The appointment and the assignment of persons, 
who are not already in the diplomatic service, to an, posts abroad as 
diplomatic or consular representatives and the entrusting of functions 
abroad to persons, who are not already in the diplomatic service, as 
special envoys;  
(ii) the conclusion of international treaties, conventions and agreements;  
(iii) the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace;  
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(iv) the protection abroad of the citizens of the Republic and of their 
interests;  
(v) the establishment, the status and the interests of aliens in the 
Republic;  
(vi) the acquisition of foreign nationality by citizens of the Republic and 
their acceptance of employment by, or their entering the service of, a 
foreign Government; 
(b) the following questions of defence:  
    (i) composition and size of the armed forces and credits for them,  
(ii) (nominations des cadres-diorismoi stelexwv  kadrolara  
tayinler) and their promotions (kai n proagwgn autwv  ve bunlardaki 
terfiler):);  
(iii) importation of war materials and also explosives of all kinds;  
(iv) cession of bases and other facilities to allied countries; 
(c) the following questions of security: 
(i) (nominations des cadres diorismoi stelexwvkadrolara tayinler)) and 
their promotions (kai n proagwgn autwv  ve bunlardaki terfiler);  
(ii) distribution and stationing of forces;  
(iii) emergency measures and martial law;  
(iv) police laws. 
It is specified that the right of veto under subparagraph (c) above shall cover all 
emergency measures or decisions, but not those which concern the normal functioning 
of the police and the gendarmerie.  
2. The above right of veto may be exercised either against the whole of a law or decision 
or against any part thereof, and in the latter case such law or decision shall be returned to 
the House of Representatives for a decision whether the remaining part thereof will be 
submitted, under the relevant provisions of this Constitution, for promulgation.  
 
3. The right of veto under this Article shall be exercised within the period for the 
promulgation of laws or decisions of the House of Representatives as in Article 52 
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provided.  
  
APPENDIX D: PART 12 - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
 
ARTICLE 170 
 
1. The Republic shall, by agreement on appropriate terms' accord most-favoured-nation 
treatment to the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland for all agreements whatever their nature might be.  
 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to the Treaty concerning 
the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus between the Republic, the Kingdom of 
Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland concerning the bases and military facilities accorded to the United Kingdom.  
 
APPENDIX D: PART 13 - FINAL PROVISIONS 
 
ARTICLE 185 
 
1. The territory of the Republic is one and indivisible.  
 
2. The integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other State or the separatist 
independence is excluded.  
 
Source:  
 
http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/portal/portal.nsf/All/C44572D7363776ACC2256EBD004F3B
B3?OpenDocument 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SELECTED ARTICLES OF THE TREATY CONCERNING THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS 
 
Signed in London, 1960. 
(1) TREATY OF ESTABLISHMENT  
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of Greece and 
the Republic of Turkey of the one part and the Republic of Cyprus of the other part 
have agreed as follows; 
ARTICLE 2  
The Republic of Cyprus shall co-operate fully with the United Kingdom to ensure the 
security and effective operation of the military bases situated in the Akrotiri Sovereign 
Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, and the full enjoyment by the United 
Kingdom of the rights conferred by this Treaty.  
ARTICLE 3  
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult 
and co-operate in the common defense of Cyprus.  
(2) TREATY OF GUARANTEE  
The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part have agreed as follows.  
ARTICLE I  
The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, 
territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.  
It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union 
with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to 
promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the 
Island.  
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ARTICLE II  
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the 
Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the 
independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the 
state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.  
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as 
concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of 
Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.  
ARTICLE IV  
In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or 
measure necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.  
In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three 
guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing 
the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.  
(3) TREATY OF ALLIANCE  
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey have agreed as follows:  
ARTICLE II  
The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or 
indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of 
Cyprus.  
ARTICLE IV  
Greece and Turkey shall participate in the Tripartite Headquarters so established with 
the military contingents laid down in Additional Protocol No.I annexed to the present 
Treaty.  
Source:  
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/Cyprus/Treaty+Concerning+The
+Establishment+of+The+Republic+of+Cyprus.htm 
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APPENDIX C 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 186 (1964) 
 
 
 
 
Source: 
 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/211/44/IMG/NR021144.pdf?Op
enElement 
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APPENDIX  D 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 353 (1974) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  
 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/289/72/IMG/NR028972.pdf?Op
enElement 
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APPENDIX  E 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 649 (1990)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  
 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/574/99/IMG/NR057499.pdf?Op
enElement 
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APPENDIX F 
 
SELECTED ARTICLES OF THE PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS 
HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
10-11 DECEMBER 1999 
I. PREPARING FOR ENLARGEMENT 
The enlargement process 
4. The European Council reaffirms the inclusive nature of the accession process, which 
now comprises 13 candidate States within a single framework. The candidate States are 
participating in the accession process on an equal footing. They must share the values 
and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect the 
European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance 
with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to 
resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should 
within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The 
European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in 
particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote 
their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 
2004. Moreover, the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria 
laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of 
accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis 
for accession to the Union. 
9. (a) The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and 
expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to bring the process 
to a successful conclusion. 
(b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the 
accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the 
completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made 
without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all 
relevant factors. 
Source:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm 
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APPENDIX G 
 
SELECTED ARTICLES OF THE AGENDA 2000-FOR A 
STRONGER AND WIDER UNION, 15 JULY 1997 
 
The Challenge of Enlargement 
Enlarging the Union 
Enlargement to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Cyprus is a 
historic challenge for the Union. But it is also an opportunity - in terms of its security, its 
economy, its culture and its place in the world. The continent-wide application of the 
model of peaceful and voluntary integration among free nations is a guarantee of 
stability. The Union, with more than 100 million new citizens, will see enhanced trade 
and economic activity, and a new impetus for the development and integration of the 
European economy as a whole. Europe's cultural diversity will be a source of creativity 
and wealth. The accession of new Member States will enhance the Union's weight and 
influence internationally. 
2. PROSPECTS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT 
The Union is determined to play a positive role in bringing about a just and lasting 
settlement in accordance with the relevant United Nations Resolutions. The status quo 
which is at odds with international law, threatens the stability of the island, the region 
and has implications for the security of Europe as a whole. The Union cannot, and does 
not wish to, interfere in the institutional arrangements to be agreed between the parties. 
But it is available to advise on the compatibility of such arrangements with the acquis of 
the Union. The prospect of accession, whose political and economic advantages are now 
becoming clear to Turkish Cypriots as well as Greek Cypriots, can in itself provide such 
an incentive. 
3. RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The timetable agreed for accession negotiations to start with Cyprus means that they 
could start before a political settlement is reached. The Union shares the view expressed 
by the UN Secretary General, that the decision to open negotiations should be seen as a 
positive development which could promote the search for a political settlement. 
Negotiations on accession would be facilitated if sufficient progress is made between the 
parties in contacts this year under the auspices of the United Nations to allow 
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representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community to be involved in the accession 
process. Agreement on a political settlement would permit a faster conclusion to the 
negotiations. If progress towards a settlement is not made before the negotiations are due 
to begin, they should be opened with the government of the Republic of Cyprus, as the 
only authority recognised by international law. 
Source:  
 
http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/09F6BA003CA0F919C2256DC5002ED
13D/$file/Agenda%202000.doc?OpenElement, last accessed on 19 June 2007. 
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APPENDIX H 
 
SELECTED ARTICLES OF THE PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS 
COPENHAGEN EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
12-13 DECEMBER 2002 
 
I. Enlargement 
 
3. The European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 launched an ambitious process to 
overcome the legacy of conflict and division in Europe. Today marks an unprecedented 
and historic milestone in completing this process with the conclusion of accession 
negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The Union now looks forward to 
welcoming these States as members from 1 May 2004. This achievement testifies to the 
common determination of the peoples of Europe to come together in a Union that has 
become the driving force for peace, democracy, stability and prosperity on our continent. 
As fully fledged members of a Union based on solidarity, these States will play a full 
role in shaping the further development of the European project. 
 
Cyprus 
 
10. In accordance with paragraph 3 above, as the accession negotiations have been 
completed with Cyprus, Cyprus will be admitted as a new Member State to the European 
Union. 
 
Nevertheless, the European Council confirms its strong preference for accession to the 
European Union by a united Cyprus. In this context it welcomes the commitment of the 
Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots to continue to negotiate with the objective of 
concluding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem by 28 February 2003 on 
the basis of the UNSG’s proposals. The European Council believes that those proposals 
offer a unique opportunity to reach a settlement in the coming weeks and urges the 
leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to seize this opportunity. 
 
11. The Union recalls its willingness to accommodate the terms of a settlement in the 
Treaty of Accession in line with the principles on which the EU is founded. In case of a 
settlement, the Council, acting by unanimity on the basis of proposals by the 
Commission, shall decide upon adaptations of the terms concerning the accession of 
Cyprus to the EU with regard to the Turkish Cypriot community. 
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12. The European Council has decided that, in the absence of a settlement, the 
application of the acquis to the northern part of the island shall be suspended, until the 
Council decides unanimously otherwise, on the basis of a proposal by the Commission. 
Meanwhile, the Council invites the Commission, in consultation with the government of 
Cyprus, to consider ways of promoting economic development of the northern part of 
Cyprus and bringing it closer to the Union. 
 
Source:  
 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf 
 
